


Cmc 1402096-16-p000887

AFRICA QUARTERLY

Vol XIX

Nos 3-4



916.05
AF 83

AFRICA QUARTERLY

VOLUME XIX

NUMBERS 3-4

16

INDIAN COUNCIL FOR CULTURAL RELATIONS
NEW DELHI

916.05
MS 83

P8373

The Indian Council for Cultural Relations, formed in 1950 to strengthen cultural ties and promote understanding between India and other countries, functions under the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. As part of its effort the Council publishes, apart from books, quarterlies in English (*Indian Horizons*, *Cultural News from India*, *Africa Quarterly*), Arabic (*Thaqafat-ul-Hind*), Spanish (*Papeles de la India*), French (*Rencontre Avec l' Inde*) and Hindi (*Gaggnanchal*). For foreign students in India, it publishes the quarterly bulletin *ICCR Newsletter*.

Africa Quarterly is a journal of African studies published in January, April, July, and October. It invites contributions from writers on African affairs and Indo-African relations. Manuscripts for consideration, typewritten with double spacing, should be sent in duplicate. Footnotes should be numbered consecutively and appended to the article. Bibliographical references should give the author's last name, date and place of publication, and numbers of specific pages. As unpublished material is not returned, contributors are advised to retain with them copies of their articles. Articles should be accompanied by certificates from the authors that these are exclusively for use in *Africa Quarterly* and have not been sent elsewhere for publication.

Editorial correspondence and manuscripts, including book reviews, should be addressed to :

The Editor
Africa Quarterly
Indian Council for Cultural Relations
Azad Bhavan
Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002

Articles published in *Africa Quarterly* are copyright and may not be reproduced in full or in part without permission. The opinions expressed in the journal are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the policy of the Council.

Editor : Anup Ranjan Basu

Rates of Subscription

India : Rs. 20.00 a year
Rs. 6.00 single copy
Foreign : \$ 7.0 or £ 3.00 by sea mail
\$ 14.5 or £ 5.10 by air mail

Printed and published by Secretary
Indian Council for Cultural Relations
Azad Bhavan, Indraprastha Estate
New Delhi-110002

Printed at Kumar Printers Pvt. Ltd.
18/12, Doriwalan, New Rohtak Road
New Delhi-110005

AFRICA QUARTERLY

- 301 Africa at the United Nations
303 Namibia : The Indian Viewpoint
Shanti Sadigali
309 The Situation in Namibia
Peter Mueshinange
318 The United Nations and Namibia
B. Akporode Clark
326 Developments in Western Sahara
Hari Sharan Chhabra
341 The Struggle in Western Sahara
M. Bedjaoui
350 UN Responsibility in Western Sahara
Tingiri Mansour Omar
362 Moroccan Stand on Western Sahara
A. Filali

Notes and Comments

- 368 Agostinho Neto—A Tribute
Shanti Sadigali
372 Nigeria : National Unity A Major Test
Shanti Sadigali
375 Central Africa Coup : France Strains to
Retain the Advantage
Vanita Ray
379 South Africa's Nuclear Explosion
Vanita Ray

Documentation-I

- 385 UN Resolution on Western Sahara

Documentation-II

- 388 Zimbabwe Rhodesia : Proposals for Independence
434 India-Africa Relations
Anup Ranjan Basu
440 Book Reviews

AFRICA AT THE UNITED NATIONS

Africa has reached the final and the most critical stage of decolonisation. Over the years the liquidation of colonialism in the three remaining African territories—Zimbabwe, Namibia and Western Sahara—has been a central issue at the United Nations.

This and connected issues figured prominently at the 34th session of the General Assembly. While the protracted constitutional crisis in Zimbabwe was being debated news came of the agreement reached at the Lancaster House Conference in London between the main protagonists and Britain as the administering authority. The substantive aspect of the agreement, published as Documentation in this issue (see page...) is intended to provide authentic source material for scholars to judge the subsequent developments flowing out of the agreement.

About Namibia, the UN had decided in 1966 to assume direct responsibility for its administration. But a defiant South Africa, which continues its illegal occupation of the territory, continues to frustrate UN efforts. A new element was however introduced in 1978 when the five Western Members of the Security Council, acting in concert as the so-called contact group, assumed the role of mediation between South Africa and the South-West African People's Organisation (SWAPO). This new aggressiveness on the part of these powers, who are in a position to wield considerable influence over Pretoria, was welcomed as it could have led to a quickening of the pace of change. It did elicit a favourable response from the late President Agostinho Neto of Angola, where SWAPO has been given refuge and asylum, in the form of a proposal for a demilitarized zone to facilitate free and fair elections in the run-up to independence for the whole of Namibia. South Africa belatedly responded to the proposal during the discussion of the Namibian question in the Decolonisation Committee. Unfortunately, though this may be regarded by optimists as a small step forward, a perusal of the debates will, nonetheless, reveal that Pretoria is still persisting in its dilatory tactics and the differences have far from narrowed down. The problem remains as intractable as before.

Western Sahara, formerly known as Spanish Sahara, has been considered by the UN since 1963 and the General Assembly has been reaffirming the inalienable right of its peoples to self-determina-

tion. In 1976, however, the announcement by Morocco and Mauritania to annex the territory further complicated the problem. Spain's withdrawal and abdication of its international responsibility in respect of the territory and the transfer of authority to Morocco and Mauritania was responsible for the Frente POLISARIO, the liberation movement of the territory, supported by Algeria, resorting to armed struggle and declaring the creation of the "Saharan Arab Democratic Republic". The escalating war resulted in the collapse of Mauritania and its withdrawal from the territory. This dangerous situation also led to new initiatives being reinforced by the Organisation of African Unity, endorsed by the 6th Havana Non-Aligned Conference and the United Nations. It is against this background that the two opposing views were reflected in the debates on Western Sahara in the Decolonisation Committee.

Editor

NAMIBIA : THE INDIAN VIEWPOINT

SHANTI SADIQALI

The attention of the United Nations General Assembly has once again this year been focussed on the question of Namibia.* Despite the dedicated and determined efforts of member-states of the organization to terminate the illegal occupation by South Africa of the international territory of Namibia and to bring an end to the cruel subjugation of the Namibian people, the performance of the UN in ensuring to the people of Namibia the exercise of their inalienable rights to self-determination and independence has so far been marked by varying vicissitudes of disillusionment and despair.

Ever since the assumption of direct responsibility by the UN in 1966 for the future of Namibia when South Africa's mandate over Namibia was terminated and the territory declared the responsibility of the United Nations, this *de jure* termination of South Africa's mandate has in fact remained until today unrealised and unimplemented. Successive General Assembly and Security Council resolutions have been adopted on the question but over these 13 years they have only added more weight to the shelves of UN archives. Musty parchments, it has been said, may give rights their sanctity but they do not ensure their realisation.

The Father of the Indian Nation, Mahatma Gandhi, had stated long ago that one can only awaken a person from slumber if he is really asleep. If he is pretending, your efforts can be of no avail. The hopes and expectations of the international community have in the past years been successively raised and dashed by the deliberate procrastinations of Pretoria over the ending of its illegal

*Statement by the Indian delegate, Mrs. Shanti Sadiqali, to the Plenary Meeting of the 34th UN General Assembly Session on the Question of Namibia : 7 December 1979.

rule over Namibia. Each time the response of South Africa has been one of subterfuge and deceit. Every time the Security Council has sought to impose sanctions against this recalcitrant regime such action has been blocked either by certain countries who continue to have massive political and economic vested interests in South Africa or by yet another promise of "consideration to cooperate" by South Africa itself.

Since the consideration of this item at the 33rd Session, the Question of Namibia had come up for consideration at the meeting of the Committee of 24 in Belgrade in April 1979 and at the resumed session of the General Assembly in May this year. At the resumed session my delegation had occasion to stress that the United Nations, in particular the Security Council and its permanent members who have traditionally used the veto to bloc enforcement action against South Africa, had to face their moment of truth. We cannot afford to fail in taking effective action, fully within the powers of the United Nations, in order to force South Africa to vacate territory and to comply with UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. It has become increasingly and painfully aware to my delegation that the sudden injection of activity at the time of discussion of this item at the General Assembly is possibly part of a deliberate effort to project a myth of movement in negotiations in order to confuse the issue and prevent strong action by the General Assembly in the matter. It is for us to recommend to the Security Council action which will enable the UN to discharge its obligations and prevent this world organization from being made a mockery of by one of its own member-states. Indeed, the very question of whether South Africa should continue as a member-state of the UN deserves closer scrutiny. Both the General Assembly and the Security Council have to complement each other's efforts in promoting an early and effective solution to the problem. Any failure would mark a severe setback to the effectiveness and credibility of the role of the UN in international affairs. This will inevitably have grave consequences for peace in this region and elsewhere in the world.

How long is the world community to wait while South Africa considers its options on whether or not to participate meaningfully in negotiations on the holding of UN supervised elections in Namibia? The discussions in the March Proximity Talks, as well as the most recent one in Geneva held last month as the initiative of the Secretary-General have provided opportunities for such a meaningful dialogue. We have before us in this connection the Supplementary Report of the Secretary-General concerning the Im-

plementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) on the question of Namibia contained in Document S/13634. While SWAPO and the front-line states have accepted the concept of the demilitarised zone, it is our impression that so far, rather than engage in realistic discussions, the South African reaction has been one of further prevarication. The reply sent on the eve of this debate, the day before yesterday, expressing South Africa's conditional acceptance of the idea of a demilitarized zone only fortifies this impression. Not only has South Africa remained attached to its usual rigid posture, but it has kept the door open for further dilatory responses by making clear that the list of six conditions mentioned is only a partial one. It is facts and deeds that should justify South African pronouncements and not the other way around. The fact of the matter is that while on the one hand South Africa has been building up an elaborate smokescreen of supposed willingness to negotiate, it has simultaneously sought to strengthen its hold over Namibia. By its unilateral decisions to hold sham elections in Namibia; by its attempts to stamp out SWAPO resistance by continuous armed attacks against and imprisonment of Namibian patriots; by the artificial orchestration of the political voices of puppet groups under the umbrella of the *ersatz* Democratic Turnhalle (DTA); by the creation of tribal armies and the forced Bantustanization of the territory; by placing Walvis Bay under the administration of one of its provincial governments with the devious intention of destroying the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia; and by flagrant attacks on neighbouring states, in particular the recent assaults against Angola; by all these actions South Africa has in effect attempted an illegal UDI for Namibia. It has been said that what the imperialists cannot colonise they balkanize. South Africa has gone so far as to revive the concept of a "constellation of states" in the area hinged on Pretoria and aimed at offering security for the racist minority rump in the region. Simultaneously in Namibia, the steps taken to enhance the powers of the so-called National Assembly leave no doubt of its true intentions, namely, to continue by all possible means its illegal occupation of Namibia and to perpetuate its colonial exploitation of the people and resources of this territory. The recent reports of South African attempts to raise loans in the Swiss money market on behalf of the so-called "Administrator General" are further indication of this nefarious intent.

If all these are not sufficient indicators of South Africa's cynical intentions, certainly the most recent reports of South Africa's activity in the direction of acquiring nuclear weapons should give the international community cause for grave concern. My delegation firmly

supports in this context, the conclusions and recommendations of the UN Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa held in London in February this year which *inter alia* called for the adoption of mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter to put an end to all nuclear collaboration with South Africa. We have already had occasion to discuss in the Fourth Committee the need for a more vigorous enforcement of Decree No. 1 of the UN Council for Namibia on the protection of the natural resources of Namibia. Such action is all the more urgent in the present context.

The illegal projection of Walvis Bay as an entity separate from Namibia and part of South Africa is also calculated *inter alia* to sever the natural links of Namibia with the outside world and cause incalculable damage to her economy. Similar strategies of economic strangulation have been cruelly resorted to by 19th century imperialist powers aimed at the annihilation of entire tribes in this part of Africa. However, it was the valour and endurance of these same people that helped them survive and continue their heroic struggle. My delegation strongly condemns, as an act of colonial expansion, the designs of South Africa to annex Walvis Bay, thereby undermining the territorial integrity of Namibia.

Freedom for the struggling people of Namibia may be delayed by South African tactics, but we are convinced that it cannot be withheld for very long. Their courage and determination to fight for the inalienable right of self-determination and independence and majority rule will inevitably triumph against all odds. While pledging the support of my delegation to this cause I should like to quote from the message sent by my Foreign Minister on the occasion of the Week of Solidarity with the people of Namibia in October this year wherein he has re-affirmed India's support for and solidarity with the people of Namibia and their sole and authentic representative SWAPO. I quote: "The leading role of SWAPO in the Namibian people's valiant struggle for self-determination and genuine majority rule has been internationally recognised. SWAPO has repeatedly demonstrated its readiness to cooperate with the efforts of the UN to achieve a peaceful negotiated settlement in Namibia. In sharp contrast, the South African authorities have sought to reinforce and institutionalise their oppressive and illegal control over Namibia. They have indulged in acts of violence and repression against Namibia and members of SWAPO. They have also launched aggression against neighbouring independent African states. These intransigent and illegal acts of the racist South African regime call for strict enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. SWAPO's struggle deserves the full moral, political, diplomatic and

material support of the international community. India reaffirms her full support for the heroic struggle of SWAPO, the sole and authentic liberation movement of Namibia, against the oppression of the racist regime of South Africa."

As a member of the UN Council¹ for Namibia, my delegation has participated actively in the work of the Council as also in the preparation of the Report of the Council for Namibia now before the General Assembly for consideration. We would like to place on record at this point our tribute of warm appreciation to the President of the UN Council for Namibia, Ambassador Lusaka of Zambia, for the high qualities of leadership and sincere dedication consistently displayed by him to the cause of the Namibian people. We support the recommendations contained in this report.

My delegation attaches particular importance to the successful efforts of the UN Council for Namibia in promoting and safeguarding Namibian interests in the Specialized Agencies of the UN and at various international organizations and conferences. The activities of the Council for Namibia are particularly significant in this context as they are directed at preventing efforts by South Africa to illegally represent Namibia at various international forums. We note with particular satisfaction the increased activity of the Council in the work of the Specialized Agencies and the granting of full membership to it by an increasing number of these agencies. These decisions, we are convinced are effective proof of the growing recognition on the part of the international community of the important role played by the UN Council for Namibia as the legal administering authority for the territory.

My delegation would also like to pay a warm tribute to the UN Commissioner for Namibia, Martti Ahtisaari, for the considerable and painstaking efforts undertaken by the Office of the Commissioner for Namibia in the preparation and in the progressive implementation of the Nationhood Programme of Namibia. Apart from providing appropriate training for Namibian patriots outside the territory, this programme is a unique effort to prepare Namibia for the vital task of national reconstruction and nation-building. The valuable support and financial assistance extended by UNDP, UNESCO, WHO and FAO as well as other international organizations to the Nationhood programme will in no small way contribute to its success. We would similarly like to stress our support for the activities undertaken under the aegis of the Committee of the UN Fund for Namibia on which my country has the honour of being represented. The work of the Institute for Namibia functioning in Lusaka will also, we believe, contribute constructively to the develop-

ment of competent and qualified administrative and other personnel for a new independent Namibia.

The Government and the people of India extend their total political, moral and material support to the people of Namibia in their struggle for national Independence based on human dignity and majority rule. The courageous struggle being waged by them will not be in vain. In expressing our support to the front-line states, we are conscious of their daily sacrifice in terms of economic hardships and the constant thrust of aggressive reprisals they face from across the border for their persistence in support of the cause of the Namibian people. This annual debate in the General Assembly also provides us an opportunity to pay homage to all those freedom fighters who have lost their lives in the long war against racism and colonial domination as well as to those who are languishing in South African prisons and other victims of exploitation and apartheid. It is relevant to recall the recent announcement of the conferring of the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Peace and Understanding upon Nelson Mandela for his brave and unrelenting struggle against the forces of exploitation and apartheid and for truth, justice and human understanding. Nelson Mandela takes his place alongside such other distinguished luminaries as President Kaunda of Zambia and the late Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., as an ardent champion of peace, justice and a free world order. In recognising his contributions, we pay our tribute to the heroic sons of Southern Africa in their struggle against the heinous practice of apartheid. The success of the struggle against South African colonialism in Namibia in its turn is bound to contribute to the inevitable dismemberment of this obsolete system.

India will continue to render support, both bilaterally to SWAPO and multilaterally to the cause of Namibian freedom, through various UN Agencies. We recognise the circumstances under which SWAPO have been forced to resort to armed struggle. We are confident that victory will ultimately be theirs: a victory for the people of Namibia, a victory for truth and justice over tyranny and deceit.

Let us not allow the will of the International community to be paralysed into inaction over Namibia. Let us collectively determine that we can rise to this challenge and, with the powers that have been provided under the Charter, overcome it. What is at stake is a sacred trust and a responsibility which we owe to the people of Namibia.

THE SITUATION IN NAMIBIA

PETER MUESHINANGE

This august Assembly* is seized once again of the perennial question of Namibia, which has exercised for more than thirty-three years the mind and conscience of the international community. A just settlement of this question has remained elusive throughout the years. The hopes and aspirations of the oppressed people of Namibia for liberation and independence have been dashed time and again. Repression, oppression and exploitation of our people at the bloody and brutal hands of the successive racist rulers of the Pretoria junta have increased by leaps and bounds and permeated the entire country; colonial, reactionary violence of death and destruction of lives and property is the rule rather than an exception in Namibia.

But the determination of our people to persevere in the struggle and to resist by all means necessary, especially armed struggle, has, on the other hand, remained resolute and strong.

The quest for a negotiated settlement which appeared promising at one point seems clearly now to have run its full course. The illegal occupationist regime of the Pretoria junta persists in its defiance and intransigence and is expanding its military build-up in the country, reinforced by repressive acts such as the so-called state of emergency, the security measures and martial law, which cover nearly the entire country.

Let there be no mistake about the real situation in Namibia. There exists a state of war in our country. The colonial army of occupation is engaged in a war with the patriotic forces of PLAN: the people's Liberation Army of Namibia. It is a war of resistance

* Statement by Peter Mueshinange, SWAPO Secretary of Foreign Affairs, before the 34th Session of the UN General Assembly on the Question of Namibia on 6 December, 1979.

and liberation that SWAPO has been waging for thirteen years. It is against this background that we address this august Assembly.

During the long and painstaking process of talks and negotiations on Namibia, SWAPO has exposed the bad faith of racist South Africa by providing this august Assembly, the Security Council and the UN Secretary-General with relevant information about the atrocities of the occupation regime against our people and its unilateral actions aimed at frustrating the early and speedy implementation of the UN Plan on Namibia.

On this occasion, we would like, once again, to present the true picture about the intensified chain of brutal acts and atrocities perpetrated by the Boer regime against the Namibian civilian population.

The racist Pretoria junta has unleashed a new wave of arbitrary arrests and incarceration of SWAPO leaders and members since April this year. This campaign of terror involves thousands of Namibian patriots who are languishing in fascist jails, concentration camps and other torture chambers throughout Namibia and in South Africa. This is a calculated campaign to cow our people into submission and to try to destroy SWAPO, which is the vanguard of the Namibian Revolution. The vicious and barbaric methods used by South Africa include burning of villages, destruction of livestock, crops and other valuable property, cold-blooded massacres of innocent villagers alleged to be "terrorists" or "sympathizers", dropping of people from helicopters while others are forced to watch, rape, confiscation of property belonging to villagers, kidnapping of innocent people and poisoning of water. It further involves planting of landmines on footpaths, construction of so-called protective villages, barricades and road-blocks as means of intimidation and controlling of the civilian population. In addition to these diabolic and cowardly acts, the Boer junta in Namibia is using the most cruel and degrading techniques of torture during the long and painful hours of interrogation. For example, the fascist interrogators force their victims to spend long periods in snake huts, where purposely starved snakes are kept. This cruel and unusual means of torture is one way of waging a psychological warfare aimed at extracting so-called confessions from the political prisoners. Another Nazi-like method is that of shoving people into trenches specifically constructed to subject them to extreme temperatures.

Yet another way to impose total control over the movement of the people is the recent decision to issue the so-called identity document to everyone above the age of sixteen. This is a diabolical scheme intended to categorize the Namibian people in order to isolate

and eliminate the true patriots in the interest of a neo-colonial solution in Namibia. Already a number of Namibian patriots have disappeared mysteriously. All the indications are that they have been kidnapped and are feared murdered by the Boer gestapo. According to the *Windhoek Observer* of 10 November 1979, it is reported that the following SWAPO officers have been abducted by South African fascist Security Police: Jonannes Kaua, Mathias Ashipembe and Matheus Nahanga. This is but one of the numerous cases of mysterious disappearances of our people.

We would like to draw once again the attention of this august Assembly to the plight of thousands of Namibian freedom fighters who are being held in concentration camps all over Namibia, in particular those being held at Hardap in the district of Mariental, Gobabis, Ogongo, Oshakati, Runtu, Katima Mulilo, Okakarara, Khorixas, Karasburg and Windhoek. Our own sources as well as foreign visitors to Namibia have confirmed that these patriots are being daily subjected to extreme forms of intimidation and torture by the fascist army and police. SWAPO and the struggling Namibian masses denounce and condemn the racist Pretoria junta for its acts of brutality and murder of our people. We appeal to the international community to join us in our demand for immediate unconditional release of these patriots as well as all Namibian political prisoners whether held in Namibia or South Africa. We appeal to this august Assembly and the Security Council to empower the Secretary-General to facilitate through his good offices an inquiry into the conditions of those Namibians being held in jails, detention centres and concentration camps in Namibia and South Africa and secure their immediate unconditional release.

We have presented these grim facts of the situation under which our people are forced to exist. It is a situation characterized by an ongoing campaign of brutal repression, generalized terror, intimidation, torture and murder. This situation is made worse by the alarming rate at which the military build-up with the accompanying construction of new bases and the introduction of sophisticated military hardware are being carried out by the occupation regime in Namibia. We wish to underscore this development and to point out to this august Assembly that South Africa remains committed to entrenching her position in Namibia in order to impose a neo-colonial solution on the Namibian people. To achieve this objective, the Pretoria junta has opted for a military solution to the conflict in Namibia.

We wish to cite a number of specific cases to illustrate the extent of increased South African military presence in Namibia. Of

late, the occupationist regime has been occupying vacated farms and also purchasing others to transform them into military bases for training and deployment of troops and equipment. Likewise, new bases are being constructed at a number of places in the so-called operational area. These include bases at Kamanyab in the north-west; Omauni in the north-west; Omupindi, east of Ondangua; Andara, east of Runtu; and Ngwezi, near Katima Mulilo. Existing bases are being renovated and enlarged—for example, those at Windhoek, Grootfontein, Walvis Bay, Ondangua, Runtu and Mapcha. There is a constant movement of troops and equipment by rail, road and air throughout Namibia.

Closely related to the increased military build-up in Namibia is the constant use of that territory by the racist regime of Pretoria to commit acts of aggression against and armed invasions into the neighbouring African independent states, in particular the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Zambia. Those acts of aggression have not only continued but have also been intensified in magnitude and now include the destruction of economic targets such as bridges, roads, railway lines, factories and markets.

It is this military situation pregnant with dangers and the ever escalating political confrontation in the region which pose a serious threat to international peace and security. The racist Pretoria regime and its imperialist allies and collaborators are responsible for this situation. It is they who are creating obstacles and difficulties to obstruct the attainment of genuine independence by Namibia.

The account that I have just given of the situation in Namibia in particular and Southern Africa in general forces us to wonder whether that situation still offers a possibility for efficacious implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978).

The Pretoria junta has systematically and deliberately created obstructions and fraudulent political schemes coupled with delaying tactics in order to destroy the basis for the implementation of the final and definitive report of the Secretary-General as endorsed by Security Council Resolution 435 (1978). Already the fascist Boer junta has accelerated the military, political and administrative preparations to instal a puppet, neo-colonial regime in Namibia on the model of the Smith/Muzorewa illegal regime in Zimbabwe.

The SWAPO delegation led by President Sam Nujoma recently participated in what were called simultaneous consultations on Namibia in Geneva. These consultations were held under the auspices of the Secretary-General, Dr. Kurt Waldheim. During these consultations SWAPO made its position clear with regard to the proposed Demilitarized Zone to be created along the Namibia/

Angolan and the Namibia/Zambian borders. We reiterated our acceptance of the concept of the proposed DMZ. Comrade Nujoma addressing a press conference in Geneva on 16 November 1979 stated that:

"While desirous of the early and speedy implementation of the Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), SWAPO is strongly opposed to any attempt to use the machinery of the United Nations to negate the achievements of the struggling Namibian people and give undue advantage to the military occupationist regime in our country.

"In this connection, SWAPO is vehemently opposed to the sinister idea of disarming its armed freedom fighters in Namibia, or removing them from their beloved and only fatherland into neighbouring countries, while allowing foreign military occupationist forces to remain armed on the Namibian soil. This is unjust, unfair and thus an unacceptable proposition. It is intended to appease and give undue advantage to the illegal occupationist forces in our country. If accepted, this idea will destroy the essence of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978). Therefore, SWAPO resolutely rejects this sinister scheme."

By assuming direct responsibility for Namibia, the United Nations has accepted a solemn obligation to grant all the possible support and assistance to the Namibian people in their legitimate struggle for liberation. We urge the United Nations not to renege on this trust and commitment until genuine national independence is realized in our country.

In this connection, we express our gratitude and appreciation to the United Nations Council for Namibia, under the able and dedicated leadership of His Excellency Ambassador Paul Lusaka of Zambia. His statement made at the beginning of this debate clearly attests to the ever-increasing activities of the Council in support of our struggle. The challenges and hardships that the oppressed people of Namibia undergo daily are shared by the Council and this gives us further impetus to carry on with the struggle.

SWAPO, since the creation of the Council, has always worked closely with it in the preparation of the annual reports and other relevant documents submitted to the General Assembly. Likewise, we participated actively in the preparation of the report so brilliantly introduced a little while ago by Ambassador Lusaka, in his capacity as President of the Council. We appeal to the entire international community to give all the support to the Council in the discharge of its important mandate.

SWAPO feels obliged to renew publicly our trust and confidence in the illustrious Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Kurt Waldheim. His involvement on the question of Namibia has been trying and difficult. But we note with satisfaction and appreciation that his resolve and dedication to the principles of the UN Charter and the resolutions and decisions on the question of Namibia have remained uncompromising. We reassure him of our readiness to always cooperate with and support him in all genuine efforts to effect a speedy and early independence of Namibia.

Elsewhere we have stated emphatically and strongly that the machinery of the UN should not be used to undermine our struggle and the UN's very position and give creeping support and legitimacy to certain non-representative puppet elements in Namibia, which are nothing more than quislings and surrogates representing imperialism, neo-colonialism and reaction. We condemn and reject any attempts to that end and we will continue to speak up and expose such machinations from whatever quarter.

The time has come for the United Nations to face up to the persistent challenge from South Africa. The UN must act now to compel that regime to withdraw unconditionally and forthwith from Namibia. What we call for are enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

The fascist Boer junta of Pretoria has been pampered for far too long. It is an illegal regime which maintains the most brutal, violent and repressive military occupation in Namibia; Pretoria does not want and has never accepted a negotiated settlement; it has long opted for a military solution; hence the elaborate and massive military build-up, contrary to all the efforts to implement the UN decolonization plan on Namibia.

When we talk about the war situation in Namibia and the serious threat to world peace and security, we have in mind the consistent defiance by that illegal regime of the UN authority and directives, its continued illegal occupation and the bloody campaign of terrorism and repression being waged against the Namibians, its constant threats and acts of aggression and military attacks against the independent African states coupled with covert schemes of sabotage and destabilization in these states, its latest strategy of destroying economic infrastructures, especially of Angola and Zambia, its renewed attempts to establish itself as a regional super-power through economic balkanization of the region, its commitment to develop nuclear weapons for aggression and destruction and its recruitment and use of mercenaries in Namibia and Zimbabwe. These are dangerous developments which should no longer be

viewed as ordinary features of a conflict situation. Rather they should be viewed as alarming pointers to an explosive situation with ghastly consequences for the entire human race. The mad men of Pretoria must be stopped now. A firm and strong word should be directed by this august Assembly to the Security Council, in line with the demands of the 33rd resumed Session of the General Assembly, of the 16th Summit of OAU and the 6th Summit of the Non-Aligned Countries, to impose all the comprehensive economic sanctions under Chapter VII on the Boer regime to force it out of Namibia so that our people may enjoy liberation and genuine independence. This is the only action that will convince the racist usurpers that this organization means serious business.

We have already had our say concerning the recent simultaneous high-level consultations on Namibia in Geneva. Actually, we would have preferred to leave it at that. But we have been sufficiently provoked by the latest situation bearing on Namibia created by the Pretoria racists.

True to type, yesterday, on the eve of this debate, the illegal Boer junta sent yet another of its familiar burdensome and outrageous letters to His Excellency, the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In it they showed, once more, their infamous arrogance by requesting its publication as an official document of the Security Council, presumably as some sort of an awaited acceptance from them of the concept of the Demilitarized Zone, called for in the Secretary-General's latest report (S/13634) of 20 November 1979.

That report is explicit. It, *inter alia*, states: "At the conclusion of the consultations, the front-line states accepted the concept of the Demilitarized Zone and the broad outline of the working paper. SWAPO also accepted the concept of the Demilitarized Zone. It was indicated that, provided that South Africa also accepted the concept, detailed discussions could follow." Nearly three weeks since the end of the Geneva consultations, there is still no explicit, clear, unambiguous or direct reaction from Pretoria in this regard.

Then on 28 November 1979, the President of the Security Council for that month, on behalf of the Council, issued a statement, after informal consultations on Namibia, which read: "The Security Council calls on South Africa to give an urgent reaction concerning an acceptance of the concept of the Demilitarized Zone bearing in mind that the General Assembly is to begin its consideration of the question of Namibia on 6 December 1979."

What we now have before us is a far cry from what the Secretary-General expected and quite clearly contrary to what the Security Council demanded. It amounts to an insult and an open

challenge to the authority of the Security Council and also a further abuse of the persona and office of the Secretary-General.

In our view, the authorities of the Boer Republic are up to their usual political antics and delay tactics. They obviously delight in the theatre of the absurd. SWAPO definitely does not. We are confident that for its part the UN will never entertain such a thing. In fact, South Africa's ridiculous contention is that as much as an acceptance, even in principle, of the concept of the Demilitarized Zone is subject to certain pre-conditions, indeed a long list of demands, which the rest of us are expected to accept first, and then the fascist junta may consider acceptance of the concept. This is to put the cart before the horse. What was expected from the racist usurpers was to give an urgent and explicit reply concerning an acceptance of the concept. Once that happened other matters of implementation arising from the proposed DMZ would be discussed as appropriate and eventually resolved. SWAPO accepted this and indicated that we would participate in such discussions.

The Boers have instead issued an ultimatum. It reads: "The South African Government accepts the concept of the zone provided agreement is reached in further discussions, *inter alia*, on the following:

1. The number of South African bases remaining in the DMZ.
2. Acceptable arrangements regarding the disarmament of SWAPO personnel on the closure of bases, i.e. seven days after certification of the election.
3. The deployment of an acceptable percentage of UNTAG inside the DMZ in the light of practical requirements.
4. Agreement on practical arrangements between the UNTAG military commander and the South African military authorities.
5. Confirmation that the settlement proposal (S/12636) accepted by South Africa on 25 April 1971 remains unchanged.
6. Confirmation that the claim for SWAPO bases inside South-West Africa/Namibia, which is in any case not provided for in the settlement proposal, will not be revived".

In other words, this is only a partial list. There are, by implication, additional pre-conditions or demands to these. To us this is totally unacceptable.

The said letter, in our view, must be treated with the contempt that it deserves and rejected. What this serious development demands, however, is far more than mere condemnation and rejection. This time, let them not be allowed to get away scot-free. Let them not succeed beyond this point to make a laughing stock of the United Nations.

We, once again, appeal: Let there be no more equivocation. Even here at this front, let the struggle continue and be intensified. This must be a serious and politically charged debate towards affirmative and decisive action in support of the armed struggle inside Namibia, under the leadership of SWAPO.

Last but not least, we are most gratified to see you preside over the 34th Session of the General Assembly. In you we have a friend, fellow fighter, and a consummate diplomat. It is fitting and proper that a noted son of Africa is presiding over this august Assembly at the time when the critical situation in Southern Africa demands fortitude, commitment and leadership.

The struggle continues; death or independence, we shall win.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND NAMIBIA

B. AKPORODE CLARK

The question of Namibia is being debated at a time when the entire history of colonization and racism in Southern Africa is at the cross-roads.* The political ferment in Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa has acquired such a force and momentum that few, if any, can fail to see in which way that history is being written. The tide of freedom and liberation is moving inexorably forward. Like destiny, no one can stop it. It may be delayed. But the tide will run its course, logically and to the end.

Pretoria is watching closely the current talks on the political future of Zimbabwe which are going on in Lancaster House in London between Her Majesty's Government and the Patriotic Front. Pretoria had hoped that the illegal Smith/Muzorewa administration, which could neither govern Zimbabwe, nor win the war of liberation, nor gain international recognition, would survive the talks and provide it with an excuse to implement its own racist programme of an illegal internal settlement in Namibia. The truth is that while perfidy may still be lurking around the corner, Her Majesty's Government has assumed its responsibilities to itself and the nationalists of Zimbabwe. Whether the agreement just reached in London between the Administering Power and the Patriotic Front would succeed depends on the good faith of all the parties concerned. The world will be watching closely how scrupulously all the terms and conditions of the agreement are carried out. We cannot but wish all the parties well. A truly free and independent

*Statement of His Excellency B. Akporode Clark, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations and Chairman of the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid, on the question of Namibia made in the General Assembly on 6 December 1979.

Zimbabwe is all we want.

As regards the threats by South Africa to undo by armed intervention or criminal subversion the outcome of the London Talks, as reported by the *New York Times* of 20 November, let me sound this simple note of warning. Free Zimbabwe will not be alone. The death-wish and the suicide streak in the character of the racist regime of South Africa will doom the regime much sooner than it thinks through such ill-advised adventurism.

Some two weeks ago, several delegations, representatives of all the political and geographical regions of the world, tabled some seventeen resolutions at the end of a deeply moving debate on the policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa. Both the debate and the resolutions had a common thread running through them; they all condemned apartheid without exception, they all wanted an end to apartheid without delay, they all called for concrete action to meet the challenge of apartheid, they all likened the racist regime of Pretoria to those tragic characters in Charles Lamb's tales, who knowing not how and where to roast a pig, burnt their own house over their heads.

Unfortunately, it has not taken long for events in that tragically sad country to prove us right. On 15 November 1979, the trials of the Pietermaritzburg twelve were concluded. Contrary to the additional protocols of the Geneva Convention and the resolutions of the United Nations, one of the freedom fighters, James David Mange, has purportedly been sentenced to death and 11 others sent to jail for between 13 and 18 years. Perhaps, it is significant to record that even by South African standards, the trials were unique and the penalties bizarre. The accused did not plead guilty and the so-called witnesses against them testified *sotto voce* 'in camera' and without the due process of law.

Perhaps it will arouse world public opinion from mere expression of moral indignation to deeper and more serious perception of the heinous monstrosity that the policies of apartheid truly constitute, if the facts are known that James David Mange was being sentenced to death for an alleged political crime. It was not for attempted murder or any offence involving a killing. Even in South Africa such a sentence has no parallel or precedent since World War II. The implication is that the racist regime may be embarking on a novel course of policy—one of systematically liquidating all leaders of thought whether or not they commit any offence.

I do not want to take undue advantage of the debate on Namibia to dwell at length on events in South Africa. The temptation to seize upon the organic linkage between all the political

developments in Southern Africa and to say more about the tragic flaws in the racist regime of Southern Africa is irresistible. However, I am so convinced that the fate of the Pietermaritzburg 12 is a crying affront to human conscience and the principles of the United Nations that I wish to appeal once again, and this time to all member-governments of the General Assembly, international organizations and all men and women of goodwill to use their good offices to free James David Mange from the South African gallows and his other colleagues from unconscionable brutality.

Some three years ago, the five Western members of the Security Council, relying on their influence and friendship with South Africa, undertook an initiative to work out a face-saving formula that would permit the racist regime of South Africa to vacate its illegal occupation of Namibia in accordance with Security Council resolution 385 of January 1976. In the ensuing developments, considerable pressure was brought to bear on SWAPO and independent African states, particularly the front-line states, to cooperate with the Western Five so that Namibia might move peacefully into independence. A United Nations presence in the form of UNTAG (United Nations Transition Assistance Group) was to be established in the territory; there would be a cease-fire; free and fair elections conducted by the United Nations would be held and by December 1978 a free Namibia would take its place in the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations Organization.

The high hopes which the above scenario generated rested, firstly, on our confidence in the integrity and good faith of the Western Five. And secondly, we could hardly believe that a country like South Africa, so dependent on the Western Five for its very survival, and a clay colossus in the calculus of world power, would dare to defy the Western Five and reject Security Council Resolution 435. But what has happened? In December 1978 the racist regime of South Africa organized illegal elections in the territory in open defiance of the Security Council after arrogantly ignoring the solemn warning of the Western Five.

Subsequent events point to a presumption that the illegal elections were an integral part of a fraudulent design on the part of South Africa to install and consolidate an internal settlement that would leave Namibia firmly in control of the discredited Democratic Turnhalle Group, thereby keeping SWAPO out of power. For how else can one rationally explain Pretoria's decision to convert a so-called Constituent Assembly emanating from those overtly staged elections into a National Assembly? What is the logic behind the

decision to confer legislative powers on that unrepresentative Assembly from which SWAPO, representing the main currents of Namibia's political and social life, has been excluded? The answers to these questions are simple. Firstly, South Africa wants its own puppet government in Namibia in order to ensure its continued exploitation of the enormous mineral resources of that country and the perpetuation of its apartheid doctrine in Namibia. Thus South Africa would confront the United Nations with a *fait accompli*. Since it does not wish to leave the territory free and independent, the longer it holds out against the United Nations, the better the chances of its quislings to survive. Secondly, South Africa sees itself as a colonial power and does not recognize the authority of the United Nations over Namibia. Despite the unconditional termination of its mandate since 1956 South Africa does not want the presence of the United Nations in the territory. Such an attitude is quite consistent with her policy of arrogant defiance of the United Nations.

Consequently, there has been no forward movement of the Namibian issue since the last meeting of the resumed session of the 33rd General Assembly. The Pretoria regime pretends to keep the matter alive by stalling, by maladrotingly seeking clarifications on issues that are patently clear. A little over two weeks ago, "simultaneous high-level consultations" took place at the instance of the Secretary-General of the UN in Geneva to consider the latest United Nations plan for establishing a demilitarized zone along Namibia's border with Angola and Zambia. The idea was to meet South Africa's objections to the Security Council's settlement proposals. The consultations, which were attended by representatives of six African states, the Western Five, SWAPO and South Africa, were once again inconclusive. All the Front-line countries and SWAPO accepted the concept of the demilitarized zone. The African states have even expressed their acceptance of the general outline of the working paper in respect of the practical and security arrangements for the zone. But as before, South Africa remains the villain of the piece.

On 5 December, on the very eve of the UN debate on the Question of Namibia, the South African Government sent in a reply to express its conditional acceptance of the idea of the demilitarized zone. A passage of the South African Foreign Minister's letter dated 5 December 1979 reads as follows, and I quote.

"... the South African Government accepts the concept of the zone provided agreement is reached in further discussions, *inter alia*, on the following:

- 1 The number of South African bases remaining in the DMZ.

2 Acceptable arrangements regarding the disarmament of SWAPO personnel on the closure of bases, i.e. 7 days after certification of the election.

3 The deployment of an acceptable percentage of UNTAG inside the DMZ in the light of practical requirements.

4 Agreement on practical arrangements between the UNTAG military commander and the South African military authorities.

5 Confirmation that the settlement proposal (S/12636) accepted by South Africa on 25 April 1978 remains unchanged.

6 Confirmation that the claim for SWAPO bases inside South West Africa/Namibia, which is in any case not provided for in the settlement proposal, will not be revived".

It must be recalled that the supplementary report of the Secretary-General, concerning the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) dated 20 November 1979, concerning the question of Namibia in Document S/13634, was submitted to the Security Council after days of anxious anticipation of South Africa's response to the consultations held in Geneva between 12—16 November 1979. Paragraphs 10 and 12 of that Secretary-General's report are significant both for their implications and South Africa's dilatory tactics. The former reads:

"At the conclusion of the consultations, the Front-line states accepted the concept of the Demilitarized Zone and the broad outline of the working paper. SWAPO also accepted the concept of the Demilitarized Zone. It was indicated that provided that South Africa also accepted that concept, detailed technical discussions could follow".

And the latter paragraph says:

"I shall not fail to inform the Council immediately of the reaction of the South African Government concerning the acceptance of the concept of the Demilitarized Zone".

Aware that the Security Council has been holding informal consultations on the Secretary-General's report with a view to deciding when to convene at the urgent request of the African Group and in response to the resolutions of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity held in Monrovia last July, and the Final Declaration of the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries held in Havana, Cuba, last September, so as to deal under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter with South Africa's obstinate and illegal occupation of Namibia, threatened by the President of the Security Council's statement of last week demanding an urgent action, South Africa has resorted to another sleight-of-hand, clumsy and

mischievous.

Is the intention of South Africa to deflect the Security Council from assuming its responsibility to honour its own Resolutions 385, 431, 432, 435 and 439? Is it another sordid manoeuvre to prevent the General Assembly from addressing itself to the prevailing dangerous situation in Namibia pursuant to its own Resolutions 2145 (1966), 2248(SV) (1967) and that of the 33rd Resumed Session? Or is it another attempt to delay the attainment of independence by Namibia by undermining the efforts to achieve a just and lasting solution to the Namibian problem?

There are still other questions in my mind concerning the South African Government's letter of 5 December. Even if we were to grant it the benefit of doubt, we would like to know, clearly and unambiguously, how South Africa sees its present role and presence in Namibia? Is it one of a colonial power or administering authority with trusteeship responsibilities or that of a usurper in illegal occupation of the territory? Does she recognize the fact that its mandate over the territory has been terminated since 1966? Did the Western Five remind South Africa of its bandit status in the territory? Did they tell South Africa that by refusing to accept their mediatory role, in open defiance of the United Nations, South Africa and its friends are, in the eyes of the world, undermining the institutions of the United Nations, and thus contributing to the current wave and spate of lawlessness in flagrant disregard of international obligations bedevilling our times?

Even if these questions can be answered to our satisfaction, one may still ask who is to conduct "the further discussions" with South Africa? Is it still the Western Five or the Secretary-General or the United Nations Council for Namibia? Will there be a pre-determined time-table? And for how long would those discussions be prolonged? When will they commence? What are the probable results, given South Africa's gratuitous self-appointed role of guardian angel or Father-Christmas to the people of Namibia?

Answers to these questions can only be contemplated with scepticism and cynicism. The South African letter mentioned above is another proof of South Africa's delaying tactics calculated to freeze the implementation of the United Nations settlement plan and to forestall decisive action by the Security Council against its obscene policy of continued intransigence. It could be another evidence of South Africa's present policy aimed at liquidating the Front-line states, particularly Angola and Zambia, in pursuit of its policy of establishing a so-called constellation of states in Southern Africa.

Thirdly, as stated by Peter Mueshinange, the SWAPO representative to the United Nations, new draconian laws are being introduced under the cover of so-called emergency powers which enable the Administrator-General of the territory to detain SWAPO leaders at will. So widespread has been this provocative arrest of SWAPO supporters that SWAPO, which has been recognized by the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, the Non-aligned States and the overwhelming majority of the world community, as the sole, legitimate representative of the Namibian people, is being compelled to narrow its options to armed struggle. The last straw was the perfidy shown by South Africa and her Western allies to purportedly raise some bogus international loans in the Swiss money market. According to the Reuter report of 5 December:

"South West Africa (Namibia) has taken out its first international loan, it was announced in Cape Town. The Cape Town-based company Lawfin Limited said the 9.5 million Swiss Franc (15.2 million dollar) loan was negotiated by Lawfin in association with Creafin (South Africa) of Zurich, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Rothschild's Bank. The loan, signed recently in Johannesburg by SWA/Namibia Administrator-General Dr. Gerrit Viljoen, was guaranteed by South Africa."

Nigeria supported the initiative of the Western Five because of a pragmatic necessity to bring to an end the agony of the Namibian people after half a century of racist repression and exploitation. My Government relied then on the good faith of the Western Five.

The minimum my delegation therefore expects from the Western Five is an assurance that they will not only condemn unequivocally the current charade that South Africa is indulging in, but they will also pledge their support to all measures provided under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, including mandatory political and economic sanctions against the Pretoria regime, should South Africa persist in its acts of defiance and intransigence over Namibia. Secondly, the recent loan raised by the South African authorities, referred to above, underlines the urgent necessity of implementing Decree No. I in respect of the permanent sovereignty of the Namibian people over their natural resources. The loan, to all intents and purposes, is illegal, null and void. It must be repudiated by this Assembly.

In conclusion I would like to quote from a declaration made by a Namibian patriot, Tojvo Hermann Tojvo¹, who, in 1968, was

1. Hermann Tojvo is languishing on the Robben Island Maximum Security Prison, along with Nelson Mandela.

savagely sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment for challenging the occupation of his country:

"We are Namibians and not South Africans. We do not, now, recognise your right to govern us, to make laws for us in which we had no say; to treat our country as if it were your property and us as if you were our masters. We have always regarded South Africa as an intruder in our country."

Tojvo's words show that the tragic story of Namibia is yet to be completed. It will be finished by the people of Namibia in triumph and dignity. Either the United Nations will help them to achieve it soon after this year of Solidarity with Namibia in order to maintain peace and security in Southern Africa, or South Africa will be compelled to withdraw from Namibia in disgrace and with irreparable damage to the credibility of the United Nations.

DEVELOPMENTS IN WESTERN SAHARA

HARI SHARAN CHHABRA

On 5 August this year¹ when Mauritania, a weak link in the Western Sahara imbroglio, decided to withdraw from the area it had acquired in the territory under a secret tripartite agreement with Morocco and Spain, the former colonial power, Moroccan forces immediately occupied the evacuated area. This move by the latter, which has all along regarded Spain as "a usurping colonial power" and the territory as being part of its kingdom has aggravated the already intractable problem.

For one thing it has undoubtedly been responsible for hardening the resolve of the POLISARIO Front, the Sahroui liberation movement, to continue the armed struggle with the active support of Algeria and Libya and some other neighbouring black African states.¹ Another complicating factor stemming from the conflict is the further deepening of the rift among Arab States. This is most strikingly apparent in Egypt's stand. President Anwar Sadat for instance, has come out openly on the side of Morocco, announcing that his country is willing to provide arms and ammunition to the Government in Rabat in its war against the POLISARIO Front. On 23 September, Sadat openly stated in an interview with the Egyptian Weekly *October* that he was despatching arms to King Hassan II. Justifying his action, he argued that he did not regard the war in the Sahara desert a struggle for self-determination, but rather as a war waged by the POLISARIO with the help of Cuban advisers and mercenaries. "This could also happen to me", he remarked, implying perhaps that the Arab radicals in their effort to increase their influence throughout the Maghreb may ultimately try to subvert Egypt as well. Whether the Egyptian action could internationalize the Saharan war or not, it certainly signifies exacerbation of the

divisions among Arab states and is rapidly acquiring ideological overtones.

Of significance in the regional setting, the conflict over the future of the territory has dominated relations between the Maghreb countries themselves. Not unexpectedly, Mauritania's unilateral withdrawal has led to a sudden and serious deterioration in relations between Morocco and its erstwhile partner on the one hand and Morocco and Algeria on the other. Morocco has been forced to withdraw its forces stationed in Mauritania under a May 1977 Defence Treaty. Mauritania's withdrawal from the Sahara has, moreover, enabled the POLISARIO to concentrate its attacks against Morocco in the area occupied by it. However, the real extent to which relations between Morocco and Mauritania have been soured became apparent when recently Mauritania declared three Moroccan diplomats *persona non-grata* for "breach of diplomatic protocol" and "contacts with opposition circles in Mauritania." Moroccan denials notwithstanding, observers have tended to conclude that King Hassan's intentions are not above-board and he may well have been planning to instal a more pliable regime in Nouakchot, one which in any case would be willing to continue aligning itself with Rabat in the protracted war against the POLISARIO Front and thus help retain the phosphate rich country among themselves.

As far as Algeria is concerned, its continuing support to POLISARIO has, of course, meant continuing hostility with Morocco. Recent evidence, moreover, suggests an apparent hardening of Algeria's position. Originally, it is accepted, Algeria's role was aimed essentially at trying to seek a negotiated settlement of the problem while maintaining its diplomatic support for POLISARIO at the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity. In fact, it is claimed that in 1977 POLISARIO with Algerian backing tried direct negotiations both with Morocco and Mauritania and at least on two occasions after that Algerians and Moroccans met in Europe.² Later in the year however, deterioration in Franco-Algerian relations made its impact felt in the Western Sahara conflict. It may be recalled that the French Government in 1977 decided to despatch troops and six Jaguar aircraft to a base near Dakar, Senegal, for reconnaissance operations over Mauritania. Subsequently POLISARIO's announcement on 18 December 1977, that Jaguar aircraft had inflicted heavy losses on them³ was interpreted in Algeria as proof that France was now militarily involved on the side of Morocco and Mauritania. Even after Mauritania's withdrawal Algerian fears regarding France's continuing role in the region may not be easily allayed as its (Algeria's) suspicions are

perhaps based on the fact of France reasserting itself in French-speaking Africa subsequent to Angola's independence. French involvement in Zaire in 1977 and 1978 is an example. At the same time Algeria has reinforced its diplomatic offensive at the OAU as was clear from the 1979 Monrovia Summit Conference.⁴ Algeria also exerted pressure on France by banning all imports from it and concluded several contracts with non-French firms.

As for Morocco, despite the drain on its economy by the escalating cost of the war and Mauritania's withdrawal enabling POLISARIO to concentrate against it, King Hassan remains adamant and refuses to recognize the Polisario front. When the POLISARIO Front representatives were permitted to attend the OAU—an indication of the effectiveness of Algerian lobbying—Morocco decided on February 25, 1977 to suspend its participation in all OAU activities and ended it only after being persuaded to return by Egypt, Senegal and Gabon. Again Morocco kept out of the 1979 Monrovia Summit Conference where it suffered a serious diplomatic setback as will be seen later. Moreover, Morocco has found itself more closely aligned with French policy in West and Central Africa which at times has stirred the hornet's nest within the ranks of the member states of the OAU creating further disunity. Apart from its intervention in Shaba, Morocco together with Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon and France was implicated in an April 1977 Security Council report in the mercenary attack on Cotonou in Benin which took place on 16 January 1977.

Another factor which has led to further polarisation in the Maghreb was the Carter Administration's decision to seek the permission of the US Congress in January 1978 to sell Morocco 24 OV—10 armed reconnaissance aircraft and 24 cobra helicopter gunships. It was reported on the occasion that both the slow-flying turboprop aircraft and the helicopters were for use in the Western Sahara war.⁵ The request was subsequently withdrawn in the face of Congressional resistance. But in 1979, following POLISARIO raids inside Morocco and Rabat's total annexation of Western Sahara, the Carter Administration renewed the request.

The impact of the crisis however, beyond the confines of the Maghreb has not been as serious as was to be expected as a result of the United States and France increasing support to Morocco largely because of Soviet caution. Thus despite the Soviet Union's recognized support for the POLISARIO Front, relations with Morocco have remained cordial as can be seen from its help to the tune of 250 million for the exploitation of the phosphate reserves at Meskala. In addition under the deal a railway and new port to serve the open-

cast mine at Meskala will also be built. After 1990 the USSR would receive 10 million tons of Moroccan phosphate from the Meskala mining complex. A fishing industry agreement with the Soviets is also an important factor. Thus Soviet Union's vital economic interests in Morocco and close political affinity with Algeria may perhaps be seen as a redeeming feature preventing an escalation of the conflict. Nonetheless, Moscow did issue a warning against foreign intervention in the Western Sahara and the need to recognize the POLISARIO in the search for a solution.⁶

From the above, however, it is clear that the Western Sahara conflict has proved to be a divisive factor both as far as the Arab States are concerned as also the Organization of African Unity. A better appreciation of the crisis may perhaps be had by recalling the major historical developments and the background to the problem.

BACKGROUND

The desert tract earlier known as the Spanish Sahara was hardly of any economic importance twenty years ago. Surrounded by Mauritania in the south and east, Morocco in the north and the Atlantic in the west, this 266,000 sq. km. territory has a predominantly floating nomadic population; the settled population in towns and villages was estimated in 1974 as being approximately 108,000.⁷ The region was probably discovered around 1434 when the Portuguese skirted its coast; it later became important for shipping slaves to Europe. Spain, which already possessed the nearby Canary Island, did not succeed in colonising the territory and even that only nominally until four and a half centuries later in 1884. It eventually acquired a formal hold over the territory with the drawing up of three conventions with France in 1900, 1904 and 1912; these demarcated its zone of influence.

The search for petroleum was given up finally in the early 60's. The region however shot into the limelight with the discovery of phosphates in 1863, the Bou Craa deposits said to be among the richest in the world. Western Sahara is now the fourth largest producer of phosphate in the world.

Moroccan Claims

Morocco, as stated earlier, has always laid claim to the territory on the ground that its writ ran there long before the Europeans occupied it. In fact, a strip of the territory in the north was ceded to Morocco by Spain shortly after its independence in 1956. Rabat's

claims to the territory, however, became more insistent after the discovery of its phosphate deposits. Annexation of the territory would have given Morocco, already emerging as one of the world's largest phosphate exporters, the power to manipulate more advantageously the world market price. If on the other hand, the territory was annexed by another country or became independent it would have become a fierce rival to Morocco's own phosphate market.

Rabat's dreams of a 'Greater Morocco' extended not only to all the territories occupied by Spain in the Maghreb but also included Mauritania, which it agreed to recognize only nine years after its independence. Even then, the suspicions of Morocco's expansionist aims against Mauritania have never been entirely suppressed. But in 1970, King Hassan II of Morocco and President Moktar Ould Daddah of Mauritania were formally reconciled at the Islamic Summit held in Rabat and Morocco finally gave up its claims to Mauritania and agreed to recognize it as an independent state. Subsequent to the agreement to annex the Western Sahara to their own territories Mauritania reinforced its military and economic links with Rabat. This alliance was forged with Mauritania, in every respect a weaker partner.

Western Sahara at the UN

But before this as early as 1964, Mauritania had informed the UN Special Committee on Decolonisation of its desire to hold talks with Spain over the future of the Western Sahara. The following year Morocco's Ambassador to the UN also expressed his country's desire that Morocco's claim to the rest of the territory held by Spain be settled amicably. The UN in response called upon Spain to liberate the territory and to enter into negotiations with the population regarding its future and by another resolution in 1967 it called upon Spain to organize, in consultation with Morocco and Mauritania and under UN auspices, a referendum among the inhabitants regarding the territory's future. Spain accepted in principle the right of self-determination, but on the crucial question of referendum it adopted an ambivalent posture. This triggered off riots at Al Aiun and the formation of a liberation movement called 'Morehob' by tribal chieftans who took asylum in Morocco. When however Spain announced in August 1974 that it would organize a referendum in the territory, King Hassan insisted that Spanish troops and administration be withdrawn before the referendum and the people be asked not to vote for independence. He reiterated that the Western Sahara should eventually be integrated with Morocco on

historical and geographical grounds. Saharoui nationalism under the Morehob, which was fanned and materially supported by Morocco, then decided to move its headquarters to Algiers denouncing both Moroccan and Mauritanian claims to the territory. The new freedom movement took the name POLISARIO (Political Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamara and Rio de Oro).

In the same year Morocco launched a concerted diplomatic initiative to take control of the Spanish Sahara. King Hassan was fortunate in securing the support of all the political parties in the country. On Moroccan request the issue was brought before the International Court of Justice and a UN Committee on Decolonisation mission visited the territory. The World Court at the Hague however ruled in 1975 that the Sahara's nomadic tribes had some "juridical links" with the Moroccan Crown before the Spanish conquest, but this should not prevent the referendum on the territory's future proposed by Spain and Algeria and endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly. The Court stated that it found no evidence to oppose the principle of self-determination for the Saharan territory. The UN Committee on Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories meanwhile adopted a resolution wherein Spain was called on to take immediate steps so that the Saharan-born population could determine their own future under UN supervision. The Assembly also requested all parties to desist from unilateral action. Algeria voted in favour, Spain abstained while Morocco and Mauritania did not take part in the vote.

Morocco, on its part, rejected outright both the ruling of the Court and the UN Resolution and on 6 November 1975, King Hassan unilaterally ordered a "green march" by an estimated 350,000 Moroccan 'volunteers' to occupy the territory but insisted that it was not an "invasion". "We will cross the border because we are the legal owners of the territory," he said. The action was in defiance of the UN Security Council Resolution urging King Hassan to use "moderation and negotiations" to settle the dispute through the mediation of UN Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim. Hassan, however, in a message to the President of the Security Council gave an assurance that the "green march" would retain its peaceful character.⁸ The volunteers eventually withdrew after three days and Hassan claimed: "The Green March has accomplished its objectives."

SPANISH WITHDRAWAL

As the 'march' was on, a nervous Spain appeared eager to get

rid of the Saharan territory as quickly as possible. Morocco and Mauritania negotiated with Spain for the latter's withdrawal by the end of February 1976. In April 1976, Morocco and Mauritania agreed on a division of the territory with three provinces, al Aiun, Smara and Bojador, remaining with the former and the southern part, then known as Rio de Oro, was handed over to Mauritania and renamed Tiris El Gharbia. According to this arrangement Morocco controlled two-thirds of the Sahara and one-third went to Mauritania. They also agreed to the joint exploitation of its phosphate deposits.

Predictably, Algeria objecting strongly to the partition arrangement enhanced its financial and logistical support to the Saharoui POLISARIO Front. The POLISARIO Front had already announced the formation of the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) in exile with its headquarters in Algeria. Nine countries—Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burundi, Madagascar, Guinea, Mozambique, Togo and Vietnam—recognized the SADR Government in 1976.⁹ As was expected, both Morocco and Mauritania broke off diplomatic relations with Algeria. But the possibility of a full-scale war receded when Algeria limited itself to providing support and refuge for POLISARIO guerrillas. On the other hand, while in the beginning of 1976 Moroccan troops were able to inflict heavy casualties on the guerrillas and to ensure the security of major towns, they could not prevent constant infiltration, harassment and sabotage, especially of the important conveyer belt linking the Bou Craa phosphate mines with the coast. In course of time POLISARIO attacks on Mauritania, in particular, both in the partitioned territory and its own towns and villages started becoming more frequent.

POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN MAURITANIA

Mauritania was thus forced to increase its armed forces from about 2,000 to 17,000 men and buy huge quantities of equipment and weapons which it could ill afford. Mauritania's inability to defend itself from POLISARIO attacks finally led to its critical dependence on the Moroccan military. In fact, it was the POLISARIO raid on the Mauritanian town of Zouerate which spurred the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact on 13 May 1977, under which Morocco brought into Mauritania an estimated 10,000 troops. These troops were soon not only defending the copper and iron ore installations in Mauritania, which were targets of POLISARIO attacks, but also the Mauritania-controlled Sahara. Following these developments, the Algerian Government obviously with a message

for the nationalist and left wing elements in Mauritania, ever suspicious of Morocco's motives, accused King Hassan of planning to create a "Greater Morocco" stretching from Tangiers to the Senegal river, by gradually increasing its "military occupation of both Mauritania and the Western Sahara," and said that the Defence Agreement was the first step towards a Moroccan takeover of Mauritania.

The war had bled Mauritania white. Its economy was already on the verge of collapse due to the long drawn Sahelian drought and the world recession in the steel industry. Over and above, the guerrilla attacks in the iron ore region, which had brought down production, also disrupted the vital railway line connecting the iron ore mines with the port of Nouadhibou.

For all these reasons, dissatisfaction already rife resulted in the military camp on 10 July 1978. Led by the Chief of Staff, Lt.-Col. Mustapha Ould Mohamed Salek, it was the first major organized attempt against President Mokhtar Ould Daddah's Government, in power since independence. The POLISARIO leadership, in a statement issued in Algiers, supported the change provided it was in favour of the people of Mauritania. While an early sense of elation of the POLISARIO Front dampened following the ambiguous statements of the new leader, it took a bold and unilateral decision of declaring a ceasefire against Mauritania barely two days after the coup, undoubtedly in an attempt to wean away Mauritania from the war in the Sahara.

Soon after the coup, Col. Ould Salek said in an interview with the Rabat Magazine, *Al-Watan al Arabi*, that the former regime's mistakes had reached a pitch which the Mauritanian people could no longer tolerate. He, however, expressed optimism on the possibility of resolving the problem of the Sahara. But his Interior Minister, Major Jeddou Ould Salek, was more explicit when he condemned the former President for letting himself be dragged into an "absurd war" with the POLISARIO guerrillas. He said the overthrown regime had neither the courage nor the honesty to take its responsibilities and weigh the harmful side-effects of a war that was not only wasteful but selfish in its motives and vague in its aims. The Minister stressed that the new Mauritanian Government wanted peace and would negotiate with whoever could help end the war. The affinities between the population of Mauritania and the Western Sahara should not serve as a pretext to justify "a murderous war between these populations", he said.

Following these statements of Col. Ould Salek and his Interior Minister, King Hassan expressed his concern in a televised speech to

the nation, warning Mauritania not to fall into the trap laid by a neighbouring country. Obviously alluding to Libya, which had reportedly agreed to give financial assistance to Mauritania, King Hassan said : "Those who are manifesting their friendship today are the same who created, trained and armed the ones who were killing your children yesterday."¹⁰

While Col. Salek wanted peace in the Western Sahara, he was wary of losing Morocco's support till a solution was found. Within weeks of the coup in July, he paid a one-day visit to Morocco for talks with King Hassan. A joint communique issued in Rabat gave few details of their discussions, but significantly it did disclose that the two leaders would give full cooperation to an OAU committee¹¹ set up to try solve the Western Sahara problem. The Mauritanian leader said he was "very satisfied" with the visit to Morocco.

As Col. Ould Salek dragged his feet but made no concessions to POLISARIO, the latter reacted by rejecting further talks with Mauritania so long as its troops remained in the Western Sahara. The ultimatum was delivered after a series of little publicised meetings in Paris between the Polisario and Mauritanian officials. Mauritanian ambiguity on the Western Sahara finally ended when Col. Ould Salek in his 1979 New Year message stated that Mauritania was prepared to withdraw from the Sahara conflict, if it would open the way to peace. He made two further points: first, that his country supported "the right of self-determination of all peoples;" second, Mauritania wanted peace so that it could overcome its economic crisis.¹²

Unfortunately, inspite of these professions and intensified diplomatic activity, the Government continued to maintain an ambivalent and vacillating stand. A series of internal developments, added constraints in pushing ahead with an agreement with POLISARIO. Col. Ould Salek was replaced and given the nominal post of President in a bloodless *coup* on 6 April by Lt. Col. Bouceif's Military Committee of National Salvation. A month later the CMSN agreed to break off relations with Egypt reportedly in return for Libyan support in a bid to negotiate from a relatively stronger position. Prime Minister Bouceif was, however, killed in an air crash and on 3 June, Col. Ould Salek tendered his resignation as President. He was replaced by Lt. Col. Mohammed Ould Louly as Prime Minister and President. On its part the POLISARIO Front, disillusioned by Mauritania's growing inability to come to terms, finally broke the year-old ceasefire with Mauritania in the second week of July 1979 by attacking the Techla district in the Southern Mauritanian-controlled sector of the former

spanish colony. The Polisario representative in Paris, Abedlfattah however held out the olive branch adding that despite the ceasefire having been ended, the SADR was willing to continue negotiations with Mauritania.

MAURITANIA WITHDRAWS

Initially Mauritania reacted to the breaking of the ceasefire by POLISARIO by boycotting the talks to have been held in Monrovia, the Liberian capital, before the OAU Summit. Condemning POLISARIO'S decision, the Mauritanian Foreign Minister threatened that his country might ask its "traditional friends", France and Morocco, to help it face any new attacks.¹³ But ironically a few days later, on 5 August, Mauritania whose economy had been brought to its knees by the war and contributed to the overthrow of two heads of states in the past 13 months, agreed to sign the Algiers accord with POLISARIO, which led to Mauritania's withdrawal from the Sahara. Not surprisingly this turn of events was considered by some commentators as the most significant development since the struggle for the independence of Western Sahara began.¹⁴ Of great importance was the agreement, that in response to Mauritania's renunciation of all claims to Tiris el Gharbia—the 71,000 square kilometres under its control—the POLISARIO Front "solemnly" declared that "it does not and will not have any claims, territorial or otherwise on Mauritania." Other details of the Algiers Agreement were not made public. Mauritania, which had re-established diplomatic relations with Algeria on 15 August, later pulled its troops out of the former Spanish Sahara.

REPERCUSSIONS IN MOROCCO

Morocco's official reactions to the developing situation in the territory was subdued but swift. On the diplomatic front the Government stated on 13 August, that it would submit a dossier containing "Morocco's explanations and proofs" to the UN, the OAU, and the Arab League and send high-level delegations to friendly countries to explain its point of view. King Hassan also reminded Mauritania that it was bound to Morocco by an economic agreement signed in 1976, a mutual assistance convention signed in 1977 and by the creation of a Supreme Defence Council which in effect had brought the armies of the two countries under a unified command to fight against POLISARIO.¹⁵ Moroccan Foreign Minister, Mohamed Boucetta,

in a statement condemning the agreement further said: "Morocco can only deplore the frivolity and the lack of awareness shown by the signatories of the Agreement at Algiers, for in defence of any bilateral and international involvement, these signatories have usurped all rights and laws and have acted on their own to determine what is to become of their neighbours (Morocco in particular) and stability of the whole region."¹⁶

By another move, however, Morocco pre-empted the peace agreement between Mauritania and Polisario. King Hassan announced that he would pull his troops out of Mauritania, but Morocco which already had a contingent of troops in the Mauritania-administered territory of Tiris-el-Gharbia moved in and took it quickly, renaming the region Oued ed-Dahab; it was also declared a Moroccan province. Militarily weak, Mauritania could only respond by condemning the occupation by Morocco of Tiris el Gharbia as an aggression against its provisional administration in the region and called upon the OAU and the UN to undertake its responsibilities in the region. Morocco meanwhile, has pulled out all its troops from Mauritania.

Mauritania's withdrawal and Morocco's occupation of the entire territory of the Western Sahara led to an intensified war between POLISARIO and Morocco, with heavy casualties on both sides. Since August this year, according to reports, there have been several major attacks such as the one at Lebouirate near Zaaq in southern Morocco and at Smara, the biggest Moroccan garrison some 150 km. from Al Aiun, the capital of Western Sahara. More revealing is a *Le Monde* report quoting a statement by Cheich Mohammed Ali Ould Saud El-Bachir, a leading figure of the town, alleging that Morocco had called on foreign experts to reorganize Moroccan troops and on September 27 and 28, two groups, one composed of American and Egyptian officers and the other of French officers in civilian dress had stayed at Al Aiun.¹⁷

The Moroccan press described the Smara battle as "quite obviously an attack by the regular Algerian Army." Later however, on 16 October, Morocco regained control of the garrison and some thirty journalists were flown to Smara. But despite this setback to the POLISARIO front, the significance of the latter's attack has been well summed up by Tony Hodges, a known authority on the area. He underlined: "First, the very fact that POLISARIO tried to attack Smara, which has a garrison of some 6,000 troops, is an indication of how confident the guerrillas must now feel. Secondly, the Moroccans were not able to capture a single POLISARIO person during the battle, while the guerrillas captured several

Moroccan soldiers. Thirdly, the Moroccans themselves admitted quite heavy losses ... (Lt. Col. Driss Harth, the Moroccan Commander of Smara was among those killed.) Additionally ... the Moroccan authorities wanted eight days before flying journalists to Smara and, when they arrived, refused to let them visit the FARs (Force Armées Royales) dug-in-positions in the surrounding hills." It also seems, according to Hodges, that the POLISARIO forces did break far enough through the Moroccan defence lines to be able to reach the large "tent City" of nomads on Smara's outskirts.¹⁸

The gravity of the threat posed by the POLISARIO guerrillas was further underlined by the use of Mirage F-1 jets (59 of which were said to have been supplied by France) by the Moroccan army. After initial setbacks and relatively heavy casualties, the Moroccan expeditionary force was able to recapture some population centres from the POLISARIO in the months of November and December 1979 and France appears far from being defeated. POLISARIO, according to a report in the *International Herald Tribune* (15 November), is believed to have fielded 10,000 to 15,000 fighters, while half of Morocco's 120,000 military force is involved in the war. Then again POLISARIO is believed to be replenishing its ranks with tribes men and nomadic people from Western Algeria, northern Mauritania, Mali and Niger.

Yet King Hassan is not ready to take any chance. That explains why he had to depend on Egyptian aid. In an interview with weekly *October* President Sadat is reported to have confirmed the delivery of arms to Morocco. He said: "Egypt will support the country and its King in spite of Moroccan politicians who continue to criticise us even as Egyptian arms arrive in Morocco."¹⁹ Describing King Hassan as "a dear friend and politician without equal in the Arab world," Sadat, however, reproached the Moroccan ruler for having counted on Saudi Arabia, saying that with the exception of Egypt "no Arab country budged when 800 Moroccan soldiers were killed and wounded by mercenaries." Saudi Arabia has mocked King Hassan II and has succeeded in taking him into the rejectionist camp (opposing the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty) by exploiting domestic problems and by enrolling politicians in its entourage, President Sadat added.²⁰ This was an apparent reference to the pressure exerted by Saudi Arabia when it reportedly stopped financial assistance to the hard pressed King Hassan because of his defence of Egypt's *rapprochement* with Israel. This forced Morocco to fall in line with the Arab League and King Hassan went to the extent of breaking diplomatic relations with Cairo. This has enabled Morocco again to get Saudi financial aid needed badly both

to prop up the sagging economy and as for arms purchases primarily from France and America. It is obvious however from President Sadat's statement that despite the overt rupture in relations with Egypt, Morocco continues to rely on the latter for military aid. More tangible proof of this was available when on 24 September, the Sahraoui Defence Minister at a Press Conference exhibited Egyptian arms and equipment captured by the POLISARIO guerrillas.²⁰

Another indication of Morocco's weakening position was the US decision on 22 October to finally sell O.V. "Bronco" counter-insurgency planes and Cobra helicopters used in the Vietnam war "to defend itself". Warren Christopher, the US Assistant Secretary of State, visited Rabat towards the end of the month to reiterate the United States "very firm support for Morocco," the strategic importance of which, situated as it is in the Western Mediterranean, is immense to the western powers. Its importance has been greatly enhanced by the naval facilities the King has granted to the US Sixth Fleet.

Morocco's growing isolation at the OAU, the non-aligned movement and the UN has also apparently increased. The 16th Summit Conference of the OAU at Monrovia voted in favour of a referendum on self-determination for the Western Sahara by a two third's majority. The Sixth Non-aligned Summit Conference at Havana, Cuba, welcoming the POLISARIO-Mauritanian peace agreement "deplored the armed occupation by Morocco of the southern part of Western Sahara previously administered by Mauritania" and gave support to the OAU resolution on the territory. The resolutions in the UN Decolonisation Committee and the 34th Session of the General Assembly, while following the line adopted by the OAU, went a step further by recognizing Polisario as the representative of the Sahroui people.

Thus while all these ominous developments could well herald a further escalation of the conflict, more so as Morocco seems to remain intransigent, there is some evidence to suggest that all options have not been foreclosed in seeking a negotiated, though what may yet prove to be a protracted, settlement. Firstly, the OAU's special committee set up in July 1978 to mediate in bringing the war to an end is trying to create a climate of cooperation rather than confrontation. In its communique of 5 December, it specifically asked the 'international community' to avoid any action which might hinder the committee's work.

The Super Powers happily seem to be still exercising some caution. Even the United States' agreement to extend military credits are seen by observers primarily as a gesture to prop up a

traditional ally and one to which it is ideologically more akin. The fall of King Hassan would, it is generally agreed, lead to a more radical Islamic regime. On the other hand, it is equally significant that coinciding with Warren Christopher's visit to Rabat, President Carter's National security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski was sent to Algiers ostensibly to represent the United States at the anniversary of the Algerian revolution on 31 October. It is certain however that some exploratory talks were held on the possibility of narrowing the gap in the divergent attitudes of the two main protagonists in the Maghreb. The United States, it may be pointed, has excellent economic relations with Algeria. Similarly, although Moscow continues to supply arms to POLISARIO, there are no signs to show that it wants to be embroiled in the conflict. Finally, there are signs that France which has adopted an overtly interventionist role and thus largely responsible for aggravating the crisis is now mending its relations with Algeria. It is also clear that the French Government is keenly interested in protecting the sovereignty of Mauritania and it would not allow the latter's independence to be usurped by any neighbour, including POLISARIO.

Ultimately, the way the crisis evolves will depend on how the concerned governments behave and on what they decide. The prospects, however, of Algeria and Morocco going to war is viewed more with apprehension than relish by both countries and it is precisely for this reason that both the countries have of late reduced verbal condemnation of each other's regime. Yet, the level of hostility between the two countries remains very high and Algerian commitment to POLISARIO is total.

Morocco may be isolated, but it will not give up easily. Morocco's intransigence over the Sahara is understandable. The prospect of getting Saharan phosphate apart, all the policy decisions on the Western Sahara have been concentrated on the person of King Hassan and it is wellknown to him that failure over the issue could risk him his throne. For King Hassan, the Sahara is thus an issue for survival. He recently declared on his 50th birthday: "The Sahara is Moroccan. It will remain Moroccan and cannot be anything but Moroccan. This attitude will be defended with the last drop of our blood."²²

1 There are reported to be scattered POLISARIO bases in Mali also. *New African Year Book*, (London, 1979) p. 54.

3 *Africa Contemporary Record*, (London), 1977-78, See Chapter on Western Sahara.

4 See *Africa Research Bulletin, Series*, (Exeter) 1979, Pp. 5300-5331.

- 5 *New York Times*, 31 January 1978. According to this report the arms deal was said to be worth \$ 100 million, including spare parts and training, and would be partially offset by American military credits of \$ 45 million a year.
- 6 This was reported on 3 November 1978 in *Le Monde* (Paris) during the talks between Algeria's Col. Yahyaoui and the Soviet Defence Minister in Moscow.
- 7 *Africa South of the Sahara*, Europa, (London, 1975), p. 819.
- 8 For full details of the "green march" and other relevant developments refer to *Africa Diary* issues of 1975 and 1976.
- 9 By the end of 1979, 20 out of the OAU's 49 members had recognised SADR.
- 10 *Africa Diary*, (New Delhi) 8-14 October 1978.
- 11 The OAU Special Committee was set up by the OAU Summit in Khartoum in July 1978. It now consists of the heads of state of Liberia, Nigeria, Tanzania, the Sudan and Mali, which has been asked to seek an end to the war.
- 12 *Africa Diary*, 5-11, March 1979, Pp. 9411-2.
- 13 *West Africa*, (London) 23 July, 1979, p. 1348.
- 14 *West Africa*, 14 August 1979, p. 1449.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 *News from Morocco*, issued by Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco, New Delhi, 11 August, 1979.
- 17 *Le Monde*, (Paris) 27-28 September, 1979.
- 18 *Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series*, 1979, p. 5480.
- 19 *International Herald Tribune*, 24 October, 1979.
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 Moroccan diplomats however insist that Egyptian arms never reached Rabat.
- 22 *West Africa*, 30 July, 1979, p. 1363.

THE STRUGGLE IN WESTERN SAHARA

M. BEDJAOU

A stubborn power is becoming involved in a hopeless war.* It is perpetuating the disturbing spectre of expansionism.

A people is fighting, suffering, dying and bearing witness. It refuses to undergo a second colonization.

The international community is calling for the freedom of that people with justice, coherence and consistency. It refuses to recognize the right of conquest.

This is the whole question of Western Sahara in its true dimensions.

There is no need to recall the origin or the dramatic vicissitudes of this problem of decolonization, which is perfectly well-known to everyone. Nor is there any need to recall the impressive list of resolutions and declarations by many international or regional bodies. Since 1966 these have been addressed to the administering power and since 1975 to the new occupiers, so as to ensure the effective exercise of what President Kaunda of Zambia so rightly described at the recent Havana Summit of non-aligned nations as the "gift of God", i.e., the right to self-determination of the Saharan people, which no one else in the world, he said, could take away from it.

This is a territory whose independence has been blocked by the forces of its neighbours at the very moment when that independence was about to be achieved, following the withdrawal of the administering power. The cause of the people of this territory is, therefore, our cause, because it puts to the test the very foundations and basic principles of the international community. It is also the

*Statement by M. Bedjaoui, Permanent Representative of Algeria, at the 19th meeting of the General Assembly Fourth Committee on 30 October 1979.

cause of the Organization of African Unity which, because of its constitutional commitments to the total decolonization of Africa, has quite naturally considered that its basic task is to support the struggle of African peoples fighting for their national liberation. It is also the cause of the United Nations which, in conformity with its Charter and in keeping with its affirmed principles, is responsible for protecting the right of all colonial peoples to self-determination and recognizes, in particular, that the Saharan people have an inalienable and irrevocable right to decide their own destiny. It is also the cause of the non-aligned movement, one of whose fundamental objectives has been and remains anti-colonialism and constant support for liberation movements.

The problem of decolonization is of all the more concern to international and regional bodies because over the years it has reached proportions which endanger the peace and stability of the whole region following the military *fait accompli* of 1975 and its recent consequences. The policy of *fait accompli*, military occupation and expansionism has always been and remains unacceptable. The use of illegal force to stifle the right of the Saharan people to self-determination is completely incompatible with the ethics of international relations. This principle has been constantly asserted by all the institutions to which the question of Western Sahara has been submitted. By refusing to endorse this policy of blocking the decolonization of Western Sahara, the international community was in fact supporting the resistance of the Saharan people to the elimination of its national existence. The developing struggle of the people of that territory, the sympathy it has evoked in Africa, in the non-aligned movement and in the entire world, and the general support it has elicited, have made it possible over the years and following a number of victories to confound the annexationists and destroy the argument that the case is closed.

The undeniable success of the Saharan fighters in the field has made all regional and international forums aware of the real nature of the problem and has brought home to them the fact that it is basically a problem of decolonization which has been impeded, blocked and frustrated by the military occupation of a neighbouring country. At the same time, there is an increasingly wide recognition by states of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic and of the Frente POLISARIO as the sole legitimate representative of the Saharan people. These states now include the former administering Power and Mauritania. Today some 34 states in Africa, Latin America and Asia have already recognized the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic. Other states have announced their intention

of doing so. This reflects a growing movement of support, which carries high the hopes of the Saharan people in their struggle which is felt as profoundly just by the international community.

The Saharan people owe all their victories to their own efforts, their own bravery and their own sacrifices. Their successes at the international level merely reflect their complete control over the political and military situation in the country which has been liberated for the most part, except for a few enclaves in which the occupation troops have barricaded themselves into defensive camps. Thus the diplomatic situation expressed by the strong support of the international community for the cause of the self-determination of the Saharan people is in no way artificial. It is in perfect harmony with the actual situation prevailing in Western Sahara.

The year 1978 was decisive for an objective assessment of this situation. Beginning in the summer of that year, certain changes in the political attitude of one of the two occupying states and the decision of the Frente POLISARIO to maintain a ceasefire offered new possibilities for a negotiated solution. A process then began which seemed to open up new possibilities for putting an end to a situation of war and tension and bringing us to a solution in conformity with the legitimate aspirations of the people of Western Sahara. At the same time, the Organization of African Unity, meeting in Khartoum, decided to establish an *Ad Hoc* Committee¹ of Heads of State to define the framework of a just and lasting solution. Finally, in December 1978 at its thirty-third session, the General Assembly adopted a resolution welcoming the cease-fire declared by the Frente POLISARIO with regard to one of the two occupying states, reaffirmed "the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence" and reiterated its fervent hope that the Organization of African Unity would find a solution in accordance with the right of peoples to self-determination by the time the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly would be convened. This resolution by our thirty-third session was to be particularly fruitful. Indeed the year 1979 will have been as successful as the previous year for the just fight of the Saharan people.

Fully assuming its responsibilities, the Organization of African Unity, at its sixteenth Summit Conference held in Monrovia, established general guidelines for a just and lasting settlement based on the inalienable right of the Saharan people to self-determination. It took this decision in conformity with the recommendations of the *Ad Hoc* Committee composed of eminent African Heads of State to whom Algeria wishes to pay a sincere tribute for their devotion, their efforts and the precious time they spent in the accomplishment

of their lofty mission. In fact the *Ad Hoc* Committee responded to the hope which the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity had so rightly placed in it. After having made a direct and careful inquiry throughout the region into all aspects of the problem and having judiciously analyzed the question and evaluated the situation, the Committee submitted its recommendations to the Conference of Heads of State meeting last July in Liberia. The major decision of the sixteenth Summit meeting of the OAU in Monrovia took into consideration certain realities and gave perfect expression to them. Among these realities we may quote the reaffirmation of the question of Western Sahara as a decolonization problem; the rejection of the idea that this problem originates in a conflict between the Moroccan occupier and Algeria, a country in no way involved; the rejection of the Tripartite Madrid Agreement which had allowed the occupation and division of the territory; the solemn reiteration of the right of the Saharan people freely and directly to decide their own destiny; and, finally, the official recognition of this right by Mauritania which had voted in favour of the decision of the African Heads of State. This was a great victory, a victory for the freedom of all peoples.

In the context of its natural cooperation with the Organization of African Unity, the United Nations should give its firm support to Africa in its historic and courageous decision all the more because two events have occurred since the July meeting in Monrovia.

Mauritania recognizing the wisdom of the recommendations of the *Ad Hoc* Committee of African Heads of State has supported unreservedly the OAU summit decision of July. It has also completely fulfilled its commitments and on 10 August signed a peace agreement with the Frente POLISARIO. In this agreement, duly registered by the United Nations in conformity with Article 102 of the Charter, it withdrew from that part of the territory it had previously occupied. It also recognized the Frente POLISARIO as the legitimate and exclusive representative of the Saharan people and the territorial integrity of western Sahara. This peace agreement was welcomed as a tribute by Mauritania to the decision of the Monrovia summit and is a great step along the path of the peaceful and final settlement of the question of Western Sahara. The United Nations can only welcome this contribution by Mauritania and the POLISARIO to the re-establishment of peace in the region.

But a shadow has unfortunately been cast over the events of 1979, which has been such a good year for the freedom of peoples. In a way which no one has forgotten, Morocco rejected the historic decision of the OAU Monrovia Summit and raised doubts about

Mauritania's right, as a sovereign state, to conclude a treaty. It then sent its army into that part of the territory which Mauritania had been preparing to evacuate. Just when Africa and the entire international community were expecting Morocco to help to bring about a just, sensible and peaceful political solution, it caused a fresh escalation in the military *fait accompli* politics of the region. This warlike act has clearly revealed that Morocco not only is refusing to seek a just and peaceful solution, in accordance with the Monrovia decisions, with regard to that part of the Saharan territory it has been occupying illegally since 1975; it is trying to render null and void the peace agreement which Mauritania, as a sovereign state, has concluded with the Frente POLISARIO in respect of the other part of the territory. Invoking a so-called right of pre-emption from the dusty archives of the colonial Powers at the time of the 19th century Congress of Berlin, Morocco is thus showing that its policy of expansionism continues. Those who had thought (and admittedly they are few), on the basis of repeated assurances, that Morocco's expansionist policy would stop with the first military *fait accompli* and the partition of the territory in 1976, are now discovering that its action had merely been a prelude to other activities aimed at escalating the annexation of the territory by force.

The extremely serious problem thus created two months ago and dangerously compounded by many other problems arising from the 1975 occupation represents a new challenge for Africa, for the movement of non-aligned countries and for the entire international community. Morocco is attempting to institutionalize the *anschluss* policy without any regard for Africa's decisions, for ethical international relations, for Mauritania's sovereign right to negotiation or for fundamental national rights of the Saharan people. This new challenge underscores in particular the disturbing nature of Morocco's policy, which affects the very basis of peace in the region. When expansionism takes such a free, untrammelled course and becomes such an alarming danger for everyone, the people involved cannot fail to take up the challenge to the survival of their freedom. Now that force is overriding what is right, the option to use force cannot remain indefinitely with Morocco alone. By defying so seriously, with this new act, the historic OAU decision, by opposing the peace agreement concluded by Mauritania as a sovereign state, by undermining the most basic principles of the Charter, Morocco is assuming a direct responsibility for the confrontations which it is actively fostering in the region.

The least can be said about this new version of *fait accompli* by Morocco is that it signifies a dangerous policy of adventurism and,

at the same time, brings out into the open Morocco's true annexationist motives, which had hitherto been screened, albeit badly, by the specious argument about territorial integrity. The occupier itself had considered territorial integrity to be fully guaranteed when it partitioned the territory in 1976. Since it deliberately violated, in August 1979, the frontiers which, at its own discretion, it had itself considered sufficient to ensure its territorial integrity, it is today quite obvious to all that the so-called territorial integrity which Morocco has too often invoked, and always out of season, has time and again served to conceal what eventually emerges as a very clearly defined policy of expansionism. If there was still a country which honestly believed Morocco's specious argument about territorial integrity, the new and inherently serious annexation of August 1979, which aggravated an already disquieting situation, provided ample proof that Morocco did respond, both the first time and the second, to unacceptable annexationist impulses and dangerous expansionist stimuli.

Africa has been ridiculed and the Saharan people wronged by these new incidents of aggression, which have had an even more serious effect on OAU efforts to find a solution compatible with the legitimate aspirations of the Saharan people. In September 1979, the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries supported the OAU decision and praised Mauritania and the Frente POLISARIO for the peace agreement they had reached; it also strongly deplored the persistence and expansion of Morocco's armed occupation of Western Sahara. It is up to the United Nations, as guarantor of the freedom of peoples, to intensify its vigilance over the grave situation in our region and to show once again its firm support for the struggle of the Saharan people. This is a particularly fitting time for the United Nations to make such a contribution, thereby demonstrating its loyalty to its ideals and principles, encouraging the efforts of the OAU, doing justice to a people struggling for their freedom and satisfy the hopes that all peoples have placed in it. In these circumstances, the consideration of the question of Western Sahara during the 34th session assumes special importance. This problem requires from the entire international community a commitment to shoulder squarely its important responsibilities. Commendable efforts, for which the peoples of the region cannot but express their deep gratitude, have been made by the OAU and encouraged recently by the non-aligned countries.

Accordingly, any acts of incitement or encouragement designed to broaden the conflict between Morocco and the Saharan people will inevitably create turmoil in northern Africa and perhaps in a

large part of the continent as well, in an era of dangerous disturbances, instability and great misfortune for our peoples. One super Power is now gratuitously running the grave risk of exacerbating, broadening and dangerously transforming the conflict. As matters stand, it is as if that super Power was challenging the peace whose foundations have just been laid at Monrovia; it is as if it were challenging the OAU and all the African Heads of State who worked out the elements of this peaceful solution.

The problem of the decolonization of Western Sahara is a problem of genuine national liberation. It is fundamentally different from any kind of subversive or ideological war. The Frente POLISARIO has untiringly proposed holding negotiations with Morocco in order to reach an appropriate solution in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and that of the OAU, and in compliance with the relevant resolutions recently adopted by the two organizations. Political problems require political solutions, but Morocco has responded to the willingness of the Frente POLISARIO to end the war and to its serious and responsible appeals for peace by increasing its armaments, expanding its territorial annexation, calling upon Powers outside the African Continent and more serious still, on a super Power which will henceforth guarantee Morocco military support. Morocco has thus demonstrated its intention to elevate a colonial conflict to the international level, with all the disastrous consequences such a change in the nature of the problem could have for the entire region. The fears which we voiced about the implications of the continuation of the situation in Western Sahara are unfortunately being realized one by one, with the emergence of disturbing factors which increase the vulnerability of our continent and open the door to super Power interference.

One super Power presently is deliberately moving against the trend of events. It has not hesitated to opt for a solution by war at a time when Africa is working towards peaceful settlement. It is thus slowing down the peace momentum. It has compounded the military risk of internationalization of the conflict with a political challenge to the authors of the historic Monrovia decision. And it is taking no account of the growing international sympathy for the just struggle of the Saharan people. It has offered appreciable military support to the forces of occupation in an effort to exterminate the Saharan people.

It cannot be over-emphasized that the problem of the decolonization of Western Sahara is a political problem which requires a political solution. The tragic deadlock in the region is the direct result of Morocco's dangerous intransigence. After the Monrovia

Summit, it is now more obvious than ever that the will to promote a negotiated political solution is present, except on the part of Morocco. The people of Western Sahara are animated by this will and their leaders have not stopped calling for negotiations for a return to peace. Mauritania has given tangible expression to this will, thanks to the political courage and sense of justice of its leaders, who have had the wisdom to take the road leading to appeasement and reconciliation. In order to defuse a situation in the region which has become more explosive than ever, the United Nations must launch an urgent appeal to Morocco and Morocco must heed that appeal and enter into negotiations with the Frente POLISARIO, the legitimate and authentic representative of the Saharan people. In spite of and perhaps because of the present worsening of the situation, and in spite of the military support pledged to Morocco by a super Power, the climate is more conducive than ever to a political solution, only if Morocco would heed the appeal of the international community. The draft resolution just submitted to the Fourth Committee by 40 sponsors takes account of the obvious and urgent need to initiate political negotiations with a view to restoring peace. The subjects, means and purposes of such negotiations are very clear. Any peaceful solution must necessarily be based on the right of the people of Western Sahara freely to decide their own destiny, on negotiations with the Frente POLISARIO to that end and on respect for the principles and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and the OAU.

The people of Western Sahara want to be sole masters of their own destiny. The close ties of civilization, religion, tradition and language that link them to other peoples to the south, east and north do not authorize the leader of any of those peoples to vitiate the clearly defined national identity of that proud and free people. Just as the colonizers of earlier times have lost out, so today's occupiers will meet defeat. One can well imagine the excitement, the sweet, fervent joy which the Saharan fighters felt when they recently stormed and invested their holy city of Smara, the historical and cultural shrine which bears such noble witness to their national identity. From their point of view, the forces of occupation are assuming and waging without conviction a doubtful rear-guard battle doomed to failure in the impasse of history.

However much Mirage jets continue to spit fire from the skies on the heads of the Saharan freedom fighters, they will be powerless to break the spirit of those men. The results of those Mirage operations will be as illusory as the 'mirages' which appear in the Sahara. As surely as heaven belongs to martyrs, so the land of the

living will sooner or later belong to the Saharan people in their homeland. Is it conceivable that so much courage and so many sacrifices and successes in such a just cause will be fruitless? Is it conceivable that the admiration inspired by the inexorable march, in an attitude of calm assurance, by the Saharan people towards freedom can be concealed indefinitely? The war of sand against the new occupiers is five years old. It has now clearly emerged from the shadow and the halo which surrounded it. A Saharan proverb quite rightly assures us that heaven lies at the end of the road of patience. In this desert where mirages lead only outsiders astray and where sandstorms catch only new-comers unaware, only the Saharan people can show us the way. For they are a people who know where they are going, whether at the age-old pace of caravans of peace or at the modern-day pace of military convoys, with only the unquenchable thirst for independence as their compass.

¹The Committee, made up of Tanzania, Nigeria, Mali, Sudan and Liberia, recommended after a two-day meeting ending on 5 December 1979 that a peace-keeping force monitor a cease-fire in the disputed territory. *Associated Press*, 6 December 1979.

UN RESPONSIBILITY IN WESTERN SAHARA

TINGUIRI MANSOUR OMAR

The situation prevailing in the world as the Fourth Committee commences its work is one in which the racist colonial forces are losing their last strongholds to the inexorable and irreversible advance of the movement to liberate those peoples which are still under colonial or racist domination.* As a result, now more than ever, the attention and hopes of the African peoples are focussed on the outcome of the Committee's work—hopes which demand that the Committee assume its responsibilities with regard to the crime committed against the Saharan people who are the victims of criminal aggression and savage occupation.

United Nation's responsibility for the struggle of our peoples to safeguard their independence and free their country from foreign occupation derives from the duty entrusted to the Organization by the Charter and by General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. It is within the context of the implementation of their provisions that the question of decolonization of Western Sahara has always been viewed with considerable concern. I do not intend to dwell at length on all the stages through which the process of western Sahara's decolonization has passed. Allow me, however, to recall that our people's struggle, first against Spanish colonization and then against the conspiracy and aggression by Morocco and its accomplices, has over the past decade been the subject of resolutions and decisions adopted by the United Nations and its organs on

*Based on a statement made by Tinguiri Mansour Omar of the *Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el Hamara y Rio de oro* (Frente POLISARIO) to the UN Fourth Committee on Decolonization at its 15th meeting, on 14 October 1979, when it considered the Question of Western Sahara.

the basis of the Charter and, in particular, of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Resolution 1514 (XV)). In this way, the international community hopes to perform its task of ensuring or safeguarding the implementation of a cardinal principle, that of the right of peoples to self-determination, and continue to view clearly and objectively the war imposed on the Saharan people by the Moroccan aggression. So the United Nations task is to help our people, like other peoples, to free themselves from a situation of subjugation, domination and foreign exploitation which is designed to deny our most elementary fundamental rights and to threaten peace and security in the region. The right of peoples to self-determination is a right which the international community has raised to the level of an irrefutable, irresistible and undeniable sacred principle, by virtue of which every people is free to determine its political status and to pursue its economic, social and cultural development without interference. This principle is stated in general terms in Resolution 1514 (XV), on which the relevant resolutions on Western Sahara are based.

In 1975, after a long and arduous struggle, when our people were about to exercise their rights and recover their lost sovereignty after more than a century of Spanish colonial occupation, a criminal conspiracy was mounted against them. It is with bitterness that we recall that this crime was designed to prevent our people from exercising their inalienable right to self-determination and independence and to subject them to genocide. The authors of that crime, however, committed a major error of judgement, for they underestimated our people's capacity not only to enforce their rights but also to pursue their struggle until the conspiracy failed and the country was totally liberated. The conspiracy thus carried the seeds of its own destruction, for the aggressors left our people no alternative but to fight to ensure that their independence and territorial integrity would be respected. In such a situation, any people would respond by exercising their right to self-defence.

The situation after four years of cruel war shows that the aggressors were wrong; the Saharan people are indeed capable of defending their right to independence and Morocco and its accomplices cannot carry out their base designs. By their struggle and sacrifices, the Saharan people have made tremendous gains in the field and have thwarted the enemy's plans. Today, the Saharan Government has liberated almost all its national territory.

Having broken, once and for all, the military alliance between Morocco and Mauritania against our people, the Saharan People's

Liberation Army (SPLA) is effectively in control of the situation and has the upper hand in battles against the Moroccan army of occupation. At the same time, in exercise of our right to self-defence, we have now taken the war to the Moroccan forces' rearguard bases inside Morocco. I should, however, like to stress that our army's military operations against the Moroccan army's rearguard bases are designed solely to force that army to evacuate those areas of our country which are still under illegal occupation. The Government of Morocco must be made to realize that, as long as its army occupies any portion of our country, however small, our army will intensify its attacks on that army both within and outside western Sahara. The liberation of almost all our national territory, and the victories won daily by SPLA show that the defeat of the Moroccan army in western Sahara is inevitable. The victories of the Saharan army at Amgala, Tifariti, Hausa, Lemseyed, Libtaina, Tantan, Lebouirate, Zag, Engab, Tiguiy y Remth Al Lbane Bir-Enzaran, Semora, Mahbes, etc., and the capture of an increasingly impressive number of prisoners-of-war are facts which neither Moroccan propaganda nor Morocco's customary distortion of the truth can conceal. On each occasion the Frente POLISARIO has, through the press and on the occasion of numerous visits by international personalities to the liberated territories, called the international community to witness the results of the military campaigns. Thus, at every possible opportunity, the prisoners-of-war and large amounts of war material captured have been seen by the press and by foreign delegations.

Our country is caught up in a cruel war in which the enemy aggressor forces it to mobilize every conceivable effort. The Government of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, however, has during these four years of war been able to structure and organize the state's institutions. Since 27 February 1976, when our people proclaimed the Republic as a sovereign state, necessary structures have been created. At the national level, our Government is conducting necessary state activities through its departments and services. In this period of war, our concern is to create the necessary socio-economic and administrative conditions to enable our people to enjoy health care; receive an education and meet their basic needs, as also to enjoy freedom and safety in the liberated areas. Thus, at the national level, the following institutions have been created :

- (a) The "9 June" Education Centre, which provides secondary education;
- (b) A national hospital for patients who could not be treated at regional hospitals and local clinics;
- (c) The "12 October" Military Academy, which provides

- military training for the various sectors of our army;
- (d) The "27 February" School which provides vocational and military training for Saharan women, who participate actively in the war;
 - (e) The Saharan Red Crescent, which is responsible for supplies.

At the regional level, in each territorial administrative department or *Wilaya*, a hospital, a school, a supply branch and other vital services meet the needs of the population of the respective *Wilayas* and *Dairas* in the national territory. This sums up briefly the efforts which we are making concurrently to organize the country administratively, alongside the military struggle.

On the international front the growth of relations between the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic and other countries and people of the world must be appreciated. The upsurge of recognition and support for the Republic, under the leadership of the Frente POLISARIO shows that our people's cause commands the admiration and respect of the international community. A large majority of States have relations with the Frente POLISARIO, as the sole legitimate representative of Saharan people, and the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic is recognised by 34 countries, 20 of them from Africa and the rest from Latin America and Asia.

This situation is marked by our Government's efforts to reduce the suffering of our people, who are still exposed to the horrors of occupation and war. In the areas still occupied by Morocco, our civilian populations are subjected to terror, repression and systematic extermination. Concentration camps have been established in which hundreds of children, women and old people die everyday. I use the word "terror" advisedly, because torture, kidnapping and rape are practised daily by the criminal officers of the Moroccan army, whose methods are comparable only to those of the Nazis. Morocco's criminal actions to uproot our populations from the occupied areas and to destroy our culture and traditional values by introducing drugs, corruption, rape of minors and other indescribable practices, must be added to those already mentioned above. For the past two years, the occupying forces have adopted a policy of colonization involving the settlement of Moroccan civilians in the occupied areas of our country—a colonialist practice with which you are familiar. The complications which such methods add to the situation need not be described here; they cannot escape the attention of the international community, which must denounce and thwart this dangerous process. It is this policy of settlement, extermination and occupation that has forced thousands of Saharans to live in shanty

towns around the occupied cities, while others have been forced to take refuge in neighbouring countries.

Before moving on to my next point, I must express to you as representatives of the international community our indignation and disappointment at the virtual indifference of the international humanitarian organizations which are morally and even legally bound to respond to this kind of disaster. At the same time, the Saharan Government would like to express its sincere gratitude to the brother peoples of the Libyan Arab Jamāhiriya and Algeria for the fraternal assistance which they are rendering us in these difficult and testing moments of suffering. The Saharan people and its Government are also grateful to humanitarian organizations of Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany for the humanitarian aid which they have offered to our refugees.

The 34th session marks a final stage in the process of decolonization of western Sahara begun by the United Nations, in which Resolution 33/31 A of 13 December 1978 was one of the most recent developments. That resolution reflected the dynamic and positive developments with regard to the question of western Sahara within this world organization. In reaffirming that this is a question of decolonization covered by Resolution 1514 (XV) and that our people must therefore exercise their right to self-determination and independence, that resolution rejected categorically the aggressor's attempts to present the international community with a *fait accompli* of military occupation. Faithful to the goal of decolonization, that same resolution took note of the Frente POLISARIO's initiative in deciding unilaterally and provisionally on a cease-fire in Mauritanian territory. Thus we note with satisfaction that the Fourth Committee's action keeps pace with developments on the ground. The statements by a representative of the Frente POLISARIO in the Security Council and in the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples also reflect the increasing importance which all United Nations organs attach to the decolonization of western Sahara and bear witness to the failure of Morocco's attempts to place the problem outside its true context. In this way, the international community has rejected its role as accomplice in a blatant manoeuvre by the colonialist forces which, in their inability to stifle the determination of peoples to throw off the colonial yoke and seize their independence, are resorting to accusations against third states.

We would advise Morocco that it is time it faced up to the facts and stopped abusing international and Moroccan public opinion,

by covering up its defeat by accusations against third states. We realize that it is perhaps most unpleasant for the "great army" of his "Majesty" the King of Morocco to acknowledge defeat at the hands of the tiny Saharan people. But defeat is inevitable, and no propaganda can hide it. The victorious campaigns of SPLA, which have resulted in thousands of deaths, the taking of hundreds of prisoners and the capture of vast quantities of light and heavy material daily are harsh realities.

This year has seen positive far-reaching developments in the situation which have created the necessary conditions for the 34th session and the Fourth Committee in particular, to take a decision commensurate with the responsibilities of the United Nations under Resolution 1514 (XV). One of the most important developments this year was the decision taken by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the organization of African Unity at its 16th session, held in Monrovia in July¹. By that decision, the OAU assumed its responsibilities by adopting a specific resolution which called for the decolonization of western Sahara. The position taken on our problem by the African states at Monrovia is clear and unequivocal. They reaffirm the right of the Saharan people to self-determination and independence. We can deduce from this that they reject categorically the occupation of our country by Moroccan expansionists. They also decided that the parties to the conflict must have recourse to political channels as a means of finding a just and lasting solution to the problem, a solution which would ensure self-determination and independence to the Saharan peoples.

The parties to the conflict were also solemnly invited to meet and initiate negotiations, with a view to reaching a peaceful settlement in accordance with that resolution. In response to Africa's appeal, and in its concern to see the restoration of justice and peace in the region, the Saharan Government invited the two other parties to the conflict (Morocco and Mauritania) to meet with us in Bamako, the capital of Mali, or in any other African capital, in order to initiate peace negotiations. While Mauritania and the Frente POLISARIO immediately embarked on the road to peace, the Moroccan Government's response to the African initiative was mere arrogance. The Moroccan delegation in Monrovia reacted with blackmail and insults to the African verdict, withdrawing from the conference after the failure of its attempts to impose its wishes against the views of the African community as a whole. History too will recall how the King of Morocco treated the African Heads of State and their organization with scorn, referring insultingly to the decision which they had taken in Monrovia in support of justice and peace. Thus it was that, at his

press conference on 19 August 1979 in Fez, the King of Morocco described the OAU conference as a "meeting of tom-tom players" and the OAU as a "cesspool."²

Nonetheless, you will probably recall in this Committee at the 3rd session, the Moroccan delegation mobilized all efforts to make the General Assembly adopt Resolution 33/31B and that the resolution was adopted, on the proposal of the Moroccan delegation, and contained only one substantive reference to the idea of entrusting the question to the OAU and its Ad Hoc Committee on Western Sahara. Morocco must be consistent and stop abusing the good faith of United Nations member-states. If it does not do so, the international community must force it to respect the rules of membership of international organizations. The United Nations must henceforth reject Morocco's continued disregard of its resolutions, and of its obligations as a Member of the United Nations whose duty it is to abide by the decisions adopted by the Organization.

The signing in Algiers on 10 August 1979 of a peace agreement³ between Mauritania and the Frente POLISARIO is another new development to which the international community must direct its attention and interest, given the decisive impact which it has had on the situation. In addition to being the logical and natural extension of the OAU Monrovia decision, this agreement is important because its effective contribution to the peace and hence the security of western Sahara, and of the region as a whole, is considerable. Also, it is the expression of the sovereign wishes of two of the three parties to the conflict; it brings to an end the war between them and it opens up a new era of understanding, good neighbourliness and cooperation based on respect for each country's sovereignty within the framework of their territorial integrity.

The signature of this agreement marks the break-up of the political alliance against our people, of the so-called "Madrid Tripartite Agreement". Mauritania, which had been an essential party to the "Madrid Agreement" henceforth recognizes, as you must have noted from the Algiers Peace Agreement, not only the illegality of the criminal undertaking to deprive the Saharan people of their rights but also the Frente POLISARIO as the sole legitimate representative of that people. I would also like to recall that Spain, the administering power for western Sahara, has in fact by its position gone beyond the "Madrid Agreement", which was Morocco's only hobby-horse. The ruling party in Spain, the *Union del Centro Democrático* (UCD), has recognized the right of the Saharan people

to self-determination and the Frente POLISARIO as their sole legitimate representative. Such recognition was recently reaffirmed by Spain's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Marcelino Oreja Aguirre. In a statement to *Le Monde* on 21 August 1979, he observed that western Sahara was still an international territory and that his Government's position was identical to that of its party (UCD). That position was again reaffirmed in his statement to the United Nations General Assembly on 24 September 1979.⁴

Instead of drawing inspiration from the courage and sense of responsibility of the Mauritanian and Saharan Governments, King Hassan II of Morocco has turned his back on peace and opted for the path of violence. His persistence in his military aggression and his decision to extend Morocco's military occupation to the city of Dakhla, prior to Mauritania's withdrawal under the provisions of the agreement of 10 August, are clear proof of the intransigence of the Moroccan Government and its intention of persisting in military escalation, in defiance of law, justice and the interests of the peoples of the entire region.

The paragraphs on the question of western Sahara in the Political Declaration of the sixth Conference of Heads of State of Non-Aligned countries, held in Havana from 3 to 9 September 1979⁵ are also a new and extremely important development which cannot fail to add weight to western Sahara's case at the present session. Although the Moroccan delegation resorted to all kinds of manoeuvres and systematically opposed the inclusion of that question on the agenda of the Havana Conference Member states assumed responsibility and expressed firm solidarity with the Saharan people in their struggle for independence by adopting the paragraphs on the question of western Sahara unanimously. This historic document indicates the firmness with which the non-aligned countries met Morocco's challenge and supported the just cause of our people.

When they analysed the problem in its true context, namely, as a case of incomplete decolonization caused by colonial aggression, the Heads of State of the non-aligned countries uncovered the dangers inherent in the Moroccan occupation of western Sahara and demanded that the right of the Saharan people to self-determination and independence be scrupulously respected. At the same time, they emphasized that the historic decision taken by the OAU in Monrovia provided a dynamic and positive impetus for restoring peace in western Sahara by returning their sovereignty to the Saharan people, thereby ushering in a new era in the region in which the demons of expansionism and disregard for the right of peoples will give way to fraternal cooperation, good neighbourliness, security and stability

among our peoples.

While Africa, the non-aligned movement and the United Nations have all agreed in repeated resolutions that the Moroccan aggression against Western Sahara represents a threat not only to justice and law but also to peace and stability on the African continent, the King of Morocco, with the complicity of certain countries, has paved the way for the internationalization of the war. In that regard, I would like to stress that the Egyptian military intervention and the collaboration of certain non-African powers with the Moroccan army provide irrefutable evidence of the serious escalation towards internationalization of the war and constitute a challenge to Africa, which is working untiringly to find a peaceful solution to the question of western Sahara.

The recent decision of President Carter of the United States of America to increase aid to Morocco by providing sophisticated anti-guerrilla material has dealt a serious blow to the movement that had given hope of a just and lasting solution to the question of the decolonization of western Sahara. The United States has thus supported Morocco's intransigence and pushed the region through fire and sword towards the internationalization of the war. This is also a blow to the wise decisions of the OAU, of the non-aligned nations and of the United Nations, which had struggled for so many years to ensure respect for the right of the Saharan people to self-determination and independence. If domestic considerations (elections) have prevailed in President Carter's mind, to the detriment of his obligation to respect the right of the Saharan people to self-determination and independence, that does not mean that he can forget the responsibility of his country as a member of the Security Council to strive for peace and stability in this region of Africa and the Mediterranean. If we really wish to put out the fire, we should not pour more fuel on it. Whoever wishes to help Morocco should show it how to get out of the war. To turn a simple problem of decolonization into an international conflagration of unlimited proportions is a crime for which Morocco and its accomplices must assume responsibility and take the consequences.

The leaders of the Saharn Arab Democratic Republic, in their desire to spare our continent further suffering and upheavals have so far at tremendous sacrifice avoided any action that might internationalize the conflict. We are still hoping for urgent action by the international community to deal with this threat. But we wish to make it clear for the historical record and for you today, that the possibility of an international conflict does not frighten us and that we will surely be the winners. Our people, with their initiative and their unswerv-

ing determination, will find the best way of facing the challenge of conspiracies that are condemned by history and by mankind. If Morocco continues its military escalation towards internationalization of the war, what choice will we have? Are we to stand and look on while Morocco perpetrates its crime? Or are we to defend ourselves against death? One need not be a wise man to know the answer. We will defend ourselves.

The specific developments of the current year, particularly the decision taken by the OAU in Monrovia, the peace agreement with Mauritania, the declaration by the Sixth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries on western Sahara and the evolution of the position of Spain, the administering power, provide the United Nations with an opportunity at this 34th session fully to discharge its responsibilities. The developments of the current year make it incumbent upon the Fourth Committee to take the measures necessary to fulfil the responsibilities of the United Nations set forth in the Charter and in General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV). We must face realities, bearing in mind that the problem of western Sahara can be solved only by guaranteeing and respecting the right of the Saharan people to self-determination and independence.

The various types of manoeuvres which the Moroccan Government has resorted to in order to change the course of the process of decolonization of western Sahara, as well as to undermine the efforts of the African and the non-aligned countries and the United Nations, must be rejected by the international community. The regional economic measures which the King of Morocco has advocated, following his failure in western Sahara, are nothing but an illusion which can deceive on one but him. Having been unable to impose the *fait accompli* of military occupation, the King of Morocco is now resorting to a manoeuvre typical of colonialists. We recall the tendentious origin of the idea of the "Greater Sahara" as a "sea of sand", over which there is no sovereignty. Hassan II of Morocco will not stop acting as a peddler of dreams. But it is time for him to wake up, for this region has no room for empires and there is no such thing as a "sea of sand"; there are only states living within their respective boundaries which have been delimited and established according to the cardinal principle of the OAU Charter; the intangibility of boundaries inherited from colonial times.

Like the other states of the region, the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic is fighting to preserve this cardinal principle of the OAU by defending its boundaries. Following the failure of his attempt to divide our country with Mauritania, the King of Morocco is seeking a new partner in his endeavour against the Saharan people. But

those states to which he is "generously" offering an outlet to the sea through a redistribution of our country should not let themselves be deceived; they can discern the underlying implications of this diabolical proposition. Morocco's true plan is not based on generosity or on a sense of responsibility, but is a manoeuvre aimed at calling into question the principle of the intangibility of borders and thus upsetting the stability of the states it mentions in its letter, so as to divert the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the OAU away from its true purpose. It is perfectly clear that the war of aggression waged by Morocco against the Saharan people is purely a colonial war. It is a case of an aggressor and a victim of aggression. It is the duty of the international community to act decisively on behalf of the victim.

We for our part are convinced that peaceful means should prevail over violence. That is why the Frente POLISARIO fully believes that the United Nations has a role to play in achieving the restoration of peace and justice in our country. The international community can attest to our full willingness to meet with the Moroccan Government to negotiate the restoration of peace, justice and fraternal cooperation. The signing of the peace agreement of 10 August 1979 between Mauritania and the Frente POLISARIO is an example of wisdom, responsibility and realism and should inspire the Moroccan Government to desist from its intransigence, which is bound to have dire consequences, and from its preference for a course of violence over one of justice and reason. In any case, we wish to reiterate here an aspect of our policy which has been constant, namely, our willingness to cooperate with the United Nations in whatever efforts may be required to seek a just and legal solution. This willingness to seek political solutions is equal only to our determination to fight, as we are fighting now, to defend our independence.

1. The Summit adopted by the necessary two-thirds majority of 33 votes a five-nation OAU report calling for a referendum on self-determination for the Western Sahara.
2. *Le Monde* 20 August 1979
3. Under the agreement Mauritania renounced all claims to Tiris el-Gharbia, the 71,000 square miles in the southern part of the Sahara under its control. Morocco, which already had a contingent of troops in the Mauritanian administered territory, moved in and took over by stages, renaming the region Oued ed-Dahab and declaring it to be a Moroccan province. The war between Morocco and *Polisario* goes on.
4. United Nations General Assembly Official Records Doc. A/34/PV. 5.
5. The Conference expresses its deep concern at the serious situation prevailing in western Sahara because the decolonization process in this territory has not been carried to its conclusion in accord with United Nations General

Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) concerning the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

For this reason, it has recalled the decisions of the non-aligned countries and the United Nations and OAU resolutions on the question of western Sahara, especially United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3331 (XXXIII), which reaffirms the inalienable right of western Sahara people to self-determination and independence.

The Conference has viewed with satisfaction the recommendations of the OAU Ad Hoc Committee on western Sahara, adopted by the 16th OAU Conference of Heads of State or Government, held in Monrovia (July 1979):

Considering that these recommendations have not led to the Western Saharan people's exercise of their right to self-determination or to any transfer of the sovereignty of this territory, the Conference considers that the creation of the Special OAU Committee established at the 16th OAU Summit should provide a guarantee that the Saharan people can exercise their right to self-determination and independence as soon as possible.

The Conference welcomes the agreement made between the Republic of Mauritania and the Polisario Front, and the Republic of Mauritania's decision to withdraw its forces from western Saharan territory. The Conference deplors the armed occupation by Morocco of the southern part of western Sahara previously administered by Mauritania. It expresses the hope that all the parties involved will cooperate in implementing the recommendations of the OAU *Ad Hoc* Committee adopted in Monrovia by the 16th Summit in order to arrive at a just solution to the question of western Sahara.

MOROCCAN STAND ON WESTERN SAHARA

A. FILALI

My* Country has been one of the sponsors of General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) and has had the honour to be the initiator of the first steps taken by the United Nations to condemn colonial domination and defend the right to self-determination of all peoples under colonial rule. In 1960 the first African Conference of Solidarity with peoples struggling for their liberation met in Casablanca; it was an event which contributed to the implementation of Resolution 1514 (XV) in Africa. Ever since 1960 Morocco has striven to ensure that the implementation of the principle of self-determination should not bring new injustices in its wake or lead to the breaking up of nations that have suffered from the ambitions of the colonial powers, which had fragmented them in order to serve their short-term economic and strategic interests.

The text of Resolution 1514 (XV) leaves no doubt that the liberation of peoples under colonial domination should not imperil the territorial integrity and unity of states. The particular situation of each territory should be taken into account in the implementation of the Resolution; the United Nations should avoid provoking new situations of conflict or justify the artificial division of nations and the creation of puppet entities which lack true nation-hood.

My delegation reiterates that the inclusion of the so-called question of the Western Sahara on the agenda of the Fourth Committee is no longer justified, given that the territory has been decolonized once and for all in accordance with international law, the rele-


*Dr. Filali is the Moroccan Permanent Representative at the U.N.

vant resolutions of the United Nations and the wishes of the population concerned. The provinces of Saguia El Hamra and Oued Eddahab have been reintegrated into the homeland from which they had been separated by the expansionism of the European Powers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries; that expansionism which had broken up pre-colonial Morocco—whose existence has been recognized by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion of 16 October 1975—and created artificial colonial frontiers where neither nations nor states had existed before.

Since 1956, when it regained independence in part of its national territory, Morocco has made every effort to recover its territorial integrity, a goal which has in part been attained with the recovery, through negotiations, of the Saharan province of Tarfaya and the Ifni enclave. Regrettably, it has not been possible to apply the process followed in the decolonization of Ifni to the Western Sahara, although the General Assembly recommended in Resolution 2072 (XX) that both territories should be decolonized by means of negotiations with the administering Power.

It was Morocco that first brought up the question of the Western Sahara in the United Nations, and it took the initiative in 1974 of asking the General Assembly to seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the dispute between Morocco and Spain, the administering Power of the territories. Since then, pursuant to United Nations resolutions, Morocco has adopted measures such as the Madrid Agreement of 14 November 1975 concluded following the request by the Security Council (Resolution 377 (1975)), has taken steps towards the final decolonization of the territory and concluded economic, social and cultural agreements with Mauritania.

If it were not for the hegemonistic caprices of a neighbouring state, co-operation between Morocco and Mauritania might have been extended to the whole of the Maghreb. Once decolonization was achieved, the challenges of under-development had to be faced. Morocco, however, has not been able to attain that peaceful goal or respond to the aspirations of its people because some have elected to follow the path of subversion and destabilization in order to satisfy their thirst for power. The alleged agreement that Mauritania was forced to sign in Algiers on 5 August 1979 could not have any legal value at the international level because the co-signatory had no legal personality and no representation standing. In its arguments before the Fourth Committee, Algeria resorted to falsifying official documents, in particular the decision adopted by the Organization of African Unity at Monrovia. The representative of Algeria then stated



that the Algiers Agreement of 5 August 1979, in which a territory had been ceded to the so-called Frente POLISARIO, was a direct consequence of the Monrovia meeting. Yet the Algiers Agreement openly contradicted the Monrovia decision, which called for a referendum on self-determination whereby the Saharan people could choose between total independence or maintenance of the *status quo*. These manoeuvres reveal the true intentions of Algeria's proclamations of support for the principle of self-determination. Algeria's representatives have stated that its interest in the evolution of the territory of western Sahara was based on clear geopolitical considerations and would have to be taken into account in any solution of the Saharan problem.

The issue of western Sahara must actually be placed in the context of the controversy between Algeria and Morocco, a controversy that has been artificially created and fed by Algerian leaders in order to increase tension, even at the risk of plunging the whole region into conflict and chaos. Morocco has consistently maintained a responsible attitude, constantly borne in mind the need to safeguard the future of the peoples of the Maghreb and resisted provocation even though it is determined to defend its sovereignty. Furthermore, Morocco has repeatedly proposed the initiation of a dialogue aimed at achieving a definitive peace and one which would lay the foundations for fruitful economic cooperation in the region. In that connexion, the Government of Morocco called for a conference of Heads of State or Government of the countries of the Sahara with the object of setting in motion an economic development programme for the benefit of the peoples of the region, which would enable the transit of persons and goods from landlocked Saharan countries and also enable the exploitation of marine resources on an equal footing. The proposals hold out the promise of a better future for the peoples of the region, and Morocco would make every effort to turn them into reality as quickly as possible.

It is no secret that Morocco is engaged in a struggle of self-defence to preserve its sacred achievements, its cultural identity and its existence as a nation. Algeria has formed mercenary bands in the guise of a national liberation movement of western Sahara. It is very significant that the Frente POLISARIO was formed at the very moment when the Spanish colonizing Power announced its withdrawal from the territory. If the Frente claims to be the conscience of the Saharan people, why did it remain silent during the 90 years of Spanish colonization? Where was the Frente in 1957 when an authentic Saharan national liberation movement sought the reincorporation of Sahara into the Moroccan motherland? Algeria

cannot deny that since the departure of the Spanish, it has set up a logistical base in the heart of the territory of Western Sahara and sent its own forces into action against the forces of Morocco. Faced with the failure of its original plan to occupy the territory, Algeria decided to take recourse to a different strategy. The Saharan population has rejected the intervention of Algeria and exercised its right to self-determination by participating, within the national and democratic framework, in local, provincial and legislative consultations of various kinds.

Morocco cannot allow adventurers who change their nationality to suit their personal ambitions to arrogate the right to act as the legitimate representatives of the Moroccan population of the provinces of Saguia el Hamra and Oued Eddahab. That population expressed itself freely in the Moroccan national framework and is in direct charge of its own affairs; it has elected its own representatives resident not on Algerian territory but in their native villages and towns.

On the one hand, the Government of Algeria has raised the question of the Saharan refugees in Tindouf, but, on the other, the Algerian authorities have refused to allow the taking of a census of those refugees under the supervision of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. In 1976 Morocco had proposed such a census for the purpose of determining the number of refugees originating in the Sahara. The Secretary-General of the United Nations accepted that proposal in principle and sent the Government of Algeria a note on the matter; the Government of Algeria however, rejected the proposal. Similarly, King Hassan II of Morocco had, through the High Commissioner for Refugees, officially requested the voluntary repatriation of the Saharan refugees to their homes but the Government of Algeria, the country of asylum, has taken no steps to transmit that request to those concerned and offer them the opportunity to return to their homeland. Over and above, the Government of Algeria has manipulated the human tragedy of the Tindouf refugees for the purpose of artificially increasing tension in the region of South Africa.

In 1974, the Spanish authorities had taken an official census of the Saharan population; it at that time numbered 73,497. It was known to every one that most of these people lived in the provinces of Saguia el Hamra and Oued Eddahab. That showed the falsity of the statements which claimed that there were hundreds of thousands of people in the refugee camps at Tindouf.

With the aim of bringing pressure to bear on the United Nations, Algeria initiated large-scale operations against Morocco a

few months ago. The invaders, who were completely routed, could in no case have been Saharans because it would have been impossible for the Frente POLISARIO to raise an army of between 5,000 and 6,000 men when the total number of refugees did not exceed that figure. Morocco has also formally denied the statements made by the representative of Algeria to the Fourth Committee with regard to the occupation of Smara. The fact is that the mercenaries from Algiers who made an incursion into that region did not succeed in getting close to the holy city.

Unfortunately for the peoples of the Maghreb, direct aggression can no longer masquerade as assistance to an alleged movement and there is no doubt that full-scale war is being imposed on Morocco by a neighbouring country using highly sophisticated weapons and all the resources available to it. Morocco, secure in its natural right of self-defence and bolstered by the unanimity of its people, is determined to make every sacrifice necessary to defend its territorial integrity and its national unity. Our decision is as firm as the desire to maintain peace and security in the region and to avoid a worsening of the situation and generalization of the conflict between Algeria and Morocco. Aware of these responsibilities King Hassan II has called for moderation, consultations and negotiations between the two countries. The controversy is not of recent origin but Morocco is convinced that there is still time to prevent the irreparable from happening and to initiate a new process of restoring peace in the region.

My delegation therefore welcomes the initiative of the Chairman of the Organization of African Unity, the President of Liberia, in visiting the region to encourage the process of establishing peace on solid foundations. Morocco would receive President Tolbert and assure him of its sincere desire for cooperation in the efforts to preserve and strengthen African solidarity and to give substance to Africa's message of peace and brotherhood.

Morocco is confident that a sense of reality and brotherhood would prevail in the end and that the General Assembly would never accept any proposal designed to legitimize the use of armed force or take recourse to violence under the cloak of the noblest of principles. The right of peoples to decide their own destiny cannot be used as a pretext for separatism or secession, which are incompatible with the principles of the Charter.

It must be remembered that Morocco has been the victim of one of the most notorious cases of colonialism and great Power rivalry. The spirit of resistance of the Moroccan people and its persistent rejection of foreign domination has for centuries symboli-

zed the desire of Africa to be free and independent.

Algeria and Morocco are neighbouring countries which have to live together and whose peoples over the years have established spiritual links which are stronger than the forces that are currently dividing them. The existing problems would doubtless be solved within the framework of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and clearly understood interests of the parties.

Notes and Comments

Agostinho Neto—A Tribute

The death in Moscow on 10 September of the 56 year-old Agostinho Neto, first President of Angola — a revolutionary, humane physician and a poet of distinction whose works have been translated into seven languages — though not wholly unexpected, came as a grave loss for his country at a critical juncture in its chequered post-independence history.

Himself a doctor, Neto must surely have been aware that the terminal cancer he was suffering from would take its toll in the not too distant future. But as a committed revolutionary, for whose heroic deeds during Angola's bitter and bloody struggle for freedom Amnesty International named him the 'Political Prisoner of the Year' in 1957 the prospect of imminent death did not deflect nor deter him from the arduous tasks that he was grappling with. The magnitude of the problems in the Angolan situation can be grasped when it is pointed out that after 500 years of Portuguese rule 98 per cent of the six million people remained illiterate and most of them could only eke out a livelihood as forced contract labour. This euphemism for slavery, has been poignantly described by Neto:

“... hired to burn out our
lives in coffee fields,
ignorant black men
who must respect the
whites
and fear the rich,
We are your children of
the native quarters
which electricity never
reaches,
men dying drunk
abandoned to the rhythm
of death's tom-toms.”

But this bleak situation did not blur his vision or hope for the future of seeing beyond Africa :

“love emerging virgin in each mouth
in invincible lianas of spontaneous life
and sculptural hands linked together
against the demolishing waterfalls of the old”

Neto was no starry-eyed dreamer. Rather pragmatism became the hall-mark of his approach in tackling the country's multifarious problems. In fact, Neto's death occurred just when he was involved in striking a balance within his politically fragile country's diverse and competing ethnic and racial groups. This was by no means easy in a situation in which his presidency had been marred by a South African-backed war of attrition and the country had suffered incursions and hot pursuit-raids for the support Neto gave to the Namibian liberation movement, SWAPO, which had devastated Angola's economy. Worse still, his MPLA party (Peoples Movement for the Liberation of Angola) which he had led since 1962, was torn by bitter dissensions. He himself had survived many *coups* since he assumed power in 1975; more recently from his close comrades in arms, Nito Alves and Jose van Dunem. Yet, undaunted and with his characteristic single-minded tenacity, he struggled till the bitter end to give his war-ravaged country, recognized as the potential “Brazil of Africa”, the much-needed stability. For the same reason, he moved boldly and with statesmanship to redress the balance in Angola's foreign policy; it however, still adheres to a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. A careful perusal of some recent developments reinforces these views.

In his handling of the problems facing the MPLA, one notes that while earlier he was attempting to transform and strengthen it into a Marxist-Leninist Party from the mass movement it was during the freedom struggle, the accent now, in sharp contrast to earlier controversies and infighting among the different factions, was unmistakably accommodationist. To appreciate the full significance of the problems Neto had to contend with, it may be worth recalling the leadership struggles which have dogged the MPLA. Danie Chipenda, military commander of the *Revolta Leste* (Eastern Revolt) faction, one of the key lieutenants of the MPLA, broke away from it in 1972, accusing Neto of “presidentialism.” In the same year, levelling similar charges, the *Revolta Activa* (Active Revolt) faction, led by Joaquim Pinto de Andrade joined the ranks of the opposition after his defeat by Neto in the first real power struggle as leader of the MPLA. The rival factions set up by Holden Roberto (National Front for the Liberation of Angola — FNLA), which Chipenda later joined, and Jonas Savimbi (National Union for the Total Indepen-

dence of Angola-UNITA) also originated in a bid for leadership. To begin with then, clashing personalities were at the root of the divisions which weakened the MPLA. The passage of time made it all the more vulnerable to exploitation by external powers till Angola truly was bled white.

Conscious of the harsh realities of post independence political life in a country which still had a long way to go to complete the process of integration, Neto had the stature to compromise. That his new initiatives did bring in a measure of success was apparent in reports of the return from exile in Zaire of a number of FNLA's leading members and speculation was rife just before Neto's death of the likely return of Chipenda himself. Several leading *Revolta* Active members had also, it was said, been released from imprisonment and were being brought into the MPLA's fold.

Another step forward in his efforts to promote greater stability, which required whole-hearted cooperation of all concerned, was the reorganization of the MPLA's political bureau, the highest executive organ, in order to give it a more broad-based and representative character. Since its inception, the MPLA was dominated almost exclusively by the Kimbundu, their sub-groups and *mesticos* or people of mixed race. The large proportion of *mesticos* within the MPLA had been a cause for continuous discontent and conflict. But by the end of 1978 the political bureau's composition was changed by including an equal number of members from the Kimbundu, *mesticos* and Kikongos, as also two members from the oil rich Cabinda enclave. The latter has had strong separatist tendencies. As a committed Marxist and one who, as a practising physician among the poorest of the poor, had acquired a first-hand knowledge of the sufferings of his people, Neto was naturally inclined to induct a larger number of workers and peasants into the Party. This move was also perhaps intended to have the effect of not only neutralising the so-called "revolutionary intellectuals" or ultra-leftists but to ensure more representation to the *Ovimbundu* and other alienated groups, who had hitherto felt neglected. The active participation of the *Ovimbundu*, who make up about 40 per cent of the population and spill over into Namibia, was particularly crucial as in some areas of the south a token guerrilla force still holds out. In the woefully fragmented society of Angola, bedevilled by ethnic rivalries, the options the country faces are, it must be agreed, far more exacting. Neto however showed pragmatism in reorganizing the MPLA as a first step towards establishing a coherent regime and welding a nation. Credit goes to him for trying at least to find a solution which would have been politically workable.

Neto's internal pre-occupations did not prevent him from taking a firm initiative in improving relations with the West. In fact it would not be incorrect to stress that domestic compulsions and the continued threats to his regime from outside prompted him to re-appraise this policies. Thus in re-establishing ties after protracted negotiations with Zaire and Portugal, he was able to restrain these Governments in allowing member of illegal organizations who resided in their countries to engage in hostile actions against Angola. The Co-operation Treaty signed with Lisbon moreover, has resulted in increasing numbers of Portuguese skilled workers being attracted to Angola.

Similarly, despite the known support Jonas Savimbi's UNITA continued to receive from the West and South Africa, Neto who, along with Samora Machel of Mozambique, had earlier shown reluctance to sign the Lome Convention — the trade and aid pact between the EEC and African, Carribean and Pacific (ACP) countries—resumed negotiations with the EEC in the past year. Claude Cheysson, the EEC's Development Commissioner visited Angola and reportedly established a good rapport with Neto. The Commission was also supposed to be acting as a focal point for donors meetings to discuss the rehabilitation of the strategic Benguela Railway. Formal relations with West Germany were established and though the United States had yet to set up an Embassy in Luanda, relations at the economic level were being gradually restored. The Government for instance, was giving its support to deals with Gulf oil and Texaco.

Of importance to the region, Neto, it was known, was actively assisting the UN Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim, in his plans for a peace settlement in Namibia, which South Africa had rejected. It was Neto who put forth the idea of a demilitarized zone between Namibia and its three neighbours to the North and North-East—Angola, Zambia and Botswana—to facilitate the implementation of the settlement proposals. But instead of co-operating in making the agreement work, South Africa has persisted in a negative and dilatory attitude which amounts for all practical purposes to a refusal to implement the crucial clauses of the proposal.

In reality, Neto belonged neither to the East or the West. That he was forced to turn to the Soviet Union was largely because the West remained unresponsive to the forces of nationalism which remain a potent factor in the political life of developing countries. Neto in fact revealed a combination of pragmatism and flexibility in his *rapprochement* with the West found in similar situations among

other progressive African states, notably Algeria, Libya and Tanzania.

Shanti Sadiqali

Nigeria : National Unity A Major Test

Nigeria's military rulers deserve to be congratulated for the exemplary manner in which they have handed over control of the government to the elected civilian administration of President Alhaji Shehu Shagari after wielding power for more than 13 years. For the approximately 48 million voters¹, the five-stage elections, starting from early July, for different levels of government was a complex exercise. But despite earlier misgivings when 'political thuggery', to quote a Nigerian paper², broke out after the lifting of the ban on political activity and led to a security decree, the voters generally conducted themselves in a peaceful and orderly manner. The final stage was reached on 1 October, when power was transferred to 54-year-old Shagari, leader of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) and a former minister, as an American-type Executive President.

Learning from the horrendous experience of the Biafra secessionist war—a 30-month agony that cost close to half a million lives—the military rulers had taken several steps in an effort to remove the structural basis of regional and ethnic strife in Nigerian politics inherited from colonial rule. Important among them was the reorganization of states. It has been generally conceded that the legislatures created for the three Regions—with the Northern Region alone containing more than half the population—under the 1947 Richards Constitution³ tended more to sow the seeds of discord than to promote ideologically based politics. The result was that independent Nigeria in effect became three nations, politically and economically and, by May 1967 when the Gowon regime announced the creation of a 12-state structure in a bid to diffuse ethnic, religious and regional tensions, Ojukwu had already thrown the gauntlet, emboldened by the knowledge that the Eastern Region was the important oil producing area. It goes to general Gowon's credit that he succeeded in bringing about national reconciliation with the end of the Biafra war in January 1970 but in course of time widespread corruption, economic stagnation and eventually his administration's decision in 1974 to abandon plans for a return to civilian rule after the preliminary census figures strongly contested, had stirred the hornet's nest, finally sealed his fate.

It was left to General Murtala Muhammed, who replaced Gowon in July 1975, to set the new date for handing over power in

1979. Murtala was assassinated a year later but his successor, 42-year old Lt. General Obasanjo strictly adhered to the programme to return the country to civilian rule, creating conditions for conducive it. The first step in the direction was the demarcation of the country into 19 states with the hope thereby to mitigate animosities and the domination of major groups; at the same time also to strengthen the Central Government. However, despite animated debates and persistent demands for more states, Obasanjo acted firmly by refusing to give the matter further consideration⁴.

In the same manner the new Constitution has as its central aim the creation of a system of government—which would forge national unity. This is highlighted, for instance, in the provision that the cabinet chosen by the President must include one minister from each state, thus ensuring participation in the decision-making process. Another interesting feature, among others, is that while the federation of 19 states has a strong central executive the President, as Head of State, in order to win, must secure at least a quarter of the votes in two-thirds of the states⁵. Shagari's success highlighted, more than that of other candidates, the fact that his party, which is built around a number of outstanding personalities, has support not just in the north from where he hails, but that it has been able by projecting him to make inroads into the other states. Unfortunately for the NPN this has not proved true at the level of the legislative elections where the party was unable to acquire the required majority. It won only 168 of the 449 seats in the House and 36 of the 95 in the Senate. Indeed, the voting pattern seems to reveal that voters had generally stuck to their regional loyalties—the NPN sweeping the polls in the north; Chief Awolowo's United Party of Nigeria (UPN) in the Western Yoruba states; and the Nigerian People's Party (NPP), led by the political veteran Nnamdi Azikiwe, triumphing in the Ibo country in the East, and that there has been very little change from the previous elections held 13 years ago. Clearly, then, in such a situation, the President will have to employ all his statesmanship if history is not to repeat itself in Nigeria.

In particular, these qualities will be put to a major test in the sensitive areas of Federal-State relations and revenue sharing. In the case of the first, the President will have to avoid the mistakes of the Gowon years (1970-'75) when the powers of the Federal Government grew steadily while those of the states were constantly eroded. The new President has, it is true, been subjected to many checks and balances but in view of the fact that income from oil, expected to be \$15 billion this year, is controlled by the federal government, invests it with enormous power and patronage. Apart from certain statutory

amounts, for example, the states are entitled to discretionary federal aid which in some cases can be as much as 80 per cent of their budgets. The President will thus have to guard particularly against accusations of being partial. Another source of friction could emerge from the fact that the new Constitution vests local executive power in the State Governors, and, even though, the federal government is the source of much of the state funds it does not call for the supervision of state expenditures by the Federal Government. With 11 Governors belonging to parties other than that of the President's, differences between the two centres of power over such questions is a distinct reality. Another, equally sensitive issue facing the new government is the census, as revenue allocation between the states is linked to the size of the population. It needs hardly be underlined that unless the Federal Government is a truly national one these burning issues may well revive the lingering old animosities. The question of national unity thus continues to remain a critical one for Nigeria under civilian rule.

However, in the final analysis, the most testing of all the legacies for the civilian government may be the state of the economy. As was to be expected, Nigeria's oil boom has generated correspondingly high hopes among the masses. But, in spite of the huge rises in world oil prices there are signs that Nigeria's oil revenues may not prove adequate to meet the commitments which the previous government had been building up. It is known, for example, that the Government was forced for the first time last year to raise two loans of US dollars 1,000 million each on the international money market to keep its development projects afloat⁶. All in all, the Government will have to reconcile the realities of the situation with the burgeoning demands of a fast-growing and militant labour force, an articulate intelligentsia and the dangerous power of political parties which for many of them continues to rest on divisions of culture, language and religion. This is no easy task but given the will there is no reason why Nigeria cannot show the way.

Shanti Sadiqali

-
1. The franchise has been extended to women, who make up almost more than half the country's voters.
 2. *New Nigerian*, 3 March, 1979.
 3. The three Regions were the North, mainly Muslim in religion and ethnically predominantly Hausa—Fulani; the East, Catholic and mainly Ibo, and the West, partly Anglican and Muslim and mainly Yoruba.

4. The demand for more states continues and Shagari in his campaign manifesto pledged to consider creating at least two more states.
5. Shagari's election was challenged in the court by Chief Awolowo, leader of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), who was defeated by the former in the bitter campaign for the Presidency on the ground that the legal conditions for his election had not been met. In one state—Kano—Shagari secured only 20 per cent of the votes. The Electoral Commission however declared Alhaji Shagari elected accepting the National Party argument that two-thirds votes of Nigeria's 19 states meant 12 plus two-thirds of the 25 per cent minimum in the thirteenth state.
6. Africa Research Bulletin (Economic, Financial and Technical Series): June-July 1978, p. 4746

Central African Coup : France Strains to Retain the Advantage

The news of the *coup* in the Central African Empire, which brought to an end the fourteen year old tyrannical rule of the self-proclaimed Emperor Jean Badel Bokassa, sent a wave of rejoicing throughout the country and the African continent at large. Coming as it did after the overthrow of two other African tyrants—Dada Idi Amin of Uganda and Francisco Macias Nguema in Equatorial Guinea—Bokassa's deposition on 20 September, was indeed a happy augury. Nevertheless, it would be wishful thinking to believe that the country is at last rid of all its problems and happily set on the path of independence. In fact, the *coup* has brought to the fore and underscored several disturbing and dangerous features.

The most notable of these was the obvious implication of foreign intervention. As in the case of the two other depositions, Bokassa's overthrow came not as a result of an organized internal effort but largely consequent to a degree of foreign planning and interference. While Tanzanian troops had helped bring down Amin, Moroccans were reported to have executed Macias¹, the French masterminded the Central African *coup*. So blatant was their role in the entire incident that two companies of soldiers arrived in Bangui on the day after the *coup* on 21 September, bringing along with them the new President, David Dacko. While they patrolled the streets of the capital city, President Dacko made the announcement of Bokassa's overthrow. Officially, the French soldiers (350 in number) part of a special long-range strike force on stand by in bases in Gabon and Chad, were called in by President Dacko to maintain law and order and to protect the French citizens and their property², but France's role in the incident was obvious. "The whole scenario," said *Jeune Afrique*, "was staged in Paris."³

The incident confirms once again France's enduring political and economic interests in the region and in all its former African colonies; its desire to maintain a "high profile in Africa" and to demonstrate "its continuing world influence, both to other nations and to the French electorate and helping to ensure that other powers do not move into the area."⁴ Apart from maintaining a tightly knit economic zone composed of its former African colonies in Western and Central Africa, its interest in the country's rich uranium and diamond resources was unmistakable. These then were reasons enough for France to tolerate and indulge the whims of the self-styled Emperor. During all the thirteen years, when Bokassa called Giscard D'Estaing his "dear relative" (he called De Gaulle "Papa") and Paris had footed his extravagant coronation bills⁵, the French Government was not unaware of the gruesome atrocities that he was committing in Bangui.

Instances of nightly kidnappings, mysterious disappearances and even personal hunting down of suspects and their elimination, were fairly well known. Excesses, when Bokassa himself beat people to pulp, were innumerable. In 1972 he decreed that captured thieves be mutilated; first offenders would have one ear cut off, second offenders the other ear and third offenders the right hand. A thief convicted a fourth time would be executed publicly by a firing squad. Other revolting deeds involved the French themselves. Right at the start of his career, Bokassa's men inveigled Gendarmerie Commander, Jean Imazo into the Emperor's office, where he was strangled. On Bokassa's instructions, Labour Minister Ledot's face was beaten to pulp with rifle butts and police chief Mounoubaya was emasculated and blinded in front of his own family. Despite these revolting and barbaric incidents and those of the killing of innocent children⁶ and teenagers in the Central African prisons, France continued its policy of tolerance. This was however only because Bokassa was incidental to it, to its larger aims of maintaining client states on the continent and for fear of a Marxist revolutionary stepping into Bokassa's shoes.

The most perturbing outcome for African states and for their future however is the fact of France's military interventionist policy having escalated. The *coup* sponsored and engineered in Central Africa was the eighth direct military intervention in the past seventeen years. Earlier, France had extended similar military assistance to regimes in Cameroon, Senegal, Gabon, Chad, Zaire (twice) and the western Sahara. The element of continuity in this policy has confirmed that France would not hesitate to resort of military intervention to safeguard and protect its own interests in his region,

which it had carefully nurtured in the post-independence period and which were vital to it.

It is interesting to note that France's Africa policy differed from that of Britain. The latter never contemplated the sending of military troops to Kampala to help overthrow President Idi Amin, even though his bloodthirsty and despotic regime was comparable to that of Bokassa. Nor had it ever intended to intervene in Rhodesia. It had in fact renounced its world military role (or found itself incapable to continue the same), and relied more on the diplomatic means of persuasion. France on the other hand, was not unfavourably inclined to appropriate this role to itself, to use its military might to protect its closely-knit post-independence political and more importantly economic ties with its former African colonies. It won over the former Belgian fief—Zaire—into its circle of influence by extending military assistance to Mobutu twice. This earned for it the dubious rubric of "gendarme" in Africa. Assistance in times of need to hard-pressed African allies would help it maintain its high profile in Africa. Also, as says the *Financial Times* 25 September, 1979, part of its aim was "to impress the Arabs and other Third World Nations with France's concern for developing nations."

Finally, the episode has brought down the curtain with a finality on the prevailing notion of the independence of African states. That, even after 20 years Paris is still capable of pulling its strings and imposing on its former African colonies leaders of its own choice, is an established fact. This naturally would have its own repercussions as it raises the question—who is to decide the form of government and leader an independent state should have?

In the case of Central Africa, the French first tolerated the rule of one whom they took to be "a clown with a penchant for wearing medals of questionable authenticity," but who later maintained a horrifying insane rule of terror and then have now brought back Dacko which may only mean the exchange of one form of dictatorship for another. The former President of the Republic, since independence till 1966, David Dacko (incidentally a cousin of Bokassa) was known to be indecisive, corrupt and authoritarian. He even committed a large number of political blunders and lived in a lavish manner while the country suffered extreme poverty. The result was that popular resentment was deep and widespread. Also, even though Dacko spent many years in prison, in 1976 he was brought back into service as Bokassa's adviser. Above all, being supported by the French he could not but act in a manner which would ensure the protection of France's interest in the region. This would understandably make his position very questionable as also

that of France's support to an unpopular man. :

This brings one to the related, but more important, issue of the implications of the episode for the future of Central Africa—How would Dacko resolve the innumerable and momentous problems facing the country? During Emperor Bokassa's long fourteen year-old rule the economy had declined considerably. There were few roads, no railway and the country's agricultural production indicated a downward trend. Cotton production fell from 41,000 tonnes to 27,000 tonnes between 1971 and 1978, while that of coffee declined from 12,000 tonnes to 11,000 tonnes over the same period. Industry and commerce also stagnated. The people's percapita income was only £ 50 a year, while inflation was widespread. Over the period of Bokassa's rule, the financial situation in the country also worsened. This however did not deter the Emperor from acquiring chateaux and fashionable restaurants in France with public money. He was even known to have switched external aid to his accounts in Switzerland.

Dacko would undoubtedly, despite his many shortcomings, be an improvement on the inhuman and grotesque Bokassa; but the tasks and problems confronting him are not only formidable but innumerable. Further, they have been made more difficult by the legacy of the past. A depleted treasury, high rate of inflation and economic recession would certainly render his most urgent task of reconstruction extremely difficult. Secondly, a suffering and discontented population, which had long lived under Bokassa's repression, would expect a quick restoration of law and order and some share in the governance of the nation. Already the series of strikes and rallies organized by the students with opposition support⁷, only a few days after the *coup* were an indication of the mood of the peoples. The students not only criticized the new Presidential incumbent of being a mere "puppet of imperialism" returned to power to ensure France's interest in the region, but also protested against the appointment of a large number of ministers of the former regime in the government. The students charged them of being implicated in the crimes committed against them. How Dacko would win over the student opposition and resolve the major issues confronting the country amicably, is yet to be seen. For the present, the only relief for the peoples of Central Africa is that they have been mercifully relieved of an African tyrant.

Vanita Ray

1. "Equatorial Guinea—Macias Nguema Execute", *West Africa* (London), No. 3247, 8 October 1979. p. 1868.
2. In Paris, the French Cooperation Minister Robert Galley announced the landing of the French troops in Bangui. He was believed to have commented: "We consider that the restoration of the Republic of Bangui is an extremely happy event." *The Guardian* (Manchester), 22 September 1979.
3. *Jeune Afrique* (Dakar), 3 October 1979.
4. *Financial Times* (London), 25 September 1979.
5. In 1977, Bokassa proclaimed himself President for life. At his coronation, patterned on the lines of the splendour of Napoleon's, he wore the most expensive ermines and had his costumes tailored and embroidered by the same house that had made the coronation robes for Napoleon in 1804. The French laughed at the thought of the short Emperor dressed in fur under the African sun. But Bokassa had the last laugh. The French were made to foot the bill of £ 12 m. The total revenues for the Central African Empire in the previous year had been only £ 14 m.
6. This incident, brought to light by a report of Amnesty International in May triggered off the most serious charges against Bokassa. The Amnesty Report started that as many as 200 school children had been massacred after they stated demonstrations in January and April to protest against the obligation of wearing school uniforms. The latter, available only in a shop owned by one of Bokassa's wives and which would cost £ 10 each, were beyond the reach of the parents. The children were rounded up after the demonstrations and taken to the Bangui prison, where they were beaten, tortured, suffocated and shot to death. *The Guardian*, 22 September 1979.
7. The Opposition parties supported the students. They were the *Oubanguien* Patriotic Front led by Abel Goumba, the only opposition leader who had never benefitted from any favours either from Bokassa or Giscard D'Estaing and the Patriotic Front, which is considered anti-French and even pro-Soviet.

South Africa's Nuclear Explosion

South Africa's nuclear detonation of September 22, which was detected by US satellite intelligence and made public a month later by the American Broadcasting Corporation, came as no surprise to the world's scientific community and individual experts. That South Africa had the nuclear "know-how", that it had the capacity to detonate a nuclear device, that it was extending its nuclear development programme on the plea of making itself self-sufficient, were fairly common knowledge.

In view of it the South African protestations of innocence bear no conviction whatsoever. The President of South Africa's Atomic Energy Board, Dr. J. Wynand de Villiens called the intelligence report "complete nonsense." Pretoria in fact went to the absurd

length of saying that the explosion in the Indian Ocean region was probably caused by a Soviet submarine present in the region. However, when the Russians denied the presence of any of their vessels in the area in the month of September (and this they said, could be ascertained from the United States Navy Intelligence), the South African Administration went to the ridiculous extent of claiming that the explosion had probably been caused by a nuclear missile lost by a Russian submarine in the South Atlantic, some fifteen years ago. Further, the South African Foreign Minister—Roelof Botha—advising United States officials “not to panic so easily”, denied any knowledge of the explosion. “I know nothing about it”, he said. Besides, “I am the representative of a sovereign government. I am not in the dock to be cross-examined by you.”

Despite these denials and protestations and in spite of the fact that South Africa's nuclear development programme is shrouded in secrecy, it is interesting to note that South Africa's induction into this field dates back to the forties. It was after the Second World war that South Africa was given its early start in nuclear energy research by the United States and Britain. The two countries had decided to expand their nuclear weapons programme, and in order to ensure an adequate supply of uranium ore had concluded an agreement with South Africa. Under its terms, uranium ore extraction facilities were provided to South Africa and these were to be under the latter's control. Additional nuclear assistance was given under the Atoms for Peace Programme launched by President Eisenhower in 1953. A Twenty-year Agreement signed in 1957, offered South African nuclear scientists and engineers facilities to receive training in the United States, mostly at the United States Atomic Energy Commission's Oak Ridge and Argonne National Laboratories¹. Four of the present technical chiefs in the South African Atomic Energy Board were among the first trainees.

To date, South Africa has a formidable array of nuclear outfits and facilities which entitle it to membership of the “nuclear club”, whose number has now expanded to seven². At least two of South Africa's research reactors are known to be presently in operation³. The National Research Center at Pelindaba, near Pretoria, houses the country's first nuclear research reactor—Safari I. Dating back to 1964, Safari I was built by an American Company which also supplied it fuel and research materials. The reactor, fuelled with enriched uranium—90 per cent U 235—operating since 1974, on an output of 20 megawatts, can produce enough plutonium for a 20 kiloton nuclear weapon every three years or so⁴. Besides, the Pelindaba Nuclear Research Center employed the majority of the 1,865

scientists and engineers who were on the rolls of the country's Atomic Energy Board⁵. This was despite the fact that a qualified team of ten persons is sufficient to design a nuclear weapon. Safari II, also at Pelindaba, has been operating since 1977, but its plutonium output is negligible. A third reactor for the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons is also believed have been set up. No reports of this plant are however available.

Added to these two nuclear facilities is the Uranium Enrichment Plant, built with West German collaboration at Valindaba, adjacent to the site of the research reactors at Pelindaba. Operational since 1975, the plant was producing some 250 tonnes of enriched uranium annually. By 1978, South Africa confirmed that a commercial-production enrichment plant with a 5,000 tonne capacity was under construction⁶. It was claimed that the pilot plant established the economic viability of the commercial production enrichment unit. Planned to be operational by 1985, it is expected to supply fuel to the country's prestigious billion-dollar nuclear power station at Koeberg, near Cape Town. Of 2000 MW capacity, its pressurized water reactors would require fuel of low enrichment, well below the 20 per cent level which international nuclear safeguards set as the lowest figure of interest to a potential A-Bomb maker. A bomb made from 20 per cent Uranium-235 would be too big to move. Uranium could also be supplied to the 20 MW thermal nuclear reactor Safari at Pelindaba.

It must be mentioned here that enriched uranium⁷ is essential for the use of strategic minerals to make weapons or to run power plants. South Africa has developed its own technique similar to a West German process for enriching uranium at a low cost. Its present programme for developing the enrichment capability indicates its aggressive designs to exploit the nuclear fuel cycle. In fact, it is today one of the seven nations with such sophisticated technology.

South Africa is the world's third largest producer of uranium after the United States and Canada, accounting for approximately 16 per cent of the total produced in the free world in 1977. It is estimated that the country's exploitable uranium deposits amount to 163,000 tonnes. This along with the Namibian deposits of 10,000 tonnes make the two countries the possessors of more than 20 per cent of the world's reserves. Uranium is produced from low grade ores mainly as a by-product of the gold mining industry. South Africa's first uranium extraction plant was started in 1952; by 1957, seventeen plants were in operation treating ore from 28 gold mines. By 1974, annual production of oxide concentrates

attained the figure of 3,075 metric tonnes with eleven gold mines supplying uranium bearing ore to ten extraction plants⁸. South Africa's production capacity is expected to rise to about 12,900 tonnes by 1982 which would bring it up to the position of the world's second largest producer. Since its own domestic consumption⁹ is not expected to be very high in the foreseeable future, its aim must essentially be to become a world supplier. Already uranium is bought by nuclear industries in France, West Germany, Japan, Switzerland and Britain. Further the commercial possibilities of enriched uranium (in the light of the energy crisis, the desire of some countries to become independent of the United States for their nuclear fuel supplies), and the fact that enrichment would double the value of the uranium ore are self-evident. South Africa's urge to attain self sufficiency in this field and the fact that it would continue to be a major factor in the world uranium market, then becomes understandable.

South Africa then has reached the "near nuclear" status; its technological and resource capability confirm its capacity for developing a nuclear option. The controversial September detonation and the spotting of nuclear structures, believed to be part of a nuclear-device testing facility, in the Kalahari Desert in August 1977 by Soviet satellites, establish beyond doubt the abounding fears of South Africa "going nuclear". In view of these developments, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that South Africa is at least in a position to fabricate small U-235 bombs¹⁰, and being the only country in the region having at its command this sophisticated technology, it is not unlikely that it could in the near future assume the role of an effective regional Power.

Having said this, it would be in the fitness of things to analyze the South African motivations for going nuclear and the possible repercussions for the region, the African continent and the world community. South Africa's technological and economic motivations for its programmed nuclear development (already analyzed above) are understandable. But what is more significant is its political and psychological motivations and the implications of those moves.

South Africa's security threat perceptions on the domestic front and in the region have undoubtedly heightened in recent years. The guerilla freedom struggle of the South African blacks has intensified; spontaneous Black uprisings and terrorism do pose a serious problem to the authorities. The minority ruling Afrikaner, numbering 4 millions in a total population of 25 millions, are naturally uneasy and despite the number of innovations in race relations at home they do

fear that they would be unable to bridge the gap between their position and minimum African demands. For the South African leadership it is a question of survival. "Our country's life is at stake", said P. W. Botha upon assuming office as Prime Minister. South Africa's anxiety is further heightened by the transitions to Marxist rule in Angola and Mozambique (it has an almost pathological fear of Communism), the recent changes in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and the added fear of Marxist-oriented Black controlling an independent Namibia. Fear of isolation and possible reprisals by neighbouring independent state is understandable.

To meet any such eventuality, South Africa has in recent years considerably increased its military strength. This is reflected in the sharp increase in the country's defence expenditure; from R 44.8 million (\$ 55.3 million) in 1960 to R 361.5 million (\$ 448.3 million) in 1973. By 1975-76 defence expenditure had risen to R 948.1 million (\$ 1332 million). South Africa's current armed forces strength is 65,000 men, with a total mobilisation strength of more than 400,000¹¹. Besides the country's total armed might is overwhelmingly white; non-whites represent 84 per cent of the population but make up only 4 per cent of the military strength. As against this, it is interesting to note that its total white population of fewer than 4.5 million peoples, 65,000 are on active duty. With such unevenly balanced forces opposing each other it is difficult to visualize a situation (other than that of the Afrikaner with his back against the wall) when the need would arise to resort to its nuclear strength; and that too not without danger to itself.

In the regional context also, with the military balance heavily weighted in favour of South Africa it appears that no African state, singly or in concert, could be a military threat. With the exception of Nigeria (with its 230,000 men army) few African countries have armies exceeding 10,000 men. Those with sizable forces—Ethiopia with 93,000, Zaire with 33,000, Somalia with 51,000, Angola with 33,000 and Uganda with 21,000 — are not only faced with severe internal problems but (with the exception of Angola) are least likely to actively assist the South African freedom fighters. Visualizing nevertheless a scenario when there would be a concentration of enemy forces in the region against South Africa (for this is another major threat perception of the latter), it must be remembered that such a situation would be very unlikely, for it would render such forces vulnerable not only to South Africa's conventional military strength but also to its nuclear might.

Thus it appears that nuclear power and technological capability has bolstered (however illusory) South Africa's confidence and

psychology of self-preservation in the face of its threat perceptions in the region (and these have certainly darkened for the Afrikaners in recent years). Nevertheless, the only redeeming feature of the present scenario in Southern Africa is the apparent limitation on the use of the nuclear potential; that South Africa would resort to the use of its nuclear might only as a last resort in a crisis situation of the highest magnitude.

Vanita Ray

1. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, *Nuclear Proliferation Fact-book* (Washington, 1977), p. 317. Quoted in "Can South Africa Go Nuclear?" by Kenneth L. Adelman and Albion W. Knight *Orbis* (Philadelphia, Pa.), Vol. 23, no. 3, Fall 1979, pp. 633-647.
2. They are the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, France, China, India and South Africa.
3. *Power and Research Reactors in Member States* International Atomic Energy Agency, (Vienna, 1972).
4. Frank Barnaly, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Monograph quoted in *Hindustan Times* (New Delhi) 30 October, 1978.
5. Atomic Energy Board, *Twenty First Annual Report : 1977* (Pelindaba, Aeb 1977), p. 44.
6. *Financial Times* (London), 17 February, 1978.
7. Natural uranium has three isotopes—U-234, U-235 and U-238 in relative abundances of 0.006, 0.72 and 99.274 per cent respectively. The process of enrichment involves the raising of the concentration of U-235. This is necessary because nuclear power reactors generally use concentrations of three to five per cent; fuel for nuclear submarine reactors needs enrichments to roughly 30 per cent while weapons-grade uranium needs to be more than 80 per cent pure in uranium-235. P. R. Chari, "South Africa's Nuclear Option" in *India International Centre Quarterly* (New Delhi). Vol. 3, no. 4, October 1976. pp. 219-236.
8. *State of South Africa Yearbook : 1976*, p. 72 Quoted in "Can South Africa Go Nuclear?" n. 1.
9. Official figures for its own uranium needs rise no higher than 345 tonnes in any year upto 1990.
10. This view has been countered by Dr. Edward Teller. According to him, South Africa is capable of bigger things—if South Africa were to develop a nuclear-weapons capability it would have little need for testing the device as was thought to be underway in the Kalahari Desert in August 1977: "A simple fission bomb can be built with no testing at all. The simple bomb that devastated Hiroshima was never tested", he said. Edward Teller, "President Carter's Nuclear Policy is all Wrong" *Baltimore Sun* 10 September 1978.
11. These and other figures of South Africa's military strength have been culled from *Military Balance* (London) 1975-76, 1978-79.

UN Resolution on Western Sahara

Resolution Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on the question of Western Sahara (Resolution 34/37) at its 75th plenary meeting on 21 November 1979.

The General Assembly

Having considered in depth the question of Western Sahara,

Recalling the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence in accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Having considered the relevant chapter of the report of the special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples¹,

Having heard the statements made on the subject of Western Sahara, including the statement of the representative of the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y de Rio de Oro²,

Bearing in mind the profound concern of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries regarding the decolonization of Western Sahara and the right of the people of that Territory to self-determination,

Recalling its Resolution 33/27 of 1 December 1978 on co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity,

Taking note of the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its sixteenth ordinary session, held at Monrovia from 17 to 20 July 1979,³ by which the Assembly adopted the recommendations of the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Organization of African Unity on the question of Western Sahara,

Also taking note of the peace agreement concluded at Algiers on 10 August 1979 between Mauritania and the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y de Rio de Oro⁴ and the decision of Mauritania to withdraw its forces from Western Sahara⁵,

Aware of the profound concern of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries at the aggravation of the situation prevailing in Western Sahara because of the continuation and extension of the occupation of that Territory;

Recalling the part of the Political Declaration adopted by the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Havana from 3 to 9 September 1979, relating to Western Sahara⁶;

1. *Reaffirms* the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity and the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoyment of that right, as envisaged in the relevant resolution of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity;

2. *Takes note with satisfaction* of the decision concerning Western Sahara taken by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its sixteenth ordinary session;

3. *Also takes note with satisfaction* of the part of the Political Declaration adopted by the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries relating to Western Sahara;

4. *Welcomes* the peace agreement concluded between Mauritania and the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y de Rio de Oro and considers that this agreement constitutes an important contribution to the process of achieving peace and a definitive, just and lasting settlement of the question of Western Sahara;

5. *Deeply deplores* the aggravation of the situation resulting from the continued occupation of Western Sahara by Morocco and the extension of the occupation to the territory recently evacuated by Mauritania;

6. *Urges* Morocco to join in the peace process and to terminate the occupation of the Territory of Western Sahara;

7. *Recommends* to that end that the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el Hamra y de Rio de Oro, the representative of the people of Western Sahara, should participate fully in any search for a just, lasting and definitive political solution of the question of Western Sahara, in accordance with the resolutions and declarations of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned countries;

3. *Requests* the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of

Independence to Colonial Countries and People to continue to consider the situation in Western Sahara as a priority question and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;

9. *Requests* the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity to keep the Secretary-General of the United Nation informed of the progress achieved with regard to the implementation of the decisions of the organization of African Unity concerning Western Sahara;

10. *Invites* the Secretary-General to follow closely the situation in Western Sahara and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

-
1. A/34/23/Add. 3, chap. X.
 2. A/C4/34/SR. 14, paras. 50-59 and A/C4/34/SR.15, paras. 3-17. For the full text of the statement, see A/C.4/34/L.4,
 3. A/34/552, annex II, decision AHG/Dec.114(XVI)
 4. A/34/427-S/13503, annex I. For the printed text, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-fourth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1979*.
 5. A/34/427-S/13503, annex II. For the printed text, see *Official Records to the Security Council, Thirty-fourth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1979*.
 6. A/34/542, annex, sect. I, paras. 96-98.

Zimbabwe Rhodesia : Proposals For Independence

The Lancaster House Conference under the Chairmanship of Lord Carrington, met in London, from 10 September to December 1979, to discuss and conclude an Independence Constitution, organize elections under British supervision to enable Rhodesia to proceed to legal independence and the parties to settle their differences by consultation. The Conference, at which all the contending parties presented their points of view for the future of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, reached agreement on the following issues:

1. A summary of the Independence Constitution;
2. Arrangements for the pre-Independence period; and
3. A Cease-fire Agreement signed by the parties.

The texts of these documents are appended hereunder :

THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION

A : THE STATE

1. Zimbabwe will be a Sovereign Republic
2. There will be a Public Seal of Zimbabwe which will be kept by the President.
3. The Constitution will be the supreme law of the republic and will prevail over any other law to the extent that such other law is inconsistent with it.

B : CITIZENSHIP

1. Every person who was a citizen of Rhodesia immediately before Independence will automatically become a citizen of Zimbabwe on Independence (by birth, descent or registration, as the case may be, according to his former status). Every person who, immediately before Independence, possessed such qualifications that the relevant authority would, upon application duly made, have registered him as a citizen of Rhodesia, will be entitled to make application in the prescribed manner at any time during the first five years after Independence and it will be incumbent upon the competent autho-

city to grant that application and cause him to be registered as a citizen of Zimbabwe.

2. Every person who is born in Zimbabwe after Independence (other than the child of a diplomat accredited to Zimbabwe, of an enemy, alien, of a person unlawfully in Zimbabwe or of a non-citizen not ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe) will become a citizen of Zimbabwe by birth. Every person who is born outside Zimbabwe after Independence will become a citizen of Zimbabwe by birth if at the time of his birth his father (or, if he is illegitimate, his mother) is a citizen of Zimbabwe but resident outside Zimbabwe in the service of the Government and his birth is registered in Zimbabwe.

3. Every person who is born outside Zimbabwe after Independence but whose father (or, if he is illegitimate, whose mother) is then a citizen of Zimbabwe by birth or registration will himself become a citizen of Zimbabwe by descent.

4. Any woman who is or has been married to a person who is or was at any time during the subsistence of the marriage a citizen of Zimbabwe (or would but for his death have automatically become a citizen of Zimbabwe at Independence) will, on making application in the prescribed manner, be entitled to be registered as a citizen of Zimbabwe.

5. Any person, one of whose parents is a citizen of Zimbabwe at the date of his application, will be entitled, on making application in the prescribed manner, to be registered as a citizen of Zimbabwe. If the person is a minor, the application may be made on his behalf by his parent or guardian. Provision will be made for adopted children.

6. Parliament will be empowered to make provision—

- (a) for conferring citizenship of Zimbabwe by registration on persons in cases other than those described above;
- (b) for taking away the citizenship of a person who has acquired it otherwise than by birth or descent, provided that the loss of his citizenship will not render him stateless;
- (c) for the renunciation by any person of his citizenship of Zimbabwe; and
- (d) for regulating the procedure relating to the acquisition and loss of citizenship of Zimbabwe.

7. Provision will be included which permits citizens of Zimbabwe to retain their citizenship of other states.

8. Provision will be made on Independence for the resumption of citizenship by persons who have forfeited it or been deprived of it since 11 November, 1965.

C : DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

1. The Declaration of Rights will set out provisions on the following lines dealing with the substantive rights concerned :

I. The Right to Life

(1) It will be forbidden to deprive any person intentionally of his life save in execution of the lawful sentence of a court after conviction of a criminal offence.

(2) There will be an express exception for death caused by reasonably justifiable force in defence of person or property; or in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person in lawful custody; or to suppress riots, etc., or to prevent the commission of a criminal offence; and there will also be an exception for death caused by a lawful act of war.

II. The Right to Personal Liberty

(1) It will be forbidden to deprive any person of his personal liberty except as authorized by law in any of the following cases—

- (a) conviction on a criminal charge or unfitness to plead to such a charge;
- (b) by order of a court or Parliament for contempt;
- (c) by order of a court to secure the fulfilment of any legal obligations;
- (d) to bring the person concerned before a court or Parliament in execution of the order of a court of Parliament;
- (e) on reasonable suspicion of that person's commission or threatened commission of a criminal offence;
- (f) for the purpose of the education or welfare of a minor;
- (g) to prevent the spread of disease;
- (h) for the management of persons of unsound mind, drug addicts, alcoholics or vagrants in the interests of their own welfare or the protection of the community;
- (i) in connection with immigration control, extradition and deportation.

(2) Any arrested or detained person will be entitled to be informed of the grounds upon which he is being held and to obtain and instruct a lawyer of his own choice. When the arrest or detention is for the purpose of bringing him before a court or is connected with his being suspected of a criminal offence, he will be entitled to be brought before a court without undue delay and if not tried within a reasonable time, to be released on bail, subject only to reasonable conditions. Any person wrongfully arrested or detained will be entitled to compensation (although a public officer acting

reasonably and in good faith will be protected from liability).

III. Freedom from Slavery and Forced Labour

(1) It will be forbidden to hold any person in slavery or to exact forced labour.

(2) The term "forced labour" will not include labour required in consequence of a sentence or order of a court; labour which a person in lawful custody may have to perform in the interest of hygiene, etc., labour required of a member of a military or similar force or in lieu of military service; or labour required during a public emergency where the requirement is reasonably justified for dealing with the emergency.

IV. Freedom from Torture and Inhuman Treatment

(1) It will be forbidden to inflict torture or inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment on any person.

(2) Provision will be made that treatment which is reasonably justifiable to prevent the escape from custody of a person lawfully detained should not be regarded as degrading.

V. Freedom from Deprivation of Property

(1) Every person will be protected from having his property compulsorily acquired except when the acquisition is in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town and country planning, the development or utilization of that or other property in such a manner as to promote the public benefit or, in the case of under-utilized land, settlement of land for agricultural purposes. When property is wanted for one of these purposes, its acquisition will be lawful only on condition that the law provides for the prompt payment of adequate compensation and where the acquisition is contested, that a court order is obtained. A person whose property is so acquired will be guaranteed the right of access to the High Court to determine the amount of the compensation.

(2) Exception will be made for the taking of possession of property during a period of public emergency.

(3) Compensation paid in respect of loss of land to anyone who is a citizen of or ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe (or to a company the majority of whose shareholders are such persons) will, within a reasonable time, be remittable to any country outside Zimbabwe, free from any deduction, tax or charge in respect of its remission, but subject always to—

- (a) its attachment, by order of a court, in connection with civil proceedings; and
 - (b) reasonable restrictions as to the manner in which the payment is to be remitted.
- (4) The Constitution will, on the same basis as in other

Declarations of Rights, make clear that a number of transactions which might be considered to involve an element of compulsory acquisition will not be so regarded for the purposes of the Declaration of Rights.

(5) It will be made clear, for the avoidance of doubt, that the property covered by this constitutional guarantee includes rights, whether vested or contingent, of individuals to receive benefits under a law, contract or scheme relating to the payment of pension benefits.

VI. Protection for Privacy of Home and Other Property

(1) It will be forbidden, except with consent of the person concerned, to subject anybody to the search of his person or property or to entry on his premises.

(2) There will however be an exception for any law (and for any measures taken under it) which makes reasonable provision in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health or town and country planning or which makes reasonable provision to protect the rights and freedom of others; or which authorizes entry on a person's premises by employees of a local government authority or of a public corporation in connection with any tax, etc., or in order to carry out work connected with any property, situated on those premises, that belongs to that local government authority or body corporate; or which authorizes entry or search in pursuance of a court order for the purpose of enforcing the judgement or order of a court in any proceedings. Any such law (and the measures taken under it) will be tested against the criterion of what would be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.

VII. The Right to Protection of the Law

(1) Any person charged with a criminal offence will be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial court. In connection with that hearing he will have the following specific rights—

- (a) to be presumed innocent until proved guilty;
- (b) to be properly informed of what he is accused of;
- (c) to be given adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence;
- (d) to be permitted to defend himself either in person or, at his own expense, by a legal representative whom he has chosen;
- (e) to be able both to examine the witnesses for the prosecution and to call and examine his own witnesses on an equal footing with the prosecution witnesses;

- (f) to refuse to give evidence himself (but without prejudice to the court's ability to draw inference from that refusal);
 - (g) to have an interpreter if he cannot understand the language used at the trial;
 - (h) to be present throughout the trial unless his own conduct renders this impracticable and the court has therefore ordered his removal; and
 - (i) to obtain a copy of any official record of the proceedings.
- (2) It will be forbidden to create criminal offences with retrospective effect or to provide for increased penalties with retrospective effect.

(3) Except on the order of a superior court as a result of appeal or review proceedings, it will be forbidden to put a person on trial for a criminal offence for which he has already been tried or for which he has stood in jeopardy of conviction at any earlier trial or for which he has been pardoned.

(4) Any court or other tribunal which is legally empowered to determine whether a person has a legal right or obligation of the extent of any such right or obligation will have to be established or recognized by law and to be independent and impartial; and any suit brought before any court or tribunal to obtain such a determination will have to be given a fair hearing within a reasonable time.

(5) All proceedings in any court or tribunal, including the announcement of the decision, will unless the parties agree otherwise, have to be held in public, subject to the right of the court or tribunal to exclude anybody other than the parties and their legal representatives—

- (a) when publicity would prejudice the interests of justice;
- (b) in interlocutory proceedings or proceedings preliminary to trial;
- (c) in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, the welfare or the protection of the private lives of persons concerned in the proceedings; or
- (d) when a minister certifies that the disclosure of certain information will not be in the public interest.

VIII. Freedom of Conscience

It will be forbidden, except with the consent of the person concerned, to interfere with anybody's freedom of conscience. This freedom will be defined as including freedom of thought and of religion, freedom to change one's religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others, and both in public and in private, to manifest and propagate one's religion or belief in worship, teaching practice and observance.

(2) It will be forbidden to prevent any religious community from providing religious instruction for members of that community in the course of any education which it provides.

(3) It will also be forbidden, except with the consent of the person concerned or his guardian, to require any person attending a place of education to receive religious instruction, or to take part in a religious observance, except when it relates to his own religion.

(4) It will be forbidden to require anybody to take an oath which is contrary to his religion or belief or to take an oath in a manner which is contrary to his religion or belief.

(5) There will be an exception to the foregoing for any law (or for any measures taken under it) which makes reasonable provision in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health; or which makes reasonable provision for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedoms of others, including their freedom from unsolicited interference by persons of other religions or beliefs. Any such law (and the measures taken under it) will be tested against the criterion of what would be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.

IX. Freedom of Expression

(1) It will be forbidden, except with the consent of the person concerned, to interfere with anybody's freedom of expression. This freedom will be defined as including freedom to hold opinions without interference, freedom to receive ideas and information without interference, freedom to communicate ideas and information without interference and freedom from interference with one's correspondence.

(2) It will be forbidden to prevent any person or group from establishing a school, or to prevent any person from sending a child to the school of his choice.

(3) There will, however, be an exception for any law (and for any measures taken under it) which makes reasonable provision in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health, or which makes reasonable provision to protect the reputations, rights and freedoms of others or the private lives of persons concerned in legal proceedings, to prevent breach of confidence, to maintain the authority and independence of the courts or to regulate the administration or technical operation of telephones, telegraphs, posts, wireless broadcasting or television or to prevent the unlawful dispatch with correspondence of other matter; or which imposes restrictions on public officers. Any such law (and the measure taken under it) will be tested against the criterion of what would be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.

X. Freedom of Assembly and Association

(1) It will be forbidden, except with the consent of the person concerned, to interfere with anybody's freedom of assembly and association. This freedom will be defined as the right of every person to assemble freely and associate with others and in particular to form or belong to political parties or to trade unions or other associations for the protection of his interests.

(2) There will, however, be an exception for any law (and for any measures taken under it) which makes reasonable provision in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health; or which makes reasonable provision to protect the rights and freedoms of others; or which imposes restrictions on public officers. Any such law (and the measures taken under it) will be tested against the criterion of what would be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.

XI. Freedom of Movement

(1) It will be forbidden to interfere with anybody's freedom of movement. This freedom will be defined as the right to move freely throughout Zimbabwe, the right to reside in any part of Zimbabwe, the right to enter Zimbabwe, the right to leave Zimbabwe and immunity from expulsion from Zimbabwe.

(2) There will, however, be an exception for any law (and for any measures taken under it)—

- (a) which imposes reasonable restrictions on the movement within Zimbabwe of persons generally or any class of person, or on their right to leave Zimbabwe, in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health;
- (b) which imposes reasonable restrictions on the acquisition or use of land;
- (c) which authorises a court to impose restrictions on any person's movement or residence within Zimbabwe or on his right to leave Zimbabwe, in consequence of his criminal conviction or to ensure his appearance before a court to stand trial for a criminal offence or to give evidence in criminal proceedings or to answer extradition or deportation proceedings;
- (d) which imposes restrictions on the freedom of movement of anybody who is not a citizen of, nor permanently resident in, Zimbabwe;
- (e) which authorizes the extradition of a person from Zimbabwe in respect of a criminal offence or his removal to some other country to serve his sentence for such an

offence;

- (f) which imposes restrictions, in order to secure the fulfilment of any person's legal obligations, on his right to leave Zimbabwe; or
- (g) which imposes, for the protection of tribes people, restrictions on residence within Tribal Trust Land for those who are not tribes-people. In all these cases, save the restrictions relating to Tribal Trust Land any such law (and measures taken under it) will be tested against the criterion of what would be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.

XII. Protection from Discrimination

(1) It will be forbidden for any law to contain a provision which is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect or for any person who is exercising statutory powers or acting in the performance of the functions, of any public office or public authority to treat anybody in a discriminatory manner. A law or an executive action of this kind will be regarded as discriminatory if it affords special advantages or imposes special disabilities upon persons by reason wholly or mainly of their race, tribe, place of origin, political opinions, colour or creed.

(2) There will be an exception to the foregoing for any law (or for any measures taken under it which are authorized by it expressly or by necessary implication)—

- (a) which places certain restrictions on persons who are neither citizens nor permanent residents of Zimbabwe;
- (b) which makes provision with respect to matters of personal law such as adoption, marriage, divorce, burial and testamentary succession;
- (c) which makes provision for the application of their customary law in the case of members of a particular race or tribe;
- (b) which makes provision with respect to the standards or qualifications to be required of persons who are appointed to offices in the public service or the service of a local government authority or of a public corporation, provided that these standards or qualifications do not themselves specifically relate to race, tribe, place of origin, political opinions, colour or creed;
- (e) which confers special rights on tribes people in relation to Tribal Trust Land.

Savings

1. The Constitution will permit certain of the substantive

rights described above to be derogated from, within specified limits, during periods of emergency.

2. Existing laws will not be held in contravention of the Declaration for a period of five years, though such laws can be amended or repealed by Parliament any time.

Enforcement

The Declaration of Rights will contain provisions to ensure that the rights which it guarantees are fully justiciable. These provisions will declare that anybody who alleges that any of his rights under the Declaration has been, is being or is likely to be infringed—and in the case of a detained person, any other person on his behalf—will, without prejudice to any other remedy which he may have, have the right to apply to the court for redress and the court will have jurisdiction to hear and determine that application. The court will be empowered to issue such orders as it may consider appropriate to enforce, or to secure the enforcement of, any of the provisions of the Declaration of Rights.

D: THE EXECUTIVE

I. The President

(1) The President will be head of State and Commander in Chief of the Defence Forces.

(2) The President will be elected by the members of Parliament. The qualifications for election as President will be the same as those required for election to the Senate.

(3) The President will hold office until he resigns or until a period of six years has elapsed. Thereafter he will be eligible for re-election for one further period of office.

(4) The President may be removed from office on the grounds of misconduct or inability to discharge efficiently the functions of his office. A motion for removal requires to be supported by not less than two-thirds of all the members of Parliament.

(5) Provision will be made for the discharge of the functions of the office of President during the President's absence or temporary incapacity.

(6) The executive power of Zimbabwe will be vested in the President and unless otherwise provided will be exercised on the advice of the Executive Council, or, if authorized by the Executive Council, the Prime Minister or other Minister. The limited circumstances in which the President will act on his own discretion in accordance with the Constitution, e. g. appointment of the Prime Minister and dissolution of Parliament following a vote of confidence,

will be specified in the Constitution.

(References to the exercise of power by the President in this summary are references to the President acting on advice unless otherwise indicated).

(7) Provision will be made to keep the President informed of the general conduct of the Government.

(8) The exercise of the prerogative of mercy will be vested in the President.

(9) There will be vested in the President the power to declare a state of public emergency, or the existence of a situation which, if allowed to continue, may lead to a state of public emergency. Such a declaration will lapse unless it is approved within 14 days by the affirmative votes of more than one-half of the total membership of the House of Assembly. The declaration may not continue in effect for longer than six months unless it is renewed by a similar resolution.

II. Executive Council and Ministers

(1) The Executive Council will consist of the Prime Minister and other Ministers, appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister.

(2) The President will appoint as Prime Minister the person who, in his opinion, is best able to command the support of a majority of the members of the House of Assembly. He will appoint and dismiss Ministers and Deputy Ministers on the advice of the Prime Minister. In the absence of the Prime Minister, the President may authorize another Minister to perform the functions of the Prime Minister.

(3) A Minister or Deputy Minister will be a member of the Senate or House of Assembly.

(4) The Prime Minister may assign Ministers responsibility for the administration of a Government department. Where a Minister is charged with responsibility for a department of Government, it will be his duty to exercise general direction and control over that department. Secretaries will have the supervision of departments subject to that general direction and control.

III. The Public Service

(1) There will be a Public Service Commission consisting of a chairman and not less than two and not more than four other members.

(2) The members of the Public Service Commission will be appointed by the President acting on the advice of the Prime

Minister. They will be chosen for their ability and experience in administration or their professional qualifications or their suitability otherwise for appointment as members. The chairman and at least one other member will have held senior rank in the Public Service.

(3) Subject to the other provisions of the Constitution, the Public Service Commission will have vested in it the power to appoint persons to hold or act in public offices, to exercise disciplinary control over such persons and to remove them from office. The Public Service Commission will also have the power to make regulations for the administration and conditions of service of the Public Service. Its decision will be reached by a majority vote.

(4) When considering candidates for appointment to vacant posts in the Public Service and Prison Service, the Commission will be required to give preference to the person who is in its opinion the most efficient and suitable for appointment. However, in making any decision the Commission will be required to take account of any general policy directions given by the President which are designed to achieve a suitable representation of all groups of the population in the service of the State.

(5) There will be an Attorney General who will be a member of the Public Service. He will be appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. Before tendering his advice the Prime Minister will consider any recommendations by the Public Service Commission, which will in turn consult the Judicial Service Commission. If he departs from such recommendations Parliament will be informed before the appointment is made.

(6) Candidates for the office of Attorney-General must have the qualifications necessary for a judge or have served in the Office of the Attorney-General for at least six years.

(7) The Attorney-General will be responsible for criminal prosecutions. In the exercise of his powers in this capacity he shall not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority. Once appointed the Attorney-General may be removed from office only on the recommendation of a tribunal.

(8) Secretaries of Ministries and the Secretary to the Executive Council shall be appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. Before tendering his advice the Prime Minister will consider any recommendations by the Public Service Commission. If he departs from such recommendations Parliament will be informed.

(9) Heads of Diplomatic Missions shall be appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister after consultation with the appropriate Commission.

IV. The Police Force

(1) The Police Force will be under the command of the Commissioner of Police who will be appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. Before tendering his advice, the Prime Minister will consider any recommendations made by a specially constituted board. If he departs from such recommendations Parliament will be informed.

(2) The power to relieve the Commissioner of his appointment will rest in the President acting on the advice of the Prime Minister. Before tendering such advice the Prime Minister will consult the Executive Council, Parliament will be informed.

(3) Subject to such general directions of policy as may be given to him by the Prime Minister (or other responsible Minister), the Commissioner of Police will be responsible for the administration and operations of the Police Force. Appointments to the Police Force will be made on the advice of or by the Commissioner of Police. When considering candidates for appointment to vacant posts the Commissioner of Police will be required to give preference to the person who, in his opinion, is the most efficient and suitable for appointment. However, in making any such decision the Commissioner of Police will be required to take account of any general policy directions given by the President which are designed to achieve a suitable representation of the various component groups of the population in the service of the State.

(4) There will be a Police Service Commission which will consist of a chairman (who will be the chairman of the Public Service Commission) and not less than two and not more than four other members appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. The persons to be appointed as members of the Commission will be chosen for their ability and experience in administration or their professional qualifications or their suitability otherwise for appointment as members. At least one member will have held senior rank in the Police Force.

(5) The function of the Police Service Commission will be to consider grievances by members of the Police Force, to consider and, if it deems fit, to confirm any proposal to dismiss a member for the general well-being, good administration and conditions of service of the Police Force.

E : PARLIAMENT

1. The legislature of Zimbabwe will consist of the President and Parliament, which will comprise a Senate and a House of Assembly.

2. An Electoral Law will make provision for the election of Senators and of members of the House of Assembly.
3. The registration of voters in elections to the House of Assembly and the conduct of these elections will be under the direction and supervision of an Electoral Supervisory Commission.
4. There will be provision for the establishment of a Delimitation Commission to delimit the common roll and white roll constituencies for general elections.
5. All citizens who are 18 years of age or over will be eligible to be enrolled as voters. There will be a common voters roll on which will be enrolled all voters except white (including Coloured and Asian) voters who, for so long as there is provision for separate minority representation in Parliament, will be enrolled on a white voters roll.

SENATE

6. There will be a Senate of 40 members, chosen as follows—
 - (a) ten will be elected by an electoral college consisting of members of the House of Assembly elected on the white voters roll;
 - (b) fourteen will be elected by an electoral college consisting of members of the House of Assembly elected on the common voters roll;
 - (c) ten will be elected by the Council of Chiefs;
 - (d) six will be nominated by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister.
7. To be qualified for election or appointment as a Senator a person must be enrolled as a voter, have attained the age of 40 and have been ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe for not less than 10 years during the last 20 years. The residence qualification will not apply during an initial period.
8. The Senate will elect a President and a Deputy President of the Senate. A Minister or Deputy Minister will not be eligible for these posts. The President of the Senate will vacate his office on the dissolution of Parliament and may be removed from office by a resolution of the Senate supported by not less than two-thirds of all the members.
9. There shall be a Senate Legal Committee with powers of scrutiny over legislation.

HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY

10. The House of Assembly will consist of 100 members elected as follows:

- (a) 80 members will be elected by voters on the common voters roll;
- (b) 20 members will be elected by voters on the white voters roll.

11. To be qualified for election to the House of Assembly a person must be enrolled as a voter, have attained the age of 21 and have been ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe for not less than five years during the last 20 years. The residence qualification will not apply during an initial period.

12. The House of Assembly will elect a Speaker and a Deputy Speaker. A Minister or Deputy Minister will not be eligible for these posts. The Speaker will vacate his office on the dissolution of Parliament and may be removed at any time by a resolution of the House of Assembly supported by not less than two-thirds of all the members.

13. A general election for members of the House of Assembly must be held within not more than four months of the dissolution of Parliament. Election of members of the Senate will follow within 28 days.

PROCEDURE IN PARLIAMENT

14. The President or the Deputy President of the Senate will usually preside over the deliberations of the Senate. The Speaker or Deputy Speaker will usually preside at sittings of the House of Assembly.

15. The quorum of the Senate will be one-third of all its members. The quorum of the House of Assembly will be one-fourth of all the members.

16. There will be a Secretary to Parliament. He and the members of his staff will be public officers.

17. There will be provision for the privileges and immunities of members of Parliament.

18. The President will have the right to address either House of Parliament or a joint meeting of both Houses.

19. A Minister or Deputy Minister will have the right to sit and speak both in the Senate and in the House of Assembly but will only have the right to vote in the House of which he is a member.

20. Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the Senate and the House of Assembly will be empowered to regulate their own procedure.

LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF PARLIAMENT

21. Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, Parliament will have full legislative powers for Zimbabwe.

22. The legislative powers of Parliament will be exercised through Bills passed by the House of Assembly and (subject to the House of Assembly's power to override it after a period of delay) the Senate, and assented to by the President.

23. Parliament will not be entitled, except upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister signified by him or by another Minister, to proceed upon a Bill which imposes or increases taxation or impose a charge on public funds or authorizes expenditure from public funds or compounds or remits a debt due to the Government.

24. If the Senate does not approve within 90 days an ordinary Bill (that is a Bill not amending the Constitution and not a Money Bill) which has been approved by the House of Assembly, the Bill may be presented to the President for his assent. The Senate will not have the power to amend Money Bills, and in the case of such Bills its power to delay will be limited to eight sitting days.

25. Save as is otherwise specifically provided in the Constitution the House of Assembly will decide all questions by a simple majority of the votes of the members present and voting. The Speaker or other member presiding will have neither an original vote nor a casting vote. If the votes are equally divided on any question, the motion will be lost.

26. Parliament will be able to amend any of the provisions of the Constitution. Any Bill to that effect must be published in the Gazette at least 30 days before first reading in the Senate or House of Assembly.

27. The Senate will have the power to delay any Bill to amend the Constitution for 180 days, but at the end of that period it can be sent to the President for his assent, even if it has not passed by the Senate.

28. Except as provided in paragraphs 29 and 30 a Bill to amend the provisions of the Constitution will require the votes of not less than 70 per cent of the members of the House of Assembly and, subject to paragraph 27, the votes of not less than two-thirds of the members of the Senate.

29. The provisions of the Constitution relating to the separate representation of the white minority in Parliament will for a period of seven years be amendable only by unanimous vote of the House of Assembly and subject so paragraph 27, not less than two-thirds of the members of the Senate. At the end of seven years, these provisions shall be capable of amendment as in paragraph 28 above.

30. The protective provisions of the Declaration of Rights will for a period of ten years be amendable only by the unanimous vote of the House of Assembly and, subject to paragraph 27, the votes of not less than two-thirds of the members of the Senate, but a Bill which

amends the Declaration of Rights in such a way as to reduce the qualifications or exceptions to those provisions will be subject to the procedure in paragraph 28 above.

SUMMONING, PROROGATION AND DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT

31. Each session of Parliament will be held at such place and will begin at such time as the President may determine but not more than six months will be permitted to elapse between the end of one session and the beginning of the next.

32. The President will be able to prorogue or dissolve Parliament at any time on the advice of the Prime Minister.

33. If the House of Assembly at any time passes a motion of no confidence in the Government and the Prime Minister does not within three days resign or ask for a dissolution, the President will be required to dissolve Parliament.

34. Unless it is already dissolved, Parliament will stand dissolved automatically at the end of five years from the date of the first sitting of the House of Assembly after the previous dissolution. There will be provision for limited extensions of Parliament's life if Zimbabwe is at war or in periods of emergency.

F : THE JUDICATURE

1. There will be a High Court of Zimbabwe, consisting of an Appellate Division and a General Division. It will have unlimited original jurisdiction in both civil and criminal matters and such other jurisdiction as may be conferred on it by the Constitution or any other law. Appeals will lie from decisions of the General Division of the Appellate Division.

2. There shall be a Chief Justice and other judges of the High Court.

3. The Chief Justice will be appointed by the President, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister. Before tendering his advice the Prime Minister will consider any recommendation from the Judicial Service Commission. If he departs from any such recommendations Parliament will be informed before the appointment is made.

4. The other judges of the High Court will be appointed by the President, acting on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.

5. A person will not be qualified to be appointed as a judge of the High Court unless—

(a) he is or has been a judge of a superior court in a country

- in which the common law is a Roman-Dutch or English and English is an official language ; or
- (b) he is, and has been for not less than seven years qualified to practise as an advocate in Zimbabwe or in a country in which the common law is Roman-Dutch or English and in any such case English is an official language. Experience in a country where the common law is English will count only in the case of citizens of Zimbabwe.
6. If the office of Chief Justice is vacant or the Chief Justice is temporarily unable to perform the functions of his office, the President will be able to designate one of the other judges of the High Court to act in his place.
7. A judge of the High Court will not be removable from office before reaching retiring age except for physical or mental incapacity or for misconduct. If the President considers that the question of removing a judge on one of these grounds ought to be investigated, he will appoint a tribunal consisting of a chairman and two other legally qualified members. When that tribunal has enquired into the matter, it will report to the President and advise him whether to refer the question of the Judge's removal to the Judicial Service Commission. If the Commission recommends that the President should remove the judge from office, the President will do so. When the case of the judge is being investigated by the tribunal, the President may suspend him from performing the functions of his office.
8. There will be a Judicial Service Commission, consisting of the Chief Justice as the chairman, the chairman of the Public Service Commission, a legally qualified person appointed by the President and a member appointed by the President, in each case acting on the advice of the Prime Minister. The Judicial Service Commission will advise the President on the appointment of judges of the High Court and of judicial officers presiding over certain courts exercising specified functions.
9. In carrying out its functions the judicial Service Commission will to be subject to direction or control by any other person or authority.
10. The power to appoint, exercise disciplinary control over and remove from office magistrates and certain other officers, e.g. registrars, connected with the High Court will rest with the Public Service Commission.

G : THE DEFENCE FORCES

1. All armed forces will be regulated by law. The Defence Forces

will consist of the Army, the Air Force and any other branch established by law.

2. There will be a Commander of each branch. Each Commander will be appointed by the President, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister. Before tendering his advice the Prime Minister will consider any recommendations made by a specially appointed board. If he departs from such recommendations Parliament will be informed.

3. The power to relieve a Commander of his appointment will vest in the President acting on the advice of the Prime Minister. Before tendering his advice the Prime Minister will consult the Executive Council. Parliament will be informed.

4. The Commander of a branch of the Defence Forces will be responsible for that branch subject to any general directions of policy which may be given to him by the Prime Minister (or other responsible Minister) for the operations or administration of the branch concerned. Appointments within a branch will be made on the advice of or by the Commander, who will be required to give preference to the person who in his opinion is the most efficient and suitable for appointment. However, in making any decision the Commander will be required to take account of any general policy directions given by the President which are designed to achieve a suitable representation of the various component groups of the population in the service of the State.

5. There will be a Defence Forces Service Commission which will consist of a chairman (who will be the chairman of the Public Service Commission) and not less than two and not more than four other members appointed by the President acting on the advice of the Prime Minister. The persons appointed to be members of the Commission will be chosen for their ability and experience in administration or their professional qualifications or their suitability otherwise for appointment as members. At least one member will have held senior rank in the Defence Forces.

6. The functions of the Defence Forces Service Commission will be to consider grievances by members of the Defence Forces, to consider if it deems fit, to confirm any proposal to dismiss a member who has had more than two year's service, and to make regulations for the general well-being, good administration and conditions of service of the Defence Forces.

H : FINANCE

1. There will be a Consolidated Revenue Fund into which all

Government revenues will be paid unless they are payable by law into some other fund established for a specific purpose or are revenues that may by law, be retained by the authority that received them for the purpose of defraying its own expenses.

2. No moneys will be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund except to meet expenditure charged on that Fund by the Constitution or another law; or where the withdrawal has been authorized by an Appropriation Act or a supplementary or additional estimate approved by or under an Act of Parliament.

3. No moneys will be withdrawn from any public funds of Zimbabwe other than the Consolidated Revenue Fund unless authorized by or under a law.

4. The Minister of Finance will be required to lay before the House of Assembly estimates of the revenues and expenditure of Zimbabwe for the next financial year. The expenditure included in those estimates (other than expenditure charged on the Consolidated Revenue Fund) will then have to be authorized by an Appropriation Act.

5. Provision will be made for supplementary or additional estimates to be laid before the House of Assembly for expenditure not covered by the Appropriation Act or if unauthorized expenditure has taken place.

6. There will be provision under which, if the Appropriation Act for any financial year has not come into operation by the beginning of that year, the President will be permitted to authorize the withdrawal of moneys from the Consolidated Revenue Fund for the purpose of meeting necessary expenditure until the end of the first four months of the financial year or until the Appropriation Act comes into operation, whichever is the earlier.

7. The public debt of Zimbabwe, i.e. all debt charges for which the Government of Zimbabwe is liable, will be charged on the Consolidated Revenue Fund.

8. There will be a Comptroller and Auditor-General who will be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Public Service Commission. It will be his duty—

- (a) to satisfy himself that any proposed withdrawal from the Consolidated Revenue Fund is legally authorized and, if so satisfied to approve it;
- (b) to satisfy himself that all disbursements and expenditure from public funds are covered by proper authority; and
- (c) at least once a year to audit all Government accounts, including the accounts of all courts which are paid for out of Government Funds and the accounts of any Commission established by the Constitution and to report on that audit

to the House of Assembly through the Minister of Finance.

For this purpose he will be entitled to have access to all relevant books and documents. In the exercise of his constitutional functions, he will not be subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority.

9. The Comptroller and Auditor-General will be removed from office only by the affirmative vote of an absolute majority of the House of Assembly.

I : PENSION RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

1. The Constitution will contain provision relating to pensions payable in respect of service of a public officer.

2. The pension benefits to be paid to a public officer will be those applicable at the time he began his service or those provided under any subsequent law not less favourable to him.

3. All pension benefits payable by the State will be a charge on the Consolidated Revenue Fund.

4. Any person who is entitled to receive pension benefits may, if he is ordinarily resident outside Zimbabwe, have them remitted to him outside Zimbabwe free of any deduction, charge or tax in respect of its remission.

J : OMBUDSMAN

(1) There will be an Ombudsman, who will be appointed by the President on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.

(2) The duty of the Ombudsman will be to investigate complaints against action taken by any employee of the Government, other than a member of the Defence Forces or Police Force, or by any employee of a local authority, where no legal redress of right of appeal to a court exists.

2. THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS

1. The British Government put forward the following proposals for implementing the Independence Constitution in amplification of those tabled on 22nd October.

2. Rhodesia continues to be part of Her Majesty's dominions. The Government and Parliament of the Union Kingdom have responsibility and jurisdiction for and in respect of it. It is for the British Parliament to grant legal independence to Rhodesia.

3. An Independence Constitution has been agreed by the parties

subject to agreement on the arrangements for implementing it. The Constitution gives full effect to the principle of genuine majority rule and will give the Government of independent Zimbabwe the powers it needs to carry out the policies on the basis of which it is elected.

4. The question of majority rule, which gave rise to the war, has therefore been resolved. The question now at issue is who is to form the future independence government. The British Government's position is that this must be decided by the people of Zimbabwe, in free and fair elections in which all parties will be able to take part on equal terms. The British Government will transfer power to whatever leaders are chosen by the people of Rhodesia in election held under these conditions and supervised under the British Government's authority. The British Government will not be prepared to transfer power to any party which has not won it in elections. The elections will be held on the basis of the Independence Constitution and all parties will be expected to abide by it. All parties taking part in the election will also be expected to commit themselves to abide by the outcome. Such a commitment will be essential if Zimbabwe is to come to independence in peace and with a prospect of stability and prosperity for all its people.

5. The proposals put to the conference by the Salisbury delegation and the Patriotic Front showed that there was a wide divergence of views on how to create the conditions in which fair election can be held.

6. The Salisbury delegation maintained that they had been elected to govern Rhodesia, that most of their members had nothing to do with the illegal declaration of independence, that they had a mandate to govern Rhodesia, and that they should do so during the interim period. Elections should be supervised by the British Government, but they would continue to administer the country.

7. The Patriotic Front's position was set out in the paper on transitional arrangement which they circulated early in the course of this Conference and later amplified. Their proposals called for complex power sharing arrangements in the interim and restructuring of the Police and Security Forces in advance of the election.

8. Against this background the British Government has reached certain conclusions. In the first place, the purpose of the pre-independence arrangements is to allow the parties to put their case to the people under fair conditions. The pre-independence period should not be concerned with the remodelling of the institution of government. This will be a matter for the independence government elected by the people of Rhodesia. The essential requirement is that all parties should be free to put their policies to the people and should

commit themselves to abide by the people's choice. The purpose of the interim period should be peaceful competition for power.

9. Secondly, the British Government proposes that the administration of Rhodesia during the election should be entrusted to the authority of the British Government, while the leaders of all parties explain their case to the people.

10. Thirdly, the British Government has concluded that, against the background of a war and the certain difficulties of a ceasefire, an interim period must not be excessively protracted, but must allow all the political parties adequate time to put their case to the people of Rhodesia. The longer the interim period lasts before the people of Rhodesia are given the chance to decide their political future for themselves, the greater will be the period of political uncertainty and the greater the risk of a break-down of the cease-fire. It is in the interests of the people of Zimbabwe that they should be enabled to choose their future leaders as soon as it reasonably possible.

11. Finally, it is clear to the British Government that whatever arrangements are proposed for the interim will be effective only if there is a genuine commitment by both sides to make them work. It is in the interests of all the parties to this Conference that there should be an end to the fighting and free and fair elections. The British Government is prepared to ensure the conditions under which those objectives can be achieved. But it can do so only if both sides accept its authority and its determination to ensure the impartiality of the election process.

THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT

12. The British Government believes that it is only through a direct British involvement that conditions for elections, acceptable to both sides, can be created. To set in train the process which will enable free and fair elections to be supervised under its authority, as was agreed at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting at Lusaka, the British Government will appoint a Governor for Rhodesia who will be British. The Governor's instructions will require him to do all things necessary to secure compliance with the conditions for free and fair elections.

13. The Governor will be established under an Order in Council which will confer on him executive and legislative authority. He will act according to the instructions given to him, for the fulfilment of his task, by the British Government. The Governor will have powers to make laws by Ordinance for the peace, order and good governance of the country. Legislative authority will not be exercised by any

other body. Executive authority will be vested in the Governor and all public officers and authorities in Rhodesia, including the civil service, the Police and the Defence Forces, will be required to comply with the Governor's directions. The Patriotic Front's forces will also be required to comply with the directions of the Governor.

14. There will be a Deputy Governor who will be British. The Governor will also have a Military Adviser, Police Adviser, Legal Adviser and Political Adviser and such other supporting staff as the British Government may decide are necessary to enable him to discharge his functions effectively, all of whom will be British. In the day-to-day administration of the country, the Governor will however work through the existing public service. The British Government see no practical alternative to this. It will be for the Governor to ensure that his authority is effectively and impartially exercised.

15. The Order in Council providing for the establishment of the office of Governor will serve as the interim constitution of Rhodesia. Provision will be made to carry forward existing laws. It will be for the Parliament to be chosen in free elections to decide which laws shall be continued and which shall be changed. It will be the Governor's duty to ensure that powers conferred by existing laws on public officers and authorities are not used in an arbitrary manner, or in such a way as to affect the conditions for free and fair elections. Allegations of improper activity by any public authority or any political party or its representative in the election campaign may be brought to the attention of the Governor or his Deputy who will cause them to be dealt with.

16. All persons detained arbitrarily and on political grounds by any party will be released. The Governor will order a review of any such cases within his jurisdiction. The British Government will require to be satisfied that similar procedures will apply in the case of persons detained outside Rhodesia.

17. Once the Governor has arrived and his authority has been accepted in Rhodesia, Rhodesia will have returned to lawful government as a part of Her Majesty's dominions.

18. The Governor will proceed to Rhodesia as soon as possible after the conclusion of the Constitution Conference. He will assume responsibility for the government of Rhodesia. All the political leaders will commit themselves to the election campaign. Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues will not exercise ministerial functions during this period. The Governor will be responsible for the administration of the country on a caretaker basis. Heads of Ministries will report to him.

THE RETURN OF CITIZENS LIVING OUTSIDE RHODESIA

19. Many thousands of Rhodesian citizens are at present living outside the country. Most of them wish to return and it will be desirable that as many as possible should do so in order to vote in the election. The return of all refugees will be a task requiring careful organization. But a start should be made in enabling the refugees to return to their homes as soon as possible, and the British Government will be ready to assist with the process. The task of effecting the return of all refugees will need to be completed by the independence government in co-operation with the Governments of the neighbouring countries.

LAW AND ORDER

20. In the event of an effective ceasefire, the necessity for martial law will disappear. The task of maintaining law and order in the pre-independence period will be the responsibility of the civil police. The police will act under the Governor's supervision, exercised through the Police Adviser and other British police officer. Special Arrangements will be made by the Governor in consultation with the parties to ensure the protection of the political leaders in this period.

DEFENCE

21. The negotiation of a ceasefire will be the next task of the Conference as soon as there is agreement on the arrangements for holding elections and on the administration of the country in the interim period. Subject to this, the role of the military forces of both sides in the interim period will be to maintain the ceasefire. The commanders on both sides will be responsible to the Governor for this. The British Government proposes to establish machinery on which the military commanders on both sides will be represented to ensure compliance with the terms of the ceasefire. The success of the arrangements proposed for the administration of Rhodesia in the period before independence will require all parties to commit themselves to accept the Governor authority.

LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURES

22. The authority of the United Kingdom Parliament will be sought for the appointment of the Governor, the making of the Independence

Constitution and the holding of elections under it. Legislation will be submitted to Parliament as a matter of urgency so that the Governor may, without loss of time after his arrival, take the steps necessary to allow elections to be held.

23. A bill will subsequently be introduced to provide for Rhodesia to become independent, following the holding of elections supervised by the British Government and held under the British Government's authority, and the establishment of a government of Zimbabwe on the basis of the Independence Constitution.

THE ELECTIONS

24. The administrative arrangements described in this paper will be implemented in such a manner as to ensure that the elections will be held under the following conditions :

- the administration of the elections will be fair and impartial as between all the political parties taking part;
- peaceful political activity will be freely conducted by all the parties to the election;
- there will be freedom of movement, assembly and expression during the election campaign;
- all the parties will have free and uncensored access to the public media to put their case to the people of Rhodesia, and there will be freedom to advertise and to publish political views in the press;
- all parties will conduct their political activities within the law;
- appropriate measures will be taken to ensure the security of all parties taking part in the election campaign.

25. There will be an Election Council, chaired by the Election Commissioner or his nominated deputy, who will be British. The Election Commissioner will invite each party taking part in the elections to be represented on the Council. The Council will have a general consultative function. Its individual members will be able to make representations in the Election Commissioner on any matter concerning the elections. The Election Commissioner and his staff will ensure that allegations of unfair practices are properly investigated and remedied.

26. Commonwealth Governments will be invited to send observers to the elections. Their role will be to observe that the elections are genuinely free and fair and that the British Government is carrying out its responsibility to supervise them. No restrictions will be placed upon their movements, and every effort will be made to facilitate

their task.

27. All political parties which register for elections will be free to take part in the elections. Any order banning or restricting a political party will be revoked.

28. The election will be held on dates to be decided by the Governor as soon as possible after he takes up office and his authority is accepted. Three consecutive days will be set aside for polling to take place.

29. The British Government will take the legislative action necessary to bring into force those parts of the Independence Constitution required for elections to be held and for Parliament to be constituted in the terms of the Independence Constitution. Relevant provisions of the Electoral Law currently adopted in Rhodesia will be applied at the Governor's discretion.

30. The Governor will be responsible for all aspects of the conduct of the elections. There will be an Election Commissioner with appropriate staff appointed by the British Government who will be responsible for supervising the elections to the full extent necessary to ensure that they are free and fair as between the parties participating in them. He and his assistants will keep themselves fully informed of all matters relating to the elections and will enquire as necessary into any aspect of the conduct of the elections.

31. Election for the Common Roll seats will be held on a party list basis. The most practical procedure may be to divide the country into districts, each of which could be allocated a number of seats in proportion to its population. The election on the white roll will take place on the basis of existing constituencies.

32. The Governor will fix a date not less than four and more than six weeks before the elections on which political parties wishing to contest the elections should apply for registration, name each electoral district for which they wish to be registered and provide a list of the candidates whom they wish to nominate for each electoral district.

33. The qualifications for voters and for candidates for elections in Senators and members of the House of Assembly will be as provided in the Independence Constitution, except that, in view of the special circumstances prevailing at present, residence qualifications will not apply.

34. Registration of voters will not be required, but voters will be required as necessary to produce evidence of identity and eligibility to vote. Steps will be taken to prevent fraudulent and multiple voting.

35. The Election Commissioner will supervise the printing and distribution of ballot papers.

36. There will be freedom to campaign, hold political meetings and carry out canvassing. Appropriate measures will be taken by the Governor, in consultation with the parties to ensure the physical security of all political leaders during the campaign.
37. Appropriate provision will be made for the conduct of the poll, the counting of votes and the declaration of results. Every voter will be free to cast his vote for the party of his choice.
38. Each party presenting candidates will be entitled to have one representative at each polling station in the district concerned to observe the polling. The Election Commissioner and his staff will make sample checks on polling stations throughout the country.
39. It will be the responsibility of the Governor to ensure adequate security at polling stations and the security of the ballot boxes.
40. The Governor, on the advice of the Election Commissioner, will take appropriate steps regarding disclosure of election expenses, the definition of corrupt and illegal practices, and election petitions.

CONCLUSION

41. The British Government is confident that if these arrangements are accepted by the parties it will be possible for them to resolve their differences by political means, thereby enabling the people of Zimbabwe to decide for themselves their future government and enabling them and the people of the neighbouring countries to live at peace.

The British Government urges the parties to take this opportunity to achieve these aims.

B : THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS

EXTRACT FROM THE REPORT ON ZIMBABWE RHODESIA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE HELD AT LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER, 1979

1. Following the Meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government held in Lusaka from 1st to 7th August, Her Majesty's Government issued invitations to Bishop Muzorewa and the leaders of the Patriotic Front to participate in a Constitutional Conference at Lancaster House. The purpose of the Conference was to discuss and reach agreement on the terms of an Independence Constitution, and that elections should be supervised under British authority to enable Rhodesia to proceed to legal independence and the parties to settle

their differences by political means.

2. The Conference opened on 10th September under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. The Conference concluded on 15th December, after 47 plenary sessions. A list of the officials delegates to the Conference is at Annex B. together with statement by Mr. Nkomo on behalf of his and Mr. Mugabe's delegation and by Bishop Muzorewa on behalf of his delegation.

OPENING SPEECHES BY LORD CARRINGTON (CHAIRMAN), MR. NKOMO AND BISHOP MUZOREWA

Lord Carrington : When the British Government issued invitations to this Conference on 14th August, after extensive consultations, we naturally hoped for and expected to positive response. Our consultations had revealed a strong desire that the United Kingdom should take the initiative in making a further attempt to achieve a final settlement of the problem of Rhodesia, in fulfilment of its constitutional responsibilities. There was also a widespread feeling that continuation or intensification of the war was not in the best interests of any of the parties to the dispute, nor of the people of Rhodesia as a whole. Nevertheless, it is not a simple matter for those who have been involved in a bitter and tragic military confrontation to sit round a conference table together. The British Government felt strongly that it had the responsibility to bring that about.

When inviting you here we appealed to you, in the interests of the people of Rhodesia, to approach these negotiations in a positive spirit and to seek to build areas of agreement. We hope thereby to lay the foundations for a free, independent and democratic society in which all the people of Rhodesia, irrespective of their race or political beliefs, would be able to live in security and at peace with each other and with their neighbours. The act of coming together is important. It is now up to us to build on that.

Since 1965, and indeed long before, many meetings have been held to try to resolve this problem. I am under no illusions, nor are any of my colleagues with me under any illusion, about the magnitude of the task before us. The problem is one which has defeated the efforts of successive British Governments, all of whom sought to achieve the objective of a peaceful settlement in conditions which would guarantee to the people of Rhodesia the full enjoyment of their rights. But I have no intention of going back over the history of those attempts ; and I hope that you also will be prepared to look to the

future rather than to the past.

This is a constitutional conference, the purpose of which is to decide the proper basis for the granting of legal independence to the people of Rhodesia. Many conferences like this have been held in this very building. A great many former dependent territories of the United Kingdom have successfully made the transition to independent statehood on the basis of constitutions agreed here. It is our intention to approach this Conference on the basis of the same principles and with no less strong a determination to succeed than in the case of those other conferences, which resulted in the granting of independence by this country to our former dependent territories. I believe that we can take some pride in the part we have played at conferences held at Lancaster House in the process of decolonisation. As Commonwealth leaders agreed at Lusaka, Britain has had no lack of experience as a de-colonising power.

The agreement reached at Lusaka has made it possible for the British Government to convene this Conference with the very real hope that it will lead to an internationally acceptable settlement. I would like to pay tribute to the Commonwealth Heads of Government and the Commonwealth Secretary-General, all of whom worked so hard at Lusaka to establish an agreed position. In summary, the Commonwealth Heads of Government at Lusaka confirmed that they were wholly committed to genuine majority rule for the people of Rhodesia, and accepted that this requires the adoption of a democratic constitution including appropriate safeguards for minorities. They reiterated that it is the responsibility of the British Government to grant legal independence to Rhodesia. They agreed that the government formed under the independence constitution must be chosen through free and fair elections, properly supervised under British Government authority, and with Commonwealth observers. They welcomed the British Government's intention to convene this Conference, and recognised that the search for a settlement must involve all parties to the conflict. We should do well, I think, to bear in mind throughout our discussions the framework thus set out in the Lusaka communique. Not only does it incorporate the views of the British Government, but it sets out the approach which the Commonwealth will support and which will gain international acceptance.

The British Government has put to you an outline of the kind of constitution on the basis of which we would be prepared to grant independence. We wish to discuss these proposals with you at this Conference, and will be prepared to elaborate them in the light of our discussions. If we can reach agreement at this Conference, there

will be an end to the war. That is an outcome which I believe will be greeted with immense relief by the people of Rhodesia and throughout Africa. Rhodesia will proceed to legal independence with a government formed by whichever party and whichever leader can show that they command the confidence of the people. I must confess that I find it difficult to see how any party or group or leader can hope to benefit from what would follow failure to reach agreement along the general lines we have put before you, and those who would suffer most would be the people of Rhodesia, towards whom our real responsibility lies.

A quarter of the population of Rhodesia has been born since 1965. Their lives have been overshadowed, not merely by a tragic and unnecessary political dispute, but by armed conflict. Many of them have died as innocent victims of the war. Or they have lost their parents, or their brothers or their sisters. Or they have lost their homes. Many of them, black and white, face the prospect of themselves having to fight, on one side or the other, or of being deprived indefinitely of peaceful residence in the land of their birth—a quarter of a million people are now in the refugee camps in other countries. If we, who are assembled in this room, cannot agree on a way to end the fighting and to provide for you to settle your differences by political means, this is what will happen.

This generation now at risk had no part in the initial causes of the conflict. It was not born when the problem of Rhodesia came to a crisis in 1965. But now there is acceptance by all the parties of a society free from racial discrimination, of universal suffrage and majority rule. We can make this objective a reality if—and only if—we are prepared to look at the problems on the basis of principles on which both sides should be able to agree. I believe the people assembled in this room have it in their power to end the war and to enable the people of Rhodesia to decide their future by peaceful means. We—you said I—bear a heavy responsibility, and I do not believe that the people of Rhodesia will readily forgive any party which deprives them of this opportunity to settle their future by peaceful means. That is a thought which should be in all our minds throughout the whole of this Conference.

It is, I must say, a matter of great regret and disappointment to me and my colleagues that hostilities are continuing during this Conference. Progress towards agreement on political issues—which I hope we are all determined to achieve—will by definition mean progress towards removing the cause of the war. It must be our objective to proceed as soon as possible to a stage at which there can be agreement on a ceasefire. We shall fall short of what we ought to

achieve for the people of Rhodesia, if we do not give them a chance to make a fresh start, its causes and its consequences put firmly in the past.

Britain has at times, and variously, been described on the one side as choosing to stand with arms folded on the touchline ; and on the other as not being serious in its determination to decolonize. Let me assure you today, if anyone is in any doubt, that we could not be more serious in our intention to achieve a satisfactory basis for the granting of legal independence for the people of Rhodesia, and in this attempt to bring about an end to the war.

Since we were elected the government of this country at the beginning of May we have engaged in extensive consultations on the best way of achieving these objectives. Lord Harlech visited Africa early in the life of this Government to consult with the parties to the dispute and with the Commonwealth and other African governments most closely concerned. He found a general conviction that a solution to the problem of bringing Rhodesia to legal independence must stem from Britain as the constitutionally responsible authority, and that we must put forward proposals to achieve that objective. He also found that there was criticism of the present constitutional arrangement, in particular of the blocking power given to the white minority over a wide range of legislation, and of the character of the Public Service and other Commissions.

In the period of consultations, we made it clear that we would attach particular importance to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting at Lusaka. At Lusaka the British Prime Minister said that the British Government were wholly committed to genuine majority rule in Rhodesia. The principle of majority rule has been accepted by all the delegates at this Conference. The Prime Minister, at Lusaka, also recognized the importance of encouraging the European minority to remain as an integral part of the community. The Prime Minister emphasized that Britain fully accepted its constitutional responsibility to bring Rhodesia to legal independence on a basis of justice and democracy, comparable with the arrangements we have made for the independence of other countries.

The British Government took action immediately to give effect to the Lusaka declaration by convening this Conference and by putting forward constitutional proposals in accordance with the principles which were agreed at Lusaka and which have formed the basis for other independence constitutions in Africa and elsewhere.

The constitution is the fundamental problem to which we must address ourselves. I am of course well aware that there are other aspects of a settlement which must in due course be resolved. But it

is essential to the prospects of success that we should first seek agreement on our destination—which is the independence constitution. If that can be achieved it will be necessary to decide the arrangements to give effect to that agreement. The British Government has stated clearly that it will be prepared to accept its full share of the responsibility for the practical implementation of those arrangements. The central element will be free and fair elections, properly supervised under British Government authority.

The British Government's outline proposals for an independence constitution have been before you for four weeks. I did not suggest that this Conference should be held on the basis of prior acceptance of this document. Instead, I would like to take the document as the starting point for our discussions. The British Government have been asked to put forward proposals and we have done so. Unless there is a focus for our discussion it will be impossible to make progress.

There are certain general points which I would make in introducing them.

First, as the constitutional authority for Southern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom intends to take direct responsibility for the independence constitution. What you have before you are the British Government's proposals, taking account of the points made to us in our consultations. They are intended to give effect to the principles which have been accepted by successive British Governments as the proper basis for independence, and you will recollect them very clearly. They are that the principle of majority rule must be maintained and guaranteed; that there must be guarantees against retrogressive amendments to the Constitution; that there should be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population; that racial discrimination is unacceptable; that we must ensure that, regardless of race, there is no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority; and that what is agreed must be shown to be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia.

Second, our proposals are comparable to the basis on which the United Kingdom has granted independence to other former dependent territories, in particular those in Africa. We have no doubt, therefore, that a solution on this basis will be accepted by the international community, as giving effect to the principles we have accepted in granting independence to either former dependent territories. In the case of Rhodesia, as in all other cases, a constitution must take account of special circumstances. But the broadlines of independence constitutions are clear enough; and in the precedents there are points which can help us towards a solution, for example

on the representation of minorities. Third, we have made it unequivocally clear that our constitutional proposals represents in outline the kind of constitution on the basis of which the British Government would be prepared to grant legal independence. If agreement could be reached on alternative proposals which meet the British Government's criteria, we would be ready to grant independence on that basis. But we believe that the best hope of success lies in negotiation on the lines we have proposed, in accordance with the Commonwealth declaration.

If it is possible to get agreement on the general framework for the independence constitution, the British Government will be prepared to put forward more detailed proposals to give effect to that agreement. We shall therefore have further suggestions to put before the Conference. But, before we advance to that stage, we must establish what measure of agreement exists on the outline proposals, and where the major difficulties, if any, will lie. As the first step, therefore, I shall hope to hear your views on the outline proposals.

I would like very briefly to speak about the arrangements to give effect to an agreement on the constitution. In other countries approaching independence, the United Kingdom's role has invariably been to establish just conditions for independence, and not to encourage the aspirations of this or that party. Our role in Rhodesia will be the same as in other dependent territories. The international community is well aware of this and of our constitutional responsibility. In many countries we have handed over power to people who had previously been confirmed opponents of the policy of the United Kingdom, if they have been elected by the people of their countries. In the position which we agreed with other Commonwealth Governments at Lusaka, we stated that there must be free and fair elections, properly supervised under British Government authority and with Commonwealth observers. This has been accepted by all Commonwealth Governments; and, as I have already said, the British Government will be ready to carry out its responsibilities in this regard.

May I say this in conclusion. This Conference has been convened in response to the statement agreed by the Commonwealth Heads of Government at Lusaka. We have put forward proposals designed to bring Rhodesia to legal independence. Your acceptance of our invitation has given hope to the people of Rhodesia and the neighbouring countries. It is within the power of the parties represented here to bring an end to the war.

I have deliberately avoided talking of a "last chance" of a settlement. Last chances have come and gone before. But I would put it differently. Since Geneva, the conflict has reached new levels.

The cost of continuing it is very high. Since 1976 the number of men under arms on both sides has more than doubled. The war has spread into neighbouring states. The toll in casualties inside Rhodesia and in the neighbouring countries has continued to rise. Neither side has infinite resources. The price of failure at this Conference would be further prolonged bloodshed and further destruction of the life of whole communities. The responsibility for preventing this lies upon all those present here, and the eyes of the international community will be upon us all to see that we live up to that responsibility. The British Government is determined for its part to do everything in its power to bring this Conference to a successful conclusion. It is in that spirit that I ask all of you to address the task before us.

Mr. Nkomo : The Patriotic Front is going to give a statement that represents the Front. Mr. Mugabe and myself are presenting this statement on behalf of our group.

The Patriotic Front, deeply conscious of the need to bring an end to racism and colonialism which continue to plague the people of Zimbabwe, welcomes the British Government's stated aim to assist in this task of decolonization. We have come to London to attend this Conference in response to the invitation recently extended to us by you, on behalf of the British Government. For us our presence here is by itself an act of immense sacrifice. The scarce material resources we have had to divert and the manpower we must of necessity tie down in London for the duration of this conference should be enough evidence of our seriousness and good faith we have always said that we will leave no stone unturned in our struggle for the total liquidation of colonialism in Zimbabwe.

In particular we welcome the fact that the British Government now states that it is prepared to help bring genuine majority rule to our country, Zimbabwe. We are anxious to discover whether that is in fact the intention. Equally we wish to make our position absolutely clear and understood in order to facilitate frank and meaningful discussions.

The unique reality of the situation is that for many years now a major war of national liberation has been raging in our country. This arose from the single tragic fact that Britain failed to meet her decolonization responsibilities even in the face of the continuing of flagrant illegal acts of secular minority which challenges the people of Zimbabwe to take up arms and decolonize themselves. Thus we are faced with the task of a peace Conference.

British secular colonization in Zimbabwe presented special problem which did not disappear by being ignored for decades. The war is an additional special problem and cannot be ignored if it is to end.

To achieve decolonization comparable to that in other Commonwealth states we must first achieve the basic conditions for the movement to independence which existed in those countries. That was peace, safety and security for all, in the context of which an independent state would be governed according to the agreed constitution by a government elected by a people who were essentially free and secure when they chose their government. That essential preliminary situation does not yet prevail in it. It is our basic task here to create those conditions.

The extent and character of the war of national liberation must be made perfectly clear. Ninety per cent, of the country is covered by this war: the towns and cities are surrounded by and often penetrated by the armed struggle. Parts of the country the regime has written off and abandoned: these we term the liberated areas. In other areas the regime can only achieve a temporary daily presence with punitive raids on the villages: these we term the semi-liberated areas. The remaining contested areas include the towns and the citadels of the regime which we are poised to conquer. Thus the Patriotic Front has now responsibilities not only to fight but also to ensure peace, order and good government—the “problem of success”—inside Zimbabwe.

Clearly it is not our purpose in coming to London to betray or abandon any of these victories of the people of Zimbabwe who have partly liberated themselves and are continuing the task precisely because Britain failed to carry out her responsibilities.

This Conference is not only unique in British colonial history because it must achieve peace as well as a future constitution, it is unique because this is the first time that two decolonising forces have to co-operate in this task. The Patriotic Front representing the people of Zimbabwe are here as the effective decolonising factor, while Britain is here asserting her diminished legal authority. In this connection it must be pointed out that Britain, despite its claimed experience in decolonization has had no success in Zimbabwe or did not give any determined effort. The task has had to be undertaken by the people themselves. Through their sweat and blood the process is well on its way. The most positive proof of this is the admission of Britain's agent in the form of the declaration of martial law in over nearly 90 per cent of the total area of the country.

Yet we are more aware than any of the destruction and tragic toll of our struggle, of the regime's continued ability and increasing determination to wreak havoc and mass destruction. It is thus our vital responsibility to achieve genuine independence, thereby bringing about peace and putting an end to the prevailing anarchy and

chaos. This is no longer a solely British responsibility; we must—and our presence here demonstrates our will to do so—work together with Britain.

We have stated before and we repeat the fact that the Patriotic Front and the achievements of the Zimbabwean people are essential factors in the decolonizing process. We have to do this together. This is vital.

The task of this peace Conference is to ensure through an indivisible comprehensive agreement the irreversible transfer of power to the people of Zimbabwe. This is one continuous interdependent process. It is complex but does not lend itself to piecemeal treatment. The critical period leading to independence is as vital as the independence constitution itself. In practice the task of creating a suitable constitution for the crucial transitional period will serve the ultimate task of agreeing to a constitutional model for independence for our country and assist us in that undertaking in understanding one another's constitutional preference. There must be no doubt about the freedom and fairness in the context of pre-independence elections. As the recent history of our land so eloquently demonstrates, treachery, tribalism and mass murder is all that can result from a false solution. To accept such a Zimbabwe would be a betrayal of our people, of our principles and quite simply (since dead and detained men can neither canvass nor cast votes) a betrayal of ourselves. We must remember here that it has always been, and it remains, the basic objective of the Patriotic Front to ensure that government of a genuine free Zimbabwe is based upon free and fair elections. We have said this several times. We were the initiators of the principle of universal adult suffrage in Zimbabwe, in the face of its constant rejection by Britain herself and the minority regime in that country.

Zimbabwe must be a sovereign republic in which the sovereign nation pursues its own destiny, totally unshackled by any fetters or constraints.

The sovereign Zimbabwean people must, act through their own freely chosen representatives in parliament, be free and fully vested with the power to exercise complete dominion over resources from time to time as need arises. They must be free to reorganize the social, political and economic institutions and structures and be free to shape their own destiny as a nation without having to ponder to any racial, ethnic, tribal, religious, social or other interests or differences.

The safety and survival of the republic must be the sacred trust of the Zimbabwean nation, not the pawn in the hands of mercenaries

and other alien adventurers and agents. We are irrevocably committed to the position that the Zimbabwean people, by whose blood and sacrifice colonialism was exercised from the land, must themselves be the perpetual guarantors of sovereignty in the face of all challenges, domestic or foreign. Liberation and the process leading thereto must, once agreed, be irrevocable and irreversible. We know no other way of ensuring this than strict adherence to the principle that the people and their forces who have toppled minority rule must be entrusted with the task of ensuring that colonialism, under whatever guise, will not return to plague the nation once again.

Justice will not occur by accident in a sovereign Zimbabwe, nor will its administration and dispensation remain in the hands of a privileged minority. It must conform to the social and cultural values of the Zimbabwe people themselves.

The socio-economic system must conform to the people's sense of justice, democracy and fair play.

These and similar goals, cherished vigorously by our people, and for which thousands now lie in mass graves throughout Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mocambique, Botswana and Angola must not be betrayed or compromised. In the past many people present here in Lancaster House, but who are now our antagonists cherished them too. It is personal ambition and greed that propelled them into betrayal and treason. We are sworn not to follow their example.

Having seen both the British proposals and yesterday's statement by Lord Carrington, we find the British proposals are too vague for us to judge whether they are adequate to our comprehensive task. The British Government must now be prepared to take us into their confidence and show us what their real proposals are. This is very essential if we are to discuss with clarity of mind. The present outlines states no more than some of the elements of any constitution but contains also certain aspects which are very different from the normal British pattern and are also seriously retrogressive as compared with earlier British proposals such as the Anglo-American proposals.

It avoids the real issue which should be brought before this Conference and solved. Only by dealing with them can we hope to leave here and return to freedom and the prospect of peace and tranquility in our country, Zimbabwe.

The essential question we have posed constantly to ourselves and which we insist must be understood by all seriously concerned with a solution include the following :

1. Will the people of Zimbabwe be really sovereign and be able to exercise their sovereign authority ?
2. Whose army shall defend Zimbabwe and its people ? It must be

noted here that 60 per cent of the present white army are mercenaries.

3. Whose police force shall protect the people of Zimbabwe ?
4. What type of administration and judiciary shall serve the people of our country, Zimbabwe ?
5. Will any ethnic, religious, tribal or other group be able to hold the rest of the people of Zimbabwe hostage ?
6. How do we create the situation for the holding of free and fair elections ?
7. Whose laws will govern such elections ?
8. In particular, apart from the British supervisors and the Commonwealth observers, who will administer the elections and ensure the safety of the voters and candidates ?
9. What will be the future of the people's land ?

These and similar issues are those which should be placed on the agenda of this Conference and before the world if real peace is to return to our beloved Zimbabwe. The time for evasion is long past and we insist that the final phase of decolonization be seriously pursued now by the British and by ourselves.

We have won the position by our own sacrifice, our own struggle, our own blood. We are not requesting anybody to bestow this right on us. We have done it ourselves. We continue to do it.

Bishop Muzorewa : I was pleased to accept the invitation to attend this constitutional Conference and to lead the delegation of our Government of National Unity, because it enables me to report officially and in person to the British Government and the British people that we have fulfilled all the requirements insisted upon by successive British administrations. This being so, it is up to the British Government to recognise the new reality of the situation in our country and to act accordingly.

It is now the responsibility of your government to accept and acknowledge this fact. You have referred to the laying of foundations for a free, independent and democratic society. We would suggest that those foundations have already been laid, and Britain has a legal and moral duty in the name of democracy, integrity and fair play to follow its own hallowed principles and recognize the new popularly elected government in our country which is of the people, by the people and for the people.

Let me examine the present situation in relation to the five principles listed by the British Government in 1965 and the sixth subsequently added in 1966. I might add, at this stage, that these principles have received general approval by other countries and were even endorsed by the United Nations Organization.

Those principles were—

- (a) unimpeded progress to majority rule must be maintained guaranteed;
- (b) there must be guarantees against retrogressive amendment to the constitution;
- (c) there must be an immediate improvement in the political status of the black population;
- (d) there must be progress towards ending racial discrimination;
- (e) the constitutional proposals must be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole; and
- (f) there must be no oppression of the majority by the minority or of the minority by the majority.

In connection with these six principles, universal adult suffrage has been accepted and introduced in our country and this change cannot be reversed. Thus, the political status of the black population has been fulfilled and majority rule is enshrined in the constitution. No retrogressive amendments can be made without the approval of the black representatives in Parliament. Racial discrimination has been totally abolished and there is no question but that the changes which have been brought about in our country are accepted by the people as a whole. There is in our country today no oppression of the majority by the minority or of the minority by the majority. I can confidently state therefore, that the requirements of previous British Governments have been fully satisfied and nothing should now stand in the way of our Government of Zimbabwe Rhodesia being granted their rightful recognition.

Let us accept one further fact. The reasons which led to the British and subsequent international action against our country were directed purely and simply against a white minority government which unilaterally declared independence in 1965. Those reasons are no longer valid. That Government, which was anathema to the majority of our people, no longer exists. It has now been replaced by a government popularly elected by 64.8 per cent of our electorate in elections which were conducted in an honest, impartial, democratic, free and fair manner. This was testified to by virtually all the observers sent to monitor our elections, including the team led by Lord Boyd which was sent by your party. You yourself indicated in the House of Lords on May 22 that the British Government would be guided by Lord Boyd's conclusions. I fear that in some measure you may have shifted your ground in this regard and, perhaps due

to the pressure exerted on your Prime Minister in Lusaka, your commitment has not been followed through. I do most sincerely hope and trust that your government has no intention of accepting a situation where Zimbabwe Rhodesia becomes the sacrificial lamb on the alter of expediency.

I would now take you back to the 15th May of this year. At the opening of the present British Parliament your Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, said it was the objective of your government to build on the major change that had taken place in my country to achieve a return to legality in conditions of wide international recognition. Let me emphasize the word "major", which is of the greatest importance. This is exactly what has happened in Zimbabwe Rhodesia. There is a total new reality in our country. In Parliament, the House of Assembly consists of 72 black and 28 white members, the Senate consists of 20 black and 10 white senators. The Cabinet contains 19 ministers, of whom 14 are black and 5 are white. Prior to May the two highest posts in the land, that of Prime Minister and President, were held by whites. Now these posts are filled by blacks. Furthermore, as Minister of Combined Operations and Minister of Defence, I have executive control and ultimate authority over all military matters in my country. The military commanders operate under my immediate policy directives. Similarly, my black colleague, the Minister of Law and Order, who is a member of my delegation, holds executive power over the police.

All racially discriminatory laws, including those relating to land tenure, have been repealed—I repeat, have been repealed. People of all races are now permitted to live where they choose, whether in rural or urban residential areas. Our black population participates in all facets of business without any racial restrictions. Our schools and hospitals are now non-racial. All these significant developments were unheard of and thought impossible less than two years ago.

You said that in the case of Rhodesia, as in all other cases, the constitution must take account of special circumstances. That is precisely what we have done. We have a new constitution drafted by both black and white members of the four parties to the March 3rd Agreement—it was drawn up by the people of our country to meet the needs of our country. We have a new flag, one that is symbolic of our country and all its people.

We have a new non-racial nation, one that is dedicating itself to be a good example to other countries, not only on the African continent but throughout the world. The successful conclusion of our agreement of 3rd March, 1978, and the implementation of our new constitution, has been achieved through the tremendous courage dis-

played by the vast majority of our electorate during elections. They went to the polls happily and willingly to exercise their newly won democratic right to elect a government of their choice despite intimidation and threats of death. In doing so they clearly demonstrated their desire to determine the future course of their country and that this should be achieved through the ballot and not the bullet. The people voted because they had at last secured their inalienable right to do so, in spite of repeated threats by the Patriotic Front to disrupt our elections, to punish and maim our citizens who dared to vote and to execute the democratically elected black leaders of their government.

There are a number of important matters on which we require a clear, binding and unequivocal undertaking from your government from the very outset of this Conference. I repeat that we have met the six principles. Lord Boyd reported on the last outstanding principle and your government has not denied his finding that the fifth principle has been met.

We require to know clearly and categorically what more your government required from us before you will remove sanctions and grant recognition to our government. Thereafter, if we are able to reach agreement, we shall require a firm commitment in specific terms from your government that it is prepared to support our government to the fullest extent, that sanctions will be lifted, and that recognition will be granted. Here I must make it absolutely clear that we are not prepared to see any negation of what has so far been achieved in our country on behalf of our people, unless it is in their interests and in the interests of their country.

We require from Her Majesty's Government a guarantee, made publicly, to the effect that no one—I repeat, no one—will have the power of veto over the stated scope and focus of this Conference and that the same will apply to any decision that may be agreed.

You asked us to set down fully our views on the constitutional questions and on the outline proposals published by the British Government when extending the invitation to the Conference. I have already dealt with the constitutional questions. As far as the outline proposals are concerned, the Constitutional Agreement of 3rd March, 1978, and our present constitution, substantially meet all the point that are made. We sincerely trust that you will not insist on us making changes to our constitution, which is already working very well, merely for the sake of appeasing other countries who do not appreciate the position in Zimbabwe Rhodesia. I repeat what you yourself said in the case of Zimbabwe Rhodesia, as in all other cases, the constitution must take account of special circumstances. The

constitution of Zimbabwe Rhodesia was agreed in that country, and for that reason it is likely to stand the test of time. History has shown that many constitutions which have been agreed in this place have not lasted for any appreciable period. We do not want the same thing to happen to us.

The British Government, in its invitation to this Conference, strongly urged both sides to observe a ceasefire. You said it was a matter of great regret and disappointment to you that hostilities are continuing during this Conference. My delegation would like to have it placed on record that we accepted that appeal by the British Government and, in fact, we are still prepared to co-operate fully in trying to bring about a ceasefire. However, no ceasefire can be achieved unless all the parties to the conflict agree to observe this.

Finally, in your address yesterday it was clear that you personally, and your government, earnestly desire to see this Conference succeed, and that you have the sincere determination to achieve this noble objective. You struck a chord which resounds in our own hearts when you deplored the terrible and useless loss of lives in our country. You challenged us in the name of humanity to adopt a constructive approach and contribute to the successful outcome of our deliberations.

I wish to assure you that I and my delegation are most willing, and indeed anxious, to respond to your challenge in the most positive manner. We shall do so in the true spirit of the Christian and democratic principles which we have always followed. We shall do so because deep in our consciences and our souls we believe that this will lead to the salvation of our people, our country and our nation. You will not find us lacking in our efforts to seek a realistic solution which will enable our country to progress to peace and prosperity. In God's name I pray that goodwill may prevail and that this Conference will be blessed with success.

SUMMARY OF THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION

The text is set out in Annexure I to the White Paper "Zimbabwe Rhodesia—Proposals for Independence"—Cmd. R.Z.R. 18-1979—and is not reproduced in this Annex.

ANNEX D

THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS

The text is set out in Annexure II to the White Paper "Zimbabwe Rhodesia—Proposals for Independence"—Cmd. R.Z.R. 18-1979—and is not reproduced in this Annex.

RHODESIA : CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT

The parties to this cease-fire agreement have agreed as follows :

1. With effect from 2400 hours on 21st December, 1979, all movement by personnel of the Patriotic Front armed forces into Rhodesia and all cross-border military activity by the Rhodesian forces will cease. This agreement will take effect on a basis of strict reciprocity. The British Government will request the governments of countries bordering on Rhodesia to make arrangements to ensure that externally-based forces do not enter Rhodesia. Provision will be made to permit the return of civilian personnel to Rhodesia in order to vote or engage in other peaceful political activity. Border crossing points will be established, under the supervision of the monitoring force, for this purpose.
2. With effect from 2400 hours on 28th December, 1979, all hostilities in Rhodesia will cease. The Commanders will issue instructions to the forces under their command to ensure that all contact between the respective forces is avoided. A Ceasefire Commission will be established in Salisbury. The Chairman of the Commission will be the Governor's Military Adviser. The Commission will consist of equal numbers of the representatives of the military Commanders of both sides. The Commission will meet as required throughout the ceasefire. Its functions will include—
 - (a) ensuring compliance with agreed arrangements for the security and activities of the forces ;
 - (b) the investigation of actual or threatened breaches of the ceasefire; and
 - (c) such other tasks as may be assigned to it by the Governor in the interests of maintaining the ceasefire.

The Commission will be independent of existing command structures and the Governor may at his discretion communicate direct with the Commanders of the Rhodesian forces and the Patriotic Front forces concerning the exercise of their respective functions. Any member of the Commission may invite it to discuss any question which appears to him to be relevant to its functions.

3. The British Government will be responsible for the establishment of a monitoring force under the command of the Governor's Military Adviser. The force will assess and monitor impartially all stages of the inception and maintenance of the cease-fire by the forces and assist the Ceasefire Commission in its tasks. The

Commanders of the Rhodesian forces and of the Patriotic Front forces undertake to co-operate fully with the monitoring force and to provide it with whatever facilities are necessary to assist it to discharge its functions.

4. Elements of the monitoring force will be assigned—
 - (a) to maintain contact with the command structures of the Rhodesian forces and Patriotic Front forces throughout Rhodesia ;
 - (b) to monitor and observe the maintenance of the ceasefire by the respective forces ; and
 - (c) to monitor agreed border-crossing points and the use made of them in accordance with such arrangements as may be agreed in the context of the ceasefire.
5. Members of the monitoring force will carry weapons for their personal protection only and will be provided with vehicles and aircraft carrying a distinctive marking. The force will be equipped with an independent radio communications network.
6. The parties recognize that disengagement of the forces will be essential to an effective ceasefire and the deployment of the monitoring force. At 2400 hours on 28th December, 1979, the Rhodesian armed forces, under the directions of the Governor, will therefore disengage to enable the Patriotic Front forces inside Rhodesia to begin the process of assembly. Elements of the monitoring force will be deployed to the command structures and bases of the Rhodesian forces and to assembly places and rendezvous positions designated for the Patriotic Front forces.
7. The Patriotic Front forces at present in Rhodesia will report with their arms and equipment to rendezvous positions (RPs) and will proceed thereafter to assembly places. The process of assembly will take place under the direction of the Commanders of the Patriotic Front forces and under the auspices of the monitoring force.
8. Movement to assembly places will be completed by 2400 hours on 4th January, 1980. The process of assembly will take place with the assistance of the monitoring force. Arrangements will be made for the accommodation, security and other agreed requirements of the Patriotic Front forces.
9. The Rhodesian armed forces will comply with the directions of the Governor. There will be reciprocal disengagement by the Rhodesian forces, in relation to the successful accomplishment of the assembly process by the Patriotic Front forces.

10. With effect from ceasefire day, all forces will comply with the ceasefire and with the directions of the Governor. Any forces which fail to comply with the ceasefire or with the directions of the Governor will be deemed to be acting unlawfully.
11. The primary responsibility for dealing with breaches of the ceasefire will rest with the Commanders of the forces through the mechanism of the Ceasefire Commission and with the assistance of liaison officers of the monitoring force. The Commanders will ensure, with the assistance of the monitoring force, that breaches of the ceasefire are contained and dealt with. In the event of more general or sustained breaches of the ceasefire the Governor will decide what action to take to deal with them the forces which have accepted his authority.
12. The parties undertake to issue clear and precise instructions to all units and personnel under their command to comply scrupulously with the arrangements for bringing the ceasefire into effect. They will make announcements, immediately following the conclusion of this agreement, which will be broadcast regularly through all appropriate channels to assist in ensuring that instructions to maintain the ceasefire reach all the forces under their command and are understood by the public in general.
13. The parties to this agreement renounce the use of force for political objectives. They undertake to accept the outcome of the elections, to comply with the directions of the Governor and to resolve peacefully any questions relating to the future composition of the armed forces and the training and resettlement of military and civilian personnel.

15 December 1979

India-Africa Relations

ANUP RANJAN BASU

Prospects for Indian Investment in Africa

The Indian Investment Centre has in a recent study indicated that on account of similarity of economic conditions, problems of development as well as large settlements of Indian populations, enormous possibilities exist for the Indian investment in Africa. Quite a few joint ventures set up in Kenya, Nigeria and Mauritius have given a good account of themselves thereby creating sizeable employment, developing resources including manpower and bringing about saving in input and adding to the resources of the host countries.

The first Indian joint venture abroad was set up in Africa when a textile Unit was established in 1956 in Ethiopia. Since then a large number of Indian joint ventures have been set up in as many as 35 countries. At present 109 Indian joint ventures are in operation in different countries of the world and 86 under implementation. Of these 39 joint ventures are in Africa, 22 in operation and 17 under implementation. Till April 1979 the total Indian investment in joint ventures in Africa was estimated at Rs. 215.45 million of which the investment in joint ventures in actual production was Rs. 99.91 million.

Nehru Award for Nelson Mandela

Nelson R. Mandela, South African Leader for black liberation movement, now imprisoned in Robben Island, has been awarded the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding for the year 1979. A seven-member jury finalised the award and it was announced at a News Conference by Shri Hidayatullah, the Vice-President of India who is also the Chairman of the Jury. The award carries Rs. 1,00,000/ in cash (convertible in foreign exchange) and a citation. The award was administered by the Indian Council for Cultural Relations. Besides Nelson Mandela, two other African Leaders—President Kenneth D. Kaunda and

President Julius Nyerere—received this award in 1970 and 1973 respectively.

Indian Financial Grant for Africa

India has given a grant of Rs. 50 lakhs to the UN Trust Fund for African development. The money will be utilised by the Economic Commission for Africa to obtain experts and consultancy and training services from India in different fields. The projects, identified for collaboration, include assistance to African countries in procurement and supply management, building materials production and construction services, rural technology, surveying and mapping.

Various Indian institutions and agencies, viz. National Building Construction Corporation, Engineers India Limited, Khadi and Village Industries Commission, the Department of Science and Technology and the Geological Survey of India, will cooperate with the African Development Programme.

Egyptian President writes to Prime Minister

President Anwar Sadat of Egypt had sent a letter to Shri Charan Singh, the Indian Prime Minister, informing him of the progress in peace negotiation in West Asia, including his meeting with the Israeli Prime Minister, Mr. Menachem Begin in Haifa. This was the follow-up communication, the first one being the letter to the Indian Prime Minister sent through the Egyptian Foreign Minister on the eve of Havana Non-Aligned Conference in September 1979.

Indo-Egyptian Talks on Resumption of Flights

Indian Diplomatic Mission in Cairo has been instructed to negotiate talks with Egyptian Government on ending the deadlock over bilateral aviation agreements. The Government of India endeavours at an early resumption of flights on the principle of equality and urges Egypt to continue talks for the removal of any misgivings. The Indian interpretation of the Agreement, first signed in 1962 and up-dated in 1976, stipulates that Egypt can operate two terminatory flights (terminating in Bombay) and two transit flights without any traffic rights, while Egypt demands two transit flights with traffic rights alongwith two terminatory flights.

Improvement in Indo-Algerian Relations

Shri M. Hidayatullah, the Vice-President of India represented



India in Algeria at the 25th Anniversary celebrations of its revolution on November 1.

Under an Indio-Algerian Memorandum of Understanding signed on 14th November, 1979, the two countries has agreed to cooperate in meeting the requirements and development of Petroleum Industry. In order to meet a likely shortfall of crude supply from the middle eastern sources in 1980, India had earlier approached Algeria to meet the shortfall next year. Under this Memorandum, Algeria has agreed to consider India's request for more crude and petroleum products for the next year and also for subsequent years on a long-term basis.

The possibilities of cooperation identified in the Memorandum relates to petroleum exploration in the on-shore areas of Algeria by the ONGC and India acquiring a share of the oil if it is found.

The possibility of cooperation between India and Algeria regarding the construction of new railway lines in Algeria and modernisation of existing ones was discussed between Shri Kamalapati Tripathi, Railway Minister and the Light Industry Minister for Algeria. The Algerian Minister headed a seven-member delegation which visited India in February this year to discuss proposals for industrial and technical cooperation. A Memorandum of understanding on Indo-Algerian cooperation in the field of railways was signed on 23rd May, 1979. The areas specified for cooperation included feasibility studies and construction of underground urban lines, modernising of existing railway network and providing of technical personnel.

Five more joint ventures in Algeria with Indian assistance, the value of which will be around \$ 200 million, was also cleared. At present there are 12 joint ventures involving an investment of \$ 37 million. Among the new joint ventures under consideration are a housing project for 10,000 technocrats and the setting up of a Training Centre for skilled persons in machine tools.

In course of a banquet hosted in honour of the Algerian Foreign Minister, Mohd. Seddik Ben Yahia, who visited at the fag-end of February 1980 Shri P.V. Narsimha Rao, the External Affairs Minister for India, reaffirmed the Indian conviction that "a just and lasting solution of West Asian problem lies in complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab lands and the restoration of inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to have a nation-state of their own". The Algerian Foreign Minister said in reply that both India and Algeria "are concerned by the reactivation of military basis and return to the policy of military pacts".

Indian Contract from Libya

The Projects and Equipments Corporation (PEC) of India has signed contracts for construction of schools, education centres, housing projects etc. with Libya on turn-key basis. The total value of contracts is Rs. 40 crores. Another important contract accorded to PEC by the Libyan Government relates to project management of a bicycle manufacturing plant which has now been set up in Libya by an Italian firm.

Indian Supports Western Saharan Freedom Movement

On the floor of the General Assembly of the United Nations, India strongly supported the demand of the people of Western Sahara for self-determination. Smt. Shanti Sadiq Ali, a member of the Indian Delegate, pleaded for speeding up the decolonisation process in the remaining 30 countries which are still under colonial rule.

As regards Western Sahara, Smt. Sadiq Ali recalled, the decision of the Organisation of African Unity at Monrovia and that of the non-aligned Summit meeting at Havana calling for a free referendum to enable the people of Western Sahara to exercise their option for independence or status quo.

More Trade Likely in West Africa

After the UNIDO Conference in India, some West African countries including Nigeria and Ghana have started negotiations with the Indian manufacturers of engineering goods. Africa's share in the export of engineering goods from Africa has been steadily rising. According to rough estimates it has risen to 25% of the total engineering exports from India in 1979-80 from 19.33% in 1977-78. Indian engineering technology and goods are becoming more and more popular also in Egypt, Sudan, Malawi, Zambia, Nigeria and Liberia.

It should also be noted in this connection that tremendous scope exists for India to export technical knowhow to Nigeria along with enormous opportunities for establishing joint ventures. There is scope for boosting exports of bicycle, motor parts, diesel pumpsets, cotton yarn, dyes, drugs, electric switchgear and the like. According to an official paper Nigeria has now come to accept the concept of appropriate technology and India is recognised as major exponent of it. The situation therefore is conducive for India to export knowhow to Nigeria.

Two favourable factors—performance of Indian experts and entrepreneurs in Nigeria and joint ventures where India is a dominating partner—have done exceedingly well. Though Nigeria offers limited export market for India's principal projects like tea, jute, textiles and handlooms but considerable scope exists for boosting Indian exports of bicycles, motor parts, cotton yarn, radio sets, water coolers and the like.

India has well-developed trading links with Nigeria. The volume of trade is small but well-spread covering almost the entire range of India's export projects. Indian exports were highest in 1975-76 when goods worth Rs. 375 millions were shipped to Nigeria.

Ugandan Trade Team in India

An Official trade delegation from Uganda visited India in March 1980 to place firm orders for a wide range of machinery and "the urgently needed consumer goods like textiles and pharmaceuticals". Mr. C.O. Okui, the Industry Minister of Uganda, said that these machinery would be purchased out of the credit of Rs. 7.5 crores provided by the Industrial Development Bank of India.

India Accuses Pretoria of Delaying Namibian Settlement

India charged the Pretorian Government of adopting a delaying tactics at the negotiations held by the five Western countries and the U.N. for settling the Namibian problem peacefully. Smt. Shanti Sadiq Ali, Member of Indian Delegation to United Nations stated that the proximity talks held at New York and the discussion held by the U.N. Representative at Geneva provided opportunities for South Africa to engage in a meaningful dialogue. "While the South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) and the front-line States accepted the concept of the demilitarized zone, it is our impression that, so far rather than engaging in realistic discussions, the South African reaction has been one of further prevarication". The reply sent by Pretoria, on the eve of debate in the General Assembly, expressing South Africa's conditional acceptance of the idea of a demilitarized zone only fortified that it was prevaricating. Smt. Shanti Sadiq Ali further observed "the fact of the matter is that while on the one hand South Africa has been building up an elaborate smokescreen of supposed willingness to negotiate, it simultaneously sought to strengthen its hold over Namibia". She cited in support Pretoria's attempts to stamp out SWAPO resistance by its ruthless action against Namibian patriots, setting up of puppet

groups, creation of tribal armies and forces, fragmentation of Namibian territory and annexation of Walvis Bay.

India Wants Involvement of Patriotic Front in Interim Arrangements

India was among the Commonwealth countries, which called for broader and deeper involvement in the transitional arrangements leading to elections in Rhodesia. India's view was conveyed to Britain by the Acting High Commissioner, Dr. I.P. Singh at a special meeting which was called to consider the progress of Lancaster House talks. Dr. Singh also said that it was necessary that the Patriotic Front should be involved in the interim arrangements. India suggested that the supervision of the elections shall not be one sided and there must be some persons by both sides—the Rhodesian army and the Patriotic Front Forces.

India also ended its 15-year old ban on economic relations with Rhodesia. The decision to lift the ban which was imposed in 1965 immediately after the UDI by the minority regime of Mr. Ian Smith was taken following the Peace Agreement signed in London. The decision to discontinue the ban on economic relations followed the Security Council's Resolution recommending the lifting sanctions against Rhodesia.

It is to be noted in this context that Shri Rajeshwar Dayal has been appointed a leader of the 11-Member Commonwealth Observer group to monitor the Rhodesian election. Some of the other members of the group are Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka.

BOOK REVIEWS

NELSON MANDELA : *The Struggle is my life*. International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, London. Pp. 209, £ 1.85.

History abounds in examples when freedom fighters committed to bring back the basic human rights for their countrymen are tortured and imprisoned and the ruling Government wants to silence their powerful voices mostly by foul means. One such glaring example in modern times is the life and struggle of Nelson Mandela who has persistently been fighting for freedom and justice for his fellow men. The most unique feature in this struggle is that it has been a consistently non-violent and peaceful crusade waged on behalf of the people who constitute over 80% of the population and is being ruled by a minority Government. At the age of 61 Nelson Mandela had already spent 18 years of his life in prison. But it is a measure of his sterling character that the unceasing harassment to which

he was subjected could not make him bitter or frustrated to a point which might compel him to compromise either on the end or the means of his struggle.

Nelson Mandela was born of a tribal royal family in Transkei in July 1918. Political awareness was instilled in him through the teachings of the elders of his tribe.

The present book under review is actually a collection of his speeches, writings and documents over the years. In publishing this handy volume, International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (London) has done a singular service in the sense that a number of useful documents and policy statements of the African National Congress are now easily available to serious students who want to probe the history of the South Africa Freedom

Movement. Many of these documents and speeches were not published before and as such it gives a very good insight into the whole ideological foundation as well as the action-programme of the African National Congress. It contains above all two statements issued by Nelson Mandela himself—one in 1961 entitled "The Struggle is my Life" (from which the present volume draws its title), and the second in 1964, entitled "I am prepared to die". Apart from these useful documents and statements, the value of the book is further enhanced with the inclusion of one biographical note on Nelson Mandela by Mac Maharaj and an interview from the same freedom fighter on the life of Nelson Mandela and his co-prisoners in Robben Island. One is really astounded to find that such inhuman treatment is being meted out to those whose only crime has been to demand justice for their fellow beings. Nelson Mandela has repeatedly asserted that he is not anti-white, but

definitely against the minority regime perpetrated by the Whites in South Africa. He condemns racialism as "a barbaric thing, whether it comes from a black man or a white man." His opposition to the regime springs not from any parochialism or anti-white sentiments, but from the basic aspirations of the Africans to enjoy the elementary human rights which is their due. This collection of speeches and writings also contains a number of photographs, many of which were previously unpublished, and an autobiographical note prepared by Nelson Mandela himself while he was on trial for sabotage (Cf. the famous Rivonia Trial of 1964). Nelson Mandela will for ever remain the most outstanding symbol of resistance to apartheid from whose life and struggle posterity will draw inspiration. Both the laymen and the serious research scholars on African history and politics will be immensely benefited from this volume.

ANUP RANJAN BASU

MICHAEL CROWDER : *Colonial West Africa*, Frank Cass, London, 1978, Pp. 341 £ 11.50

Michael Crowder, a well known authority on the History of West Africa, in his book *West Africa Under Colonial Rule* (1968) had contributed to existing literature of this region. His

contribution, however, has been rivalled by W.B. Morgan and J.C. Pugh's *West Africa* (1969). The latter highlighted the impact of the modern economy, demographic changes, develop-

ment of agriculture, fishing, mining, industry and commerce and transport. Crowder claims that the present work, *Colonial West Africa* would "supplement rather than duplicate" the understanding of such themes. His claims however of having analyzed "the impact of European culture on African culture; the resistance of African to European conquest; African reaction to colonial rule, particularly as seen through the lens of rebellions against it; the difference between French and British administrative, social and economic policies; and the consequences of these differences for those subjected to them; the extent to which Africans accepted the new socio-political structures imposed on them by their European overlords and the points at which they began to demand that they take over control of them; and finally the importance or otherwise of the colonial period in African history as a whole," are quite exaggerated.

We are extremely disappointed after a mere glance through the pages of the book. We note that there is nothing new in the book. Rather it is a compilation of articles published through 1956-1974 on the themes discussed in his earlier book. These are : I "West Africa and the Europeans : Five Hundred Years of Direct Contact," a paper specially written for the Conference of the Historical

Society of Ghana held in 1971 to mark the 500th anniversary of the first arrival of Europeans on the coast of Ghana. II "Background to the Scramble" taken from his *West Africa Under Colonial Rule* (1968), pp. 45-64. This paper was earlier also reprinted in Joan G. Ronald (ed.) *Africa : the Heritage and the Challenge—An Anthology of African History* (1974). III "West African Resistance" "from his Introduction to *West African Resistance : The Military Response to Colonial Occupation* (1971), pp. 1—18. IV "Bai Bureh and the Sierra Leone Hut Tax War of 1898" written with La Ray Denzer, for Robert I. Rotberg and Ali Mazrui (eds.) *Protest and Power in Black Africa* (1970), pp. 169-212. V "Blaise Diagne and the Recruitment of African Troops for the 1914-18 War", printed earlier in *West Africa under Colonial Rule* (1968). VI "The White Chiefs of Tropical Africa" from L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan (eds.) *The History of Colonialism in Tropical Africa*, vol. 2 (1970). VII "The Imposition of the Native Authority system in Bussa : The Rebellion of 1915" from the proceedings of the Seminar on the History of the Peoples of the Niger-Benue Valleys (Ahmadu Bello University, Ilorin, March 1974). VIII "The French Suppression of the 1916-17 Revolt in Dahomeyan Borge", from *The Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, vol. viii, 1, December 1975. IX

"Indirect Rule : French and British Style", from *Africa*, xxxiv, 3 July 1964, pp. 197-205. X "West African Chiefs" with Obaro Ikime (eds.) *West African Chiefs : Their Changing status under Colonial Rule and Independence* (1970). XI "West Africa 1919-1939 : The Colonial Situation," co-authored with J.F. Ade Ajayi and Longman from J.F. Ade Ajayi and M. Crowder, (eds.) *History of West Africa* vol. 2 (1974). XII "Colonial Black water" from *The Times British Colonies Review*, 1956-57. XIII "The Vichy Regime and Free France in West Africa during the Second World War," from M. Crowder and Ade Ajayi (eds.) *History of West Africa* (1974). XIV Independence as a Goal in French-speaking West African Policies 1944-60", from William H. Lewis (ed.) *French-speaking Africa: The Search for Identity* (1965) and XV "Colonial Rule in West Africa: Factor for Division or Unity," from *Civilisations*, 2 (1965). These are not like flowers of a garland. They are rather put like balls in a basket to be played with both by the author and reviewers. They overlap and duplicate the themes. In fact, the central theme of the book can rightly be described as variance in the British and French methods *vis-a-vis* policies. This variance is analyzed through the scrappy and unlinked events of the three stages of colonial rule—occupation, consolidation and

decolonization by these colonial Powers. Analysis of these stages is, on the one hand, also quite uneven. Almost two-thirds of the book concern the local administration. It tempts the present reviewer to title the book: "Some Aspects of the Colonial Local Administration in West Africa."

Further, Crowder criticizes the *eurometric* approach in the study of the history of Africa. He claims to "see through the lens of rebellions" of Africans against colonial rule. This appears to be the most ambiguous claim of the author. Contrary to it, his approach appears to be heavily biased in favour of the Europeans when he compares them with Asians or African authorities; and in favour of the British when he makes a comparison between the policies of the colonial Powers in Africa. Tracing the outside contact with Africa, for example, he says that both Islam and Christianity, who established contact with West Africa, depended on slave trade. Portugal did try to give "technical aid to the *Kongo* kingdom" but their experiment failed since Africans had nothing to offer but slaves in exchange. (p. 5) He further maintains that "the Europeans traded with Africans at the latter's pleasure as commercial and, let it be said, more equals." (p. 7) Similarly while highlighting the problems faced by post-independence West

Africa, he opines that: "Certainly France was right in thinking that a Balkanized Africa, would be more dependent on her in the post-independence era, as subsequent events have proved." (p. 321) But in case of British West Africa, he puts the blame squarely on Kwame Nkrumah for disrupting the structure and strengthening the process of disunity of the anglophone territories of West Africa. "Ghana, as the first of the British West African colonies to gain independence," he said, "could have seized the initiative in retaining these common services instituted by the British Colonial Administration. Instead Nkrumah quite deliberately withdrew Ghana from them on the grounds that regional groupings would prove a stumbling block to the achievement of continental unity." (p. 322).

Secondly, by microscoping the 500 year-history of outside contact with West Africa in 22 pages, Crowder has raised many doubts and not unfolded any secrets. If we accept his argument we simply exonerate imperial tactics which destroyed the Afro-Asian structures and facilitated the control of the "mass" by a "few" Europeans. This kind of treatment further blurs the past and becomes more un-afrocentric. We cannot analyse present Africa, as Professor Ajayi questions, without first authenticating the pre-colo-

nial States. But Crowder tries to authenticate that "until the late 1870s European nations preferred to trade and evangelise [Africa] without control of their home government being extended over the areas in which they worked." Thus according to him, the rivalry between Islam and Christianity or the royalistic and commoners represented by the Napoleonic Wars did not affect this contact. Ashanti wars did not aim at establishing British control.

Thirdly, as the author himself says: "Where I have changed my views, say, on the nature of the differences between French and British local administration in West Africa—as between 'Indirect Rule—French and British Style; published in 1964, on the one hand, and 'West African Chiefs' published in 1970, on the other, I have made no attempt to reconcile them. Nor, when an interpretation has proved wrong, as that of the Niger Election in 1958 in 'Independence as a Goal in French-speaking West African Politics, 1944-60' published in 1965 which has been effectively challenged by Finn Fugelstad's 'Dijibo Bakary, the French and the Referendum of 1958 in Niger' in the *Journal of African History* XIV, 2, 1975, have I altered it. I felt that the business of updating essays, some written more than a decade ago, would involve in some cases complete rewriting and change the character of the

series in which this collection appears." His confession itself eliminates any justification for bringing out this book. Is it not really cheating to sell obsolete and outdated papers at an exorbitant cost of £11.50? Above all this approach dampens the thought of the reviewer whose sole purpose is improvement of the existing literature. I would also like to add, that Crowder has not done justice by taking the functional aspect of the French policy and the theoretical aspect of the British policy to highlight the variance in their methods and policies.

Finally, I would like to equate the book under review with the base calculation of those producers of Hindi films who are repeating their popular themes of [and also others'] old films again and again in their movies and pick-pocketing the cine-goers, of course, in a sophisticated way.

However, they can be credited with the task of re-performance. Crowder has not perhaps even cared to go through the draft of this book before sending it to Press. The only job he has done is collecting his printed material and also omitting some of the paragraphs of Chapter XI, "West Africa 1919-1939: The Colonial Situation" as he boastingly points out "to avoid duplication of the discussions in Chapters IX and X of the administrative policies of France and Britain in West Africa." (p. 233).

The publishers, Frank Cases can also not be exonerated from the charge of misusing Crowder's name and position. Further, the reviewer fears like D.H. Jones that Crowder's reputation will not be much enhanced by this "sadly misconceived *compilation*" (Emphasis mine), *African Affairs*, v. 77, pp. 577-78.

DHARAMPAL

JAMES O. OJIAKO : *13 years of Military Rule 1966-79*. Daily Times Nigeria Ltd., Lagos; N 1 : 50K

In its attempt to inform the public on the developments taking place in Nigeria, the Daily Times of Nigeria Ltd. occasionally publishes books of contemporary interest. One such was the *Great Debate*, a collection of various opinions expressed by many people on different aspects of our new Constitution which

came into effect on 1st October 1979. The latest book, *13 Years of Military Rule 1966-79* is another of such occasional publications. It is written by J.O. Ojiako, a journalist and the current editor of the popular *Nigeria Year Book*, an annual publication by the Daily Times Nigeria.

Essentially, the book cata-

logues the activities of the military from January 1966, when it took over the reins of government from the civilians to October 1979, when it handed over power to a democratically elected government. The book appraises the important political developments during the thirteen years in a chronological order. It provides for the general reader, general information on the most significant events of the military era. The Book is also an easy source of reference.

There are however, a few faults on the cataloguing and presentation of events. First the relationship between one political development and another is not properly explained or linked together to provide a coherent and stimulating story. (See for example, pp 162 and 163, 168 and 169). Similarly, discussion on some events are abruptly terminated in such a way that a person who is not familiar with the event, so described, could easily be confused. Thirdly, emphasis is placed on some events which could have been played down or ignored entirely in preference to the more monumental ones. For instance, the exhaustive list of the names of public officers retired or dismissed by General Mohammed in the great purge of 1975 (pp. 89—129) is not only unnecessary but contributes nothing to the understanding of the history being unfolded. Instead, the

implications of the mass retirement and dismissal, and the peoples' reaction to it could have been given greater attention.

The author could have saved himself from criticisms if he had limited himself to merely providing an anthology of the developments during the thirteen years. By going further to offer some interpretations on the justification for some of the events, the author reveals his lack of understanding of the political economy of neo-colonial Nigeria.

Finally, the last chapter titled "Unique Achievements of the Military Government", merely looks at the introduction and execution of some political and economic measures without showing how they have significantly contributed to the economic and political emancipation of the country. The author, for reasons best known to himself, has completely ignored the shortcomings and the utter failure of the military. No amount of "covering up" could hide the fact that the military regime was an aberration, that the successive military regimes pushed the country further into the Euro-American, exploitative, capitalist economy, that the military mutilated our economy, widened the gap between the poor and rich and significantly contributed to the lack of a meaningful socio-political order in the country.

TOYIN FALOLA

The Challenge : The Memoirs of King Hassan II of Morocco, Anthony Rhodes (Trans.) Macmillan, London, 1978, 250 p. £ 5.95.

The Challenge is yet another addition to royal autobiographies. Its publication at this juncture is significant, as the author's war against the POLISARIO in Sahara is leading nowhere and as more and more countries are according recognition to the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic. He needs the attention and sympathy of the world in what he is doing in his country and in Sahara. But it is doubtful if *The Challenge* is the right step in that direction.

The book interestingly opens with two quotations; the first from the Quran and the second from Machiavelli. They neatly sum up the personality of the King, whose claim to kingship is based on his descent from the Prophet; and yet who seriously applied himself to learning the art of kingship when he wrote a doctoral dissertation on Machiavelli's *The Prince*. [An achievement nowhere mentioned in the Memoirs]:

The Memoirs are divided into three parts. Book one deals with the period of protectorate, when Morocco was divided into the French Protectorate, the Spanish Protectorate and the International Zone of Tangier. The Moroccan King, Sidi Mohammed V, Hassan's father, was in an unenviable position of ruling his country under a multiple domi-

nation. King Hassan has faithfully depicted the struggle of his father who united his people under the banner of *Istiqlal*, a national liberation movement and led them to independence.

In 1961, Sidi Muhammed V died and Hassan succeeded him. Book Two deals with the country and people of Morocco under Hassan. In this book, the King writes at length about the frontiers, demographic growth, education, agriculture, Five-Year Development Plans and so on. It is a long, dull narration which gets bogged down under a lot of facts, figures and tables. At times, the King offers his own philosophy on various themes. On Moroccan nationalism he says: "Deep in the innermost being of our people, patriotism is closely linked with the firm belief in those spiritual forces without which man would be little more than an automaton. This is not to say that patriotic feeling is stronger in Morocco than elsewhere, but simply that it exists." (p. 86) On education, he says, "The first education, the most solid and lasting, starts in the family and not on the school benches," (p. 104) and "we have repeated to those who have passed through our schools and universities that if a diploma is the sign of learning and quality in a young citizen, it is not an end in

itself; it is a means." (p. 106) On tourism: "We do not regard tourism as the art of extracting as much money as possible from the foreigner in the shortest possible time. It is the art of receiving a guest according to the Moroccan tradition...." (p. 126) These are mediocre observations, to say the least. Also, throughout the narration, he does not touch upon the political life in the country. The concepts like political process, participation or representation are almost never mentioned.

That is probably because in Book Three, he writes about the kingship which to him is the most important political fact in Morocco. Book Three is the most readable part of the Memoirs and quite amusing at times. After tracing the history of his family right back to Prophet Muhammed, the King asserts the principle of absolute monarchy and sympathizes with the constitutional monarchs in other places. "They appear in magnificent ceremonies; whose brilliance surprises some people all the more because it masks a fiction. They feel they are watching a splendid theatrical production of monarchy...May God preserve me from giving offence! Each country adopts a style of life in keeping with its aspirations and national needs. Morocco however cannot afford to indulge in such fictional magnificance." (P. 140) The

King then goes on to recount the attempts on his life and comes to a startling conclusion, "I have often read in the foreign press statements such as the following: 'By an extraordinary stroke of luck, the King of Morocco...'; or 'Hassan II, by an incredible fluke...', etc. The Moroccan people do not talk about luck or flukes. They believe quite simply—and they say so—that the Most High had seen fit to put us to the test and then, when all seemed lost, to save us. I hope that I have shown now much this faithful people deserve a king who is prepared to face the risks of his calling" (pp. 154-5).

The most interesting chapter in Book Three is the one entitled "The Green March and the Sahara Regained", in which the King describes the march of Moroccan volunteers that he led into the Sahara in October 1975. The chapter gives an insight into the massive preparations that were made beginning with the registration centres for the volunteers to the transport by thousands of lorries, thousands of tons of food, water, fuel, arms, ammunition and so on. The number of marchers was fixed at 350,000 because "350,000 is the annual number of births in Morocco." (p. 157) Then, he tells us why it was called the Green March. The Prophet had fought *jihads* under the green standard, and so, the name Green March would impart "an

impression of gravity and enthusiasm, and be a ceremony both patriotic and spiritual..." (p. 157) However, even after comparing his futile venture to the Prophet's conquests, he does not feel satisfied and goes right on and compares it with Mao Tse-tung's Long March as well!

The book is mostly a dull reading, amusing in parts. It is liberally sprinkled with quotations from all kinds of sources

including the Quran, Mohammed the Prophet, Montesquieu, Pierre de Coubertin, Rene Clair, Machiavelli and so on. The picture that emerges from the autobiography is that of a man of limited vision and mediocre intellect; a man who takes his vocation seriously but not confidently; a man who is constantly trying to relate himself to the world around him and does not really succeed.

GULSHAN DHANANI

Q8373

13

27 OCT 1961